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Private Keys Stolen Within Hours From Heartbleed OpenSSL Site
Billly Gates (198444) writes "It was reported when heartbleed was discovered that only passwords would be at risk and private keys were still safe. Not anymore. Cloudfare launched the heartbleed challenge on a new server with the openSSL vulnerability and offered a prize to whoever could gain the private keys. Within hours several researchers and a hacker got in and got the private signing keys. Expect many forged certificates and other login attempts to banks and other popular websites in the coming weeks unless the browser makers and CA's revoke all the old keys and certificates."
the user of the keys should do this. Would you want to pay for new certs even if you were not affected by heartbleed?
Be aware that even the root CA certificates can be at risk right now, and that can really cause problems.
If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.
For all practical purposes, https is dead. There is no way browsers will carry around the hundreds of thousands of possibly-stolen-so-unsafe certificates fingerprints (to consider these tainted/revoked). The only way forward is probably to move away to an incompatible protocol. And if possible, cure some of the X509 wrong ways.
I do have to wonder if the task was made easier given the purpose of the server. After all, I'd think it wouldn't get traffic at all except for those people responding to the challenge. But, still, this proved it's possible.
So not only do those of us responsible for web servers need to generate new server certs for all of our servers... pretty much every current web server cert in existence also needs to be revoked. Are the CAs even willing/able to do something on that scale in a short amount of time?
#DeleteChrome
Interestingly enough, my browser (firefox) doesn't let me access https://www.cloudflarechallenge.com/, complaining about the security certificate...?
Until they revoke all potentially compromised CA's and roll out a brand new set I don't see how they can consider the breach closed even if the vuln itself is fixed.
Time to reboot the internets!
Oh, and BTW, slightly off topic, but can I have a checkbox on my tax return so I can select where I want my tax money to go?
Thank you.
Like the comment title said.
Most sites don't have PFS enabled, and that means anyone who has recorded a site's traffic prior to the publication of the bug only needs a short time to get the key and can then decrypt all recorded sessions. The Heartbleed exploit doesn't just jeopardize the data that is currently flowing through OpenSSL while the attacker is reading server memory through malicious heartbeat requests. If you used a vulnerable server via a public Wifi hotspot in the past two years and someone else recorded your session, then your data is potentially readable. No certificate revocation can fix that. The longer vulnerable servers have been kept online after the disclosure, the more attackers had a chance to get private server keys. These private keys compromise recorded traffic and they enable attackers to pose as the server in the future, because certificate revocation is utterly broken. Keeping vulnerable servers running for any amount of time was reckless.
IMHO browsers should treat all existing certificates as untrusted. All certificate authorities should renew their root CA certificates and have old certificates removed from client software. The system is broken, but without making sure that all potentially compromised certificates are made unusable, many server admins will just keep using old certificates, and then there's no reason to trust SSL at all.
And enable PFS, FFS!
Seriously, how out-of-touch can you get? That the X.509 global certificate system has been fundamentally compromised has been well-known for quire a few years to everybody that follows the news at least in a cursory fashion.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
Like this would come as a surprise?
Like heartbleed in itself is a surprise? For every major zero day like this out from the dark there is ten more in the forest.
General people just have no clue. Most organizations have no clue. Media have no clue. Just people in the dark know.
Anyone working in the industry would know better than to trust anything online or supposedly safe.
Secret stuff fares far better offline or in general "snail-mail", than online.
No software is safe, ever has been or ever will be.
The chain of trust for your program scope (hw, em-radiation, firmware, os etc) is just too big to consider safe at large.
Fuck.
(Except here in the UK, we are more creative with our profanity.)
The vast majority of the world won't know about certificates, won't know what OSSL is, and even if it was explained to them in the most funniest, interesting and captivating of methods they would switch off and still not be curious while they fill out their lottery forms and moan about the weather, taxes, government and many other things that they prioritize.
They won't know or care no matter the effort to make them.
Well yeah, considering the severity and size of attack vector. I'm sure the NSA are having a field day over at HQ, too (Hi, BTW).
Until people start saying 'This is all lies, prove it! Right now! In front of me! Oh look it didn't happen and OpenSSL is fixed now anyway." they will believe all the spoon-feeding of crap that Microsoft and its allies are dishing out to turn XP owners away from Linux, Chromebook's, Mac's, etc and only buy Microsoft. This is going to go on for weeks and weeks with newer and more unbelievable stories. And the gullible will believe. Pity.
I'm telling you, as long as you believe all of this hot air, this is what is going to happen. Disbelieve now, do yourselves a favor and cut the rot out before it can grow any more. Keep this stuff at arms length where it can do no unverifiable harm.
There are a couple tools available at:
https://github.com/Lekensteyn/...
It's python based so YMMV
They will tell you if you are vulnerable (See the README.md file)
NSA has the keys to the kingdom
They have access to the CA's
They have access to RSA's keys.
This was in the news years ago. Why the sudden panic now?
Coverity is a static analysis tool. It was tested on the source code with the Heartbleed vulnerability and did not find it. The developers of Coverity made a proof-of-concept modification to treat variables as tainted if they're subjected to endianess conversion, based on the assumption that such variables contain external and thus potentially hostile data. With this modification, Coverity finds the Heartbleed bug, as described in this blog post. Note the comment below the screenshot: "As you might guess, additional locations in OpenSSL are also flagged by this analysis, but it isn’t my place to share those here." This may just be a consequence of not detecting all ways in which a tainted variable is sanitized, or it may point to more problems.
Running Firefox 28 on Win7, it said the cert was revoked.
Bully!
samzenpus and Billly Gates this article is nothing more than a troll by a pair of assholes.
And its assholes like these who caused me to change my /. password and throw it away 2 years ago.
And slashdot's relation to think geek is why I stopped shopping there.
The announcement and fix have been "out" for 6 days. Last Monday it hit the fan, and the world went crazy. I recovered some data from when two hard disk platters went from 32 bad blocks to 57 bad blocks to 269 bad blocks to 643 bad blocks in two days. Then I checked and I was running OpenSSL1.0.1e, and being vulnerable, grabbed 1.0.1f and updated about 10 more software packages. With all the md5 checksums, downloading extras that some of the newer packages needed, rebuilding my build scripts and testing....took another day. So mine has been fixed since Wednesday. Now its Sunday, and I'm still hearing about this. Its true that OpenSSL has over 433000 lines of source of which about 70% is C, and because its non-trivial, auditing it is hard. The guy who added the heartbeat extension also added it in RFC6520 for the Internet Engineering Task Force. He missed counting the incoming packet size and returning a packet of the same size. So did the guy (also with PhD in CS) who reviewed it. And the yelping goes on. Why oh why after this many days, are people not downloading and fixing already? Its been 6 days. Yes the two made a mistake. Those that have not applied the fix by late Tuesday, have made an even bigger one.
What the heck, Slashdot? I read about this yesterday somewhere else. Has Slashdot become irrelevant? /don't answer that
"private-keys-stolen-within-hours-from-heartbleed-openssl-site"
"Stolen" is a word that has a meaning.
If someone says look here and try to get my keys, "stolen" is the wrong word.
How do I become a trusted root certificate authority ?
You wave a large amount of money under the noses of browser vendors to get your root certificate added.
Preferably you should also look like you know what you are doing and probably have some ISO numbers after your company name.
What if the NSA has hacked sites like sourceforge, github, or whatever, what if they were able to compromise code on all these sites by gaining root level access or through another method.
What if nothing can be trusted?
"If any question why we died, Tell them because our fathers lied."
http://it-beta.slashdot.org/story/14/04/13/0357256/obama-says-he-may-or-may-not-let-the-nsa-exploit-the-next-heartbleed
most of them require a bit more than a large amount of money and/or ISO certification. They usually also require certain security measures are in place to protect the CA, like the Root CA being offline (i.e. not connected to the internet) and independent security evaluations done on their systems.
How do I become a trusted root certificate authority ?
You ask the browser vendors, who respond by asking some very pointed questions about how trusted you are. These sorts of questions include "do you have regular audits to ensure that you're managing your keys correctly?" and "what policies do you have in place for dealing with a security breach that compromises one of the keys you've signed?" Convince enough people that you're really trustworthy, and congratulations, you're a root CA. At least until the next time they ask those questions. It's only really recommended that you seek to become a root CA if you really like acting bureaucratically.
You can also become a root CA for a particular browser by just installing a self-signed certificate in its list of trust roots. This is disappointingly common, and often a marker of an untrustworthy organisation, as the main reason for doing this is to enable SSL sniffing. Not recommended at all (and totally does not make your site trustworthy to anyone else, which is the usual point of having HTTPS set up). It does work better for specialist applications.
Becoming a non-root CA is much easier. Just pay another CA enough money (or know the right people).
"Little does he know, but there is no 'I' in 'Idiot'!"
This is getting outrageous. It really is. From storage of pin numbers to now root keys being at risk. This more or less is a confidence killer for internet based commerce regardless of the patches in place.
IE has had cert revocation checking turned on by default all the way back to IE7...