TLS 1.3 Draft Prepares to Drop Static RSA Key Exchange
msm1267 (2804139) writes with a bit of news from last week that seems to have slipped under the radar. The IETF TLS working group has reached consensus on dropping static RSA cipher suites from TLS 1.3, instead requiring the use of Diffie-Hellman Exchange (or the faster ellipitic curve variant). Static DH and not just ephemeral DH key exchange will be supported, so not all connections will have forward secrecy. The consensus is subject to change before the final TLS 1.3 specification is released, and there are still details to be worked out. The changes to the draft are pending as a git pull request.
I've wondered why there isn't a protocol similar to what was used in SSH 1.x, where every x amount of time (default was ten minutes), there was a set of RSA keys generated and kept in memory, used for transactions (and signed with the permanent set of keys), then tossed.
In theory, PFS should be the core of TLS... negotiate the protocol, use DH or the elliptic curve variant to hammer out a session key, re-negotiate the session key every so often, and in any case, toss the session key for good. Having a temporary set of RSA keys similar to SSH 1.x provides protection because it make the permanent host keys essentially signing keys only, not used for encryption, so less data would be encrypted by those keys.
In other news, OpenSSL gets a 4-year-old flaw patched. The catch here is that the bug was not only 4 years in the codebase, but it was publicly reported (CVE-2010-5298) for 4 years, without no one taking the responsibility to fix it.
OpenBSD developer Ted Unangst made a detailed report of the bug. It's not as severe as Heartbleed, but still allows remote attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and parsing error) via an SSL connection in a multithreaded environment.
There are some things you want to share, and there are some things you don't want to share, which are called "private". And there are people in other countries who want to hurt you, who are called "terrorists". There's a part of the government called the NSA that looks at other people's private things in order to stop terrorists from hurting you. But some people don't like strange people looking at their private things.
Sometimes you want to share your private things with other people you trust. One of the ways to make sure nobody else can see your private things is to use encryption. Encryption does complicated math problems on your private things. If something is encrypted, only the person you're sharing it with can see it because other people watching your Internet connection won't be able to solve the math problems. This involves another math problem called a "key exchange". A piece of software on your computer called a "crypto library" does encryption and key exchanges.
What happened here is that some people think RSA, a company that makes key exchanges, was working with the NSA to help it look at your private things. And someone found a different solution to RSA's key exchange. That's why people who make a popular crypto library want to stop using RSA's key exchange.
Are you purposely, or ignorantly, confusing RSA, the company, with RSA, the assymetric cipher suite based on primes?
Religion is what happens when nature strikes and groupthink goes wrong.
Oh my god, where are your parents?