US Navy Develops World's Worst E-reader

First time accepted submitter Dimetrodon (2714071) writes "It is an unspoken rule of military procurement that any IT or communications technology will invariably be years behind what is commercially available or technically hobbled to ensure security. One case in point is the uncomfortably backronymed NeRD, or Navy e-Reader Device, an electronic book so secure the 300 titles it holds can never be updated. Ever."

Comments

In the navy

[Anonymous Coward]

security > usability

No sir, that's just my Kindle. I didn't load classified files on to it, I swear!

What? Our secret base was compromised because Private Biff's iPad, which tracked everywhere we went, was stolen by a hooker at the last port?

There's a reason books can't be updated

[hawguy]

It's not like they "forgot" that users might want to add new books, the inability of any updatable storage was a design requirement to prevent it from being used for espionage or as a channel to inadvertently bring malware aboard a ship.

This is to prevent it being used to smuggle secret military data ashore, take illicit photos, introduce computer malware or record covert conversations.

Though it seems that there are so many ways for a person to smuggle a MicroSD card into a secure area that an eReader is probably not a huge concern.

Re:There's a reason books can't be updated

[Richard_at_work]

Getting data onto that MicroSD card would be an issue.

The main reasons for the lockdown on the device is stray EM emissions which can give away a ships position - and that includes peripherals, so no ports. I have no doubt that its cheaper to replace the readers with new ones every year than it is to build in a way to securely updateable.

Re:There's a reason books can't be updated

[jythie]

Heh. This summary strikes me as an example of consumers applying their needs to other industries. Here we have a device that is built for a specific but niche use case. Some people are reacting with the idea that as average consumers it does not meet their needs very well therefor it is useless or inferior.

makes sense

[Anonymous Coward]

"The company has already delivered similar gadgets to members of the US Army and other military personnel.
The brainchild of the Navy's General Library Program, the electronic ink Kindle-alike has no internet capability, no removable storage, no camera and no way to add or delete content. This is to prevent it being used to smuggle secret military data ashore, take illicit photos, introduce computer malware or record covert conversations."

Actually makes sense to me.....

Better Headline

[Chillas]

"Navy Invents E-reader that is Secure, Meets its Needs; Hated By People Who Will Never See or Use It"

Re:Better Headline

[sootman]

Next on Slashdot: "Army tanks are uncomfortable, get horrible mileage."

Very bad summary title

[davidwr]

This is not the "Worst" e-Reader ever.

Why do I say that?

Because it is working as designed.

Frankly, for certain high-security situations this kind of "immutable" device is the only kind of device that would be allowed in. So it's either something like this, or books-on-tape/CD/paper/something else.

For slightly less-but-still-very-secure situations you could allow some type of external read-only, no-processor-chip-onboard "expansion pack" memory so that the book content could be switched out without getting a whole new device. I wouldn't use USB though, as that requires a processor on the stick itself.

Also, I'd make very sure the data format was really "data only" not something that could, in theory, be a vector for "code." This would rule out PDF and PostScript. In other words, it would be pretty limited.

The things you absolutely do not want for this type of device in a high-security environment are:
* Any ability to "run code"
* Any wireless
* Any ability to export data other than through the screen (you can't stop someone from photographing the screen)
* Any ability to "hack" the device without physical access and accessing it in a non-standard way (e.g. with a screwdriver). This means the software must be proven to never do anything "bad" other than "just die, requiring a reboot" if the operator is tricked into giving it even carefully-crafted/designed-to-do-bad-things bad data.

In some cases, you do not want it displaying anything other than what is "whitelisted." This can be done by either only displaying properly-digitally-signed files or, as in this case, by only providing a limited set of files and "sealing" the device.