5-Year-Old Linux Kernel Bug Fixed
rastos1 sends in a report about a significant bug fix for the Linux kernel (CVE-2014-0196).
"'The memory-corruption vulnerability, which was introduced in version 2.6.31-rc3, released no later than 2009, allows unprivileged users to crash or execute malicious code on vulnerable systems, according to the notes accompanying proof-of-concept code available here. The flaw resides in the n_tty_write function controlling the Linux pseudo tty device. 'This is the first serious privilege escalation vulnerability since the perf_events issue (CVE-2013-2049) in April 2013 that is potentially reliably exploitable, is not architecture or configuration dependent, and affects a wide range of Linux kernels (since 2.6.31),' Dan Rosenberg, a senior security researcher at Azimuth Security, told Ars in an e-mail. 'A bug this serious only comes out once every couple years.' ... While the vulnerability can be exploited only by someone with an existing account, the requirement may not be hard to satisfy in hosting facilities that provide shared servers, Rosenberg said."
Linux and Greg K-H have both gone on record saying that security issues are just another type of bug, and don't deserve any type of special treatment.
This is crap. A bug that allows remote code execution or even a DoS is a much, much bigger issues than fixing the user experience or minor stability issues.
When you don't assign the significant to security issues that they deserve, they go unpatched for 5 years.
It's kind of a concern.
If you ignore ACs because they are anonymous - you're an idiot.
a "doe snot crash" sounds pretty bad to me. Just sayin'. Do you have deer hanging around your computer?
The problem was well discussed in 2009 here : A tempest in a tty pot https://lwn.net/Articles/34382... The result was that after a heated debate, Alan Cox was blamed for allowing old code to stay because emacs would loose terminal output and Greg KH was simmoned to stepup as the TTY maintainer. The new TTY/PTY guys became James Simmons, the Frame-buffer guy and C. Scott Ananian, the former jack-of-all-trades for the One Laptop per Child Foundation. Curious enough it were not Linux server systems like RedHat Enterprise who have been vulnerable for almost 5 years, but the popular Linux desktop distro's like Ubuntu.
I read through the POC, it seemed safe enough to play with, so I've tried it out on a few different servers here (CentOS & Debian Stable). On the CentOS boxes it dies before it even gets started trying to overflow into a tty, and on my Debian machine it's been going for 5 minutes (using up to 90% CPU, but still leaving the machine quite usable), and still hasn't got anywhere.
This isn't quite the "instant ROOT ACCESS!" privilege escalation that scares keeps sysadmins up at night. (unless I'm missing something...)
As something like this would be impossible with the driver executing in an isolated process. Memory corruption would still be possible of course (unless the driver was written in a secure language) but it would be local.
Openbsd defines any potential security issue as a bug. Emphasis potential. The interesting actual exploits these days are sometimes 15 unexploitable glitches strung together.
The Linux kernel is oriented towards supporting all the cutting edge hardware. This is not going to make security very practical. Openbsd is, ah, stodgy. But what openbsd brags on is "no remote holes in the default install" not "no local exploits".
I think that Linus cannot fix this sort of issue. Theo could take lessons from Linus on nasty around systemd but Linus has not been consistently nasty and I think it too late.
Send Theo money.