Do Embedded Systems Need a Time To Die?

chicksdaddy writes: "Dan Geer, the CISO of In-Q-Tel, has proposed giving embedded devices such as industrial control and SCADA systems a scheduled end-of-life in order to manage a future in which hundreds of billions of them will populate every corner of our personal, professional and lived environments. Individually, these devices may not be particularly valuable. But, together, IoT systems are tremendously powerful and capable of causing tremendous social disruption. 'Is all the technologic dependency, and the data that fuels it, making us more resilient or more fragile?' he wondered. Geer noted the appearance of malware like TheMoon, which spreads between vulnerable home routers, as one example of how a population of vulnerable, unpatchable embedded devices might be cobbled into a force of mass disruption. Geer proposes a novel solution: embedded systems that do not have a means of being (securely) managed and updated remotely should be configured with some kind of 'end of life,' past which they will cease to operate. Allowing embedded systems to 'die' will remove a population of remote and insecure devices from the Internet ecosystem and prevent those devices from falling into the hands of cyber criminals or other malicious actors, Geer argued."

Comments

Dan Geer, the CISO of In-Q-Tel,

[wiredog]

In-Q-Tel

The IQT Mission

We identify, adapt, and deliver innovative technology solutions to support the missions of the Central Intelligence Agency and broader U.S. Intelligence Community.

Here's a better idea

[msobkow]

Here's a better idea. Charge anyone who ships unpatchable and unpatched hardware with sponsoring terrorism, because it's their laziness causing the problem.

Why the hell should I be forced to buy, buy, and rebuy the same god damned hardware over and over to save them from patching their shitty systems that they sell?

Sympathy, but no go

[gnalre]

As someone who has to support legacy systems, there is nothing more I would like to see old embedded systems die (and in some cases, incinerated and the embers crushed into the ground).

But we have to be realistic.

The main effort in systems like SCADA is the commissioning time required. You cannot just rip out a system, plug in a new box and expect everything to work as before.

Secondly who pays for this? The customer will not be happy if we say every 5 years we say you have to close your factory down for 2 weeks while we rip out all your old boxes and replace with new ones.

Finally what is the guarantee that the new box has not introduced a new security hole?

The real solution is the segmentation of the security and application code. Use Trusted boot technologies to verify the running code and ring fence the code with your security management application. Then if a new threat is introduced you only need to update the security app, leaving the hardware and application untouched.

Unfortunately at present industrial application either have no security or are very closely coupled meaning that updates are difficult and costly.