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U.S. Drone Attack Strategy Against Al-Qaeda May Be Wrong
An anonymous reader writes "A new study (abstract) in the journal Informational Security evaluates the U.S. military's strategy for killing off al-Qaeda's leadership using remote drone strikes. The study argues that the strategy is ineffective, calling into question both the military's rationale for doing so and the allocation of defense funds to run it. Essentially, there are two different types of terrorist organizations: those held together by a small number of charismatic leaders, and those who have developed their own bureaucracy, almost like a business. 'Companies don't fall apart when they lose their CEO or CFO; other people are being trained to do that job and there are institutional mechanisms preserving the knowledge the CEO brought to the table. Also, rules create clear lines of succession, so destabilizing struggles over who gets to take over the group's leadership become less likely.'
Intelligence on al-Qaeda indicates it's more of a bureaucratic group — unsurprising, since terrorist organizations that have been around for a while tend to evolve that way. Since the drone attacks started, there has been no significant correlation between successful strikes and a reduction in al-Qaeda attacks. 'The case for the drone program, at its heart, is that killing significant numbers of underlings AND a small number of high-level leaders is severely weakening the group's operating ability. Jordan's study suggests that al-Qaeda just isn't the kind of group that can be beaten that way.'"
Intelligence on al-Qaeda indicates it's more of a bureaucratic group — unsurprising, since terrorist organizations that have been around for a while tend to evolve that way. Since the drone attacks started, there has been no significant correlation between successful strikes and a reduction in al-Qaeda attacks. 'The case for the drone program, at its heart, is that killing significant numbers of underlings AND a small number of high-level leaders is severely weakening the group's operating ability. Jordan's study suggests that al-Qaeda just isn't the kind of group that can be beaten that way.'"
Very good articulated and supported point which is valid, however, the targeting is no longer the guys with an idea. Meaning, 5 years ago you'd have targeted the emplacers (the guy with a shovel, or in your analogy, an idea). With time, the lesson was learned the effect was small and it is relatively ineffective. Now, you go up the chain and after those who enable others to become more effective. Let me give an example, let's say AQ has three targets in the US: A general officer, a private and an NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer).
Taking out the General is symbolic but has very little impact on the effectivness of the US Army. If you take out a private, there are 10-20 others identically trained and with similar levels of proficiency. However, the NCO leads several squads. The NCO is a trainer, mentor, coach, knowledge manager and adult babysitter.
Taking the NCO out has a real effect on the battlefield as General Officer orders may not get correctly implemented, new troops may not come up to speed (read: battle effective) as fast, etc.
So, the best target for having an effect on battle is the NCO. The US and NATO are not after the General or the Privates... yes if there's a target of opportunity, a real threat, and the RoE/LoAC allows, a shot is taken, but the active targeting is at the NCO level. I wish I could be more specific but I won't. Just as most of what you read in mainstream or see in the movies about computers, technology, etc is wrong, so is the supposed, "wanton carnage from UAVs bombing everyone." I spent 3 years watching hundreds of strikes and you couldn't even apply most of what I read here to the exceptions, much less the "norm." People read a few articles and suddenly are experts on tactical military operations 1/2 way around the world (ignoring the few who incorrectly refer to it as "strategic bombing").