India's National Informatics Centre Forged Google SSL Certificates
NotInHere (3654617) writes As Google writes on its Online Security Blog, the National Informatics Centre of India (NIC) used its intermediate CA certificate, issued by Indian CCA, to issue several unauthorized certificates for Google domains, allowing it to do Man in the middle attacks. Possible impact however is limited, as, according to Google, the root certificates for the CA were only installed on Windows, which Firefox doesn't use — and for the Chrom{e,ium} browser, the CA for important Google domains is pinned to the Google CA. According to its website, the NIC CA has suspended certificate issuance, and according to Google, its root certificates were revoked by Indian CCA.
Will there be any repercussions for this?
The National Informatics Centre of India did abuse something.
Will the National Informatics Centre of India be able to continue with such abuses and do this again in the future?
Or will they lose this ability?
What will happen now?
They have shown that they can not be trusted. They must lose the power to do this.
Pull someones certificates or kill some CA. Someone needs to suffer because of this.
The NSA?
Why is Snark Required?
The whole point of issuing certs is to be a trusted third party. No one is going accept a cert from them again. They should know better.
So SSL is nothing more than an honor system? Fuck that. Security , such as it was, is utterly fucked now that any tin-pot government quango can start intercepting.
The whole world is filled with people with dubious ethics. Some regions just have slightly more effective means of controlling them.
This is not a problem with Firefox, SeaMonkey, or other Mozilla-based applications. They use a certificate database separate from Microsoft's, a database that does not contain the certificate used in the forgery.
The certification authority at fault (NIC) has an open request to have its root certificate added to Mozilla's database. However, NIC has failed to respond to requests for further information, requested over a year ago by the Mozilla person who is in charge of the process of approving certificates. Furthermore, Mozilla persons -- both staff and users -- are aware of NIC's problem; some have suggested that NIC's request be rejected and NIC be permanently banned from the database.
To see the discussion, see https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/s....
Some certification authorities and some of their subscribers complain that Mozilla takes too long to approve root certificates and then to add those certificates to Mozilla's database. At least in this case, delay served to protect users. The delays are significantly caused by Mozilla's requirement for independent audit reports and for a period of public review and comment on each request. Hooray for Mozilla!!