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The "Rickmote Controller" Can Hijack Any Google Chromecast

redletterdave writes Dan Petro, a security analyst for the Bishop Fox IT consulting firm, built a proof of concept device that's able to hack into any Google Chromecasts nearby to project Rick Astley's "Never Gonna Give You Up," or any other video a prankster might choose. The "Rickmote," which is built on top of the $35 Raspberry Pi single board computer, finds a local Chromecast device, boots it off the network, and then takes over the screen with multimedia of one's choosing. But it gets worse for the victims: If the hacker leaves the range of the device, there's no way to regain control of the Chromecast. Unfortunately for Google, this is a rather serious issue with the Chromecast device that's not too easy to fix, as the configuration process is an essential part of the Chromecast experience.

4 of 131 comments (clear)

  1. Nowhere in TFA by OverlordQ · · Score: 3, Insightful

    If the hacker leaves the range of the device, there’s no way to regain control of the Chromecast

    Nowhere in TFA does it say why a Factory Data Reset wont fix that.

    --
    Your hair look like poop, Bob! - Wanker.
  2. Re:Better version of TFA by NoNonAlphaCharsHere · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Gosh, I wonder what item on YouTube THAT could point to...

  3. Note to Google Users: by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1, Insightful

    If Google can "remotely configure" your device, then so can someone else if they're determined enough.

    Duh.

  4. Re:Secure pairing is hard by Miamicanes · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Canonical Diffie-Hellman is vulnerable to MITM attacks when both parties are mutually-anonymous. There are ways to reduce the risk, but at the end of the day, unless at least one party knows who it's supposed to be talking to & can independently verify the other party's identity and the integrity of key-exchange traffic supposedly taking place with it, you can never know for sure that you aren't having a securely-encrypted conversation with an attacker.

    AFAIK, there's no currently known way to achieve 100% mutually-anonymous key exchange that isn't also vulnerable to MITM. Every few months, someone proposes one, and someone like Schiener usually takes one look at it and casually mentions a half-dozen ways it can be defeated in between sips of coffee.