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Ask Slashdot: Open Hardware/Software-Based Security Token?
Qbertino (265505) writes I've been musing about a security setup to allow my coworkers/users access to files from the outside. I want security to be a little safer than pure key- or password-based SSH access, and some super-expensive RSA Token setup is out of question. I've been wondering whether there are any feasible and working FOSS and open hardware-based security token generator projects out there. It'd be best with ready-made server-side scripts/daemons. Perhaps something Arduino or Raspberry Pi based? Has anybody tried something like this? What are your experiences? What do you use? How would you attempt an open hardware FOSS solution to this problem?
www.yubico.com ... not quite FOSS but its your ticket....
You can set up 2nd factor using SMS pretty easily, and have it text you a second password that's good for five minutes.
Definitely the cheapest option.
If you make your own token with an arduino and an LCD and a real time clock and a battery you've already paid for the RSA tokens.
=Rich
Yubikey is a USB OTP generator, it can be integrated quite easily and it has ssh and a little fast dig up I found this link about yubikey and openvpn..
http://www.yubico.com/applicat...
http://forum.yubico.com/viewto...
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My organization uses 2FA with a standard that's compatible with Google Authenticator and a Yubikey (OATH: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I... and http://www.nongnu.org/oath-too...). People with smartphones could use Google Authenticator to obtain auth tokens; an inexpensive ($25 per person) yubikey provides a very easy way to enter tokens without much hassle; and the open-source oathtool can generate tokens for other uses (i.e. add a "paper" authentication device with a long list of sequential tokens).
For software tokens, Google Authenticator has apps for Android, iOS, and BlackBerry. They implement the TOTP standard, so any compatible code-generating software (such as the J2ME app I have on my non-smartphone) will work with it.
They also have a PAM module that works with SSH (or anything else that uses PAM). I've used it before, and it works great.
For reference, neither the apps nor the PAM module depend in any way on Google services, they don't send any data to Google, and will work perfectly happily in a totally offline environment (assuming all the servers and client apps have synchronized clocks).
> For fans of software scheme: you must tell how your soft tokens resist attack by malware.
A solution doesn't have to be a panacea for all attacks. A soft token could be on your phone, assuming you do not also use the phone to directly access the service, that is pretty decent protection. I would consider needing to also find and gain access to your phone, in addition to whatever access they may otherwise be able to get, as a pretty decent addition to the resistence.
> Remember that to get pay-tv signals, folks were willing and able to design special ICs.
Remember that people were willing to pay for those ICs to decode signals they already otherwise had access to, meaning there was a rather large potential market for those ICs before they were produced, especially since it is decently hard to justify how you are doing anything wrong by simply recieving and manipulating a signal...you aren't even stealing a service, you are just, not using their descrabling service, just providing your own instead; for a signal you could already recieve.....
"I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
All true and yet, I don't see how any of that matters. The point of using the phone is it is something you have, and its not tied to the device you are connecting with. Yes, you may lose the phone more often, BUT...that just means you replace the phone and reload the software with a new key....BFD.
Stealing your phone doesn't reveal what systems you would connect to. Getting access to your laptop, doesn't provide the authentication token. Its about using two factors that are not tied to eachother in a way that a remote attacker can discern that improves the security of such a system.
which is why I strongly disagree that an app on the laptop is better.... because an app on the laptop is on the laptop, one device which connects to it all. Or another way to think of it...where is the safest place for the key to your safe.... in an unmarked envelope in your house....or in an unmarked envelope at your friend's house?
Even if your friend's house is less secure than your own, its still the better place because.... there is no way for the attacker to make the association needed to find it....even if it is your friend's house that he robs, even if he finds the key there!
Sure its not protection from specific kinds of attackers, but, if your security measures need to stand up to NSA levels of scrutiny, I have no problem declaring your requirements out of scope for this level of discussion, and far beyond most people who could benefit from simple tokens.
"I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"