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Google Will Give a Search Edge To Websites That Use Encryption
As TechCrunch reports, Google will begin using website encryption, or HTTPS, as a ranking signal – a move which should prompt website developers who have dragged their heels on increased security measures, or who debated whether their website was “important” enough to require encryption, to make a change. Initially, HTTPS will only be a lightweight signal, affecting fewer than 1% of global queries, says Google. ... Over time, however, encryption’s effect on search ranking [may] strengthen, as the company places more importance on website security. ... While HTTPS and site encryption have been a best practice in the security community for years, the revelation that the NSA has been tapping the cables, so to speak, to mine user information directly has prompted many technology companies to consider increasing their own security measures, too. Yahoo, for example, also announced in November its plans to encrypt its data center traffic.
That's a really great step from Google, I had never thought that it can be done in such a neat way. What's next? Can they also do it for IPv6?
I'm not convinced that this is a good precedent. Sure, they're encouraging sites to use HTTPS today... but what about tomorrow?
Speculation: Websites that block competing search engines from indexing their content may rank higher in Google searches? Websites that process payments using Google rank higher in Google search?
I'm not saying that HTTPS is a bad thing... but once they open the door once to arbitrary ranking changes done on a whim, that door can be opened again.
Expensive advertising campaigns engender trust because it shows that the advertiser has the resources to carry out the campaign. It's why online ads are so commonly ignored - people want to do business with "reputable" companies and expensive advertising is a way of establishing repute.
Similarly, putting out the modicum of effort to perform basic security like SSL is a signal that the website is reputable. I mean, if you can't be bothered to buy a $50 SSL certificate and install it, are you *really* trustworthy?
SSL should be a basic signal of trustworthiness.
I have no problem with your religion until you decide it's reason to deprive others of the truth.
I have no technical problem switching every website/server I have to SSL but the actual problem is the price of all those SSL certs. Most of my sites are just hobby type sites that I run for my own enjoyment and to benefit others (quite a few "others" I should mention; some of my sites are very popular). However, I don't make any money off these, in fact it already costs me money to run them.
Now you want me to add SSL so that people can still find my relevant and useful information? Well, OK but how the hell am I suppose to pay for it? SSL server certs are expensive. The whole thing is a scam to make the few "official" CA's rich. How about some sort of official public service that can hand out server certs of every registered domain? Every domain should come with an unlimited supply of SSL certs or at least a wildcard cert and a renewal service, free of charge.
The ratio of people to cake is too big
I mean, if you can't be bothered to buy a $50 SSL certificate and install it, are you *really* trustworthy?
It's not only the cost of a certificate, which StartSSL provides without charge to individuals. It's also a dedicated IPv4 address if you want to reach people still using Android 2 or Windows XP. A lot of entry-level hosting packages use name-based virtual hosting, and doing this over name-based virtual hosting requires the TLS stack to support Server Name Indication (SNI). Android Browser didn't gain support for SNI until Honeycomb (3.x) on tablets and ICS (4.0) on phones, and Internet Explorer didn't gain support for SNI until Windows Vista.
That's part of it - a valuable enough part in itself, IMO; at least one UK ISP, TalkTalk, has started duplicating HTTP requests made by their customers: so, if you request http://example.com/stuff on one of their lines, 30 seconds later they'll go and request the same URL themselves for monitoring purposes. Obviously, enabling SSL prevents this kind of gratuitous stupidity - and the previous incarnation of such snooping, Phorm. If enough websites enable SSL, ISPs will no longer have the ability to monitor customer behavior that closely, all they will see are SSL flows to and from IP addresses, and whatever DNS queries you make to their servers, if any. (Use encrypted connections to OpenDNS or similar, and your ISP will only ever see IP addresses and traffic volume - exactly as it should be IMO!)
It's actually a lot more than that. HTTPS isn't just about protecting passwords anymore, not post Snowden.
Let us recall one of the more interesting things we learned about SSL via the NSA leaks: the Five Eyes countries apparently have not broken SSL yet despite that the internet is still not capable of stopping them. The reason is a system they've built called QUANTUM.
QUANTUM is a series of systems that work together. Imagine it like being a giant set of guard towers on the internet backbone. QUANTUM is called that because it's based on deep packet inspection and insertion. The first part is a massive set of DPI devices that trawl unencrypted internet traffic passing through intercept points. These DPI devices can be configured by NSA/GCHQ analysts to look for selectors - personal identifiers like email addresses, IP addresses, cookies and so on. QUANTUM does not run on every internet link and cannot see through encrypted traffic, but that doesn't matter: it's like a searchlight crawling the grounds of a prison at night. It doesn't matter that it can't light up everywhere simultaneously - once tasked it will keep searching until it finds you. Given enough time and good selectors, it will always find you, simply because the average internet user makes many different unencrypted connections to many different websites.
Once QUANTUM locates an un-SSLd traffic stream that matches your selectors, the next step begins, this is called QUANTUM INSERT. You see these DPI devices are not only capable of reading traffic but also injecting packets directly onto the backbone as well. This allows them to race legitimate answers from the real servers, and redirect the victim to an entirely different server (this is probably based on racing DNS lookups although I think the leaked docs were fuzzy on this aspect). These races are called "shots" and interestingly, they don't always succeed - sometimes the NSA is slower than the real server. But QUANTUM keeps trying and eventually you end up connected to this new FOXACID server, which then proceeds to act as an HTTP proxy for the real request and injects an exploit kit. That then pwns your system such that the NSA can now see all your encrypted traffic, along with turning on your microphone and so on.
An observant reader will notice something very important about the above description. The longer you can stay in the SSLd web, the longer it will take for QUANTUM to hack you. That means you directly benefit from a website being SSLd even if all it contains is cat pictures and you don't even log in. Once QUANTUM has figured out your IP address, any non-SSLd HTTP connection is a useful foothold.