Next Android To Enable Local Encryption By Default Too, Says Google

An anonymous reader writes The same day that Apple announced that iOS 8 will encrypt device data with a local code that is not shared with Apple, Google has pointed out that Android already offers the same feature as a user option and that the next version will enable it by default. The announcements by both major cell phone [operating system makers] underscores a new emphasis on privacy in the wake of recent government surveillance revelations in the U.S. At the same time, it leaves unresolved the tension between security and convenience when both companies' devices are configured to upload user content to iCloud and Google+ servers for backup and synchronization across devices, servers and content to which Apple and Google do have access.

Comments

If you believe this

[zeigerpuppy]

You need your head read. Google has shown time and again that it does not care about your security. There is no need to trade off convenience for security in cloud backup. Encrypt locally and send the data encrypted to backup. This would be great but i bet that Google also holds they keys and decrypts on their end. Google says it wouldn't be able to use your data for their massive data mining and information theft machine if it were properly encrypted. This is why the data sits on their servers unprotected by encryption, they are the antithesis of your guardians of security. If you value your data, turn off all Google services and manage your own backups.

Re:If you believe this

[steelfood]

I know everybody talks about encryption, but the word itself is just the tip of security. What's the key size? What's the algorithm? What data is encrpyted? Is it even relevant to talk about local encryption with respect to metadata (which is just as if not more useful to the NSA than the actual data). What about backups? Is it a snapshot of the encrypted contents each time? Or does the backup use a different encryption key, and the data transferred securely? There are so many layers to security (including the user), the "encryption" buzzword is meaningless without full context.

My guess is, Google's not encrypting anything they're really interested in. They're probably not nearly as interested in your pictures or your contact list as say, Facebook. That's data they may currently collect, but ultimately throw away. They're probably more interested in the websites you go to, the links you used followed to get there, the links you followed from that site, the people you actually contact (text, chat, etc.), the geographical location of that person as well as your location, the date and times of your conversations, the contents of your conversations, etc. Local encryption does not apply to any of that data.

In fact, local encryption doesn't even matter much with regards to securing your phone's data. Your phone is probably leaking the encrypted data through one if not more applications. Facebook, Candy Crush, Twitter, etc. largely negate the effects of local encryption. The only thing it will do is keep your private information out of the hands of someone who picked up your lost phone and decided to keep it (or sell it).

Re:If you believe this

[sabri]

I know everybody talks about encryption, but the word itself is just the tip of security.

Rknpgyl gung. "Rapelcgrq" qbrf abg nyjnlf zrna "Frpherq".

Re:If you believe this

[swillden]

You need your head read. Google has shown time and again that it does not care about your security. There is no need to trade off convenience for security in cloud backup. Encrypt locally and send the data encrypted to backup. This would be great but i bet that Google also holds they keys and decrypts on their end. Google says it wouldn't be able to use your data for their massive data mining and information theft machine if it were properly encrypted. This is why the data sits on their servers unprotected by encryption, they are the antithesis of your guardians of security. If you value your data, turn off all Google services and manage your own backups.

There are two different threat models to consider. Device encryption protects against one, but not the other.

The purpose of device encryption is to protect your data from someone who obtains physical possession of it, because it was lost, stolen, confiscated, etc. The goal really isn't so much to protect it from law enforcement or the NSA -- if the NSA is interested in your data, they'll get it, period -- but against people who might want to, for example, steal your bank account information, etc.

Device encryption obviously does nothing to keep your data secret from someone you actively send the data to. If you have Google's backup services enabled on your phone, then it will back up a bunch of stuff. I don't know everything that's backed up, but I think Wifi configuration is, your list of apps are, the list of accounts on your phone, your contacts, and similar. Separately from device backup, you can also have the Google+ app upload your photos and videos automatically, and you can also configure the device to report your location, in various ways and for various services (there are several controls). Whatever you have backed up is (a) not protected by device encryption and (b) cannot be secure from whoever you backed it up to unless you have some sort of encryption key which the holder does not.

It's also clear that anything that is stored by Google and which isn't encrypted with some key not available to Google is also accessible to the US government and local law enforcement, assuming they have the legal right to demand it from Google. Device encryption does not do anything to defend against that. This is all obvious and not in dispute. It also doesn't make device encryption worthless, it just means that it defends against different threat.

Also, I have to say that from my perspective as a security engineer at Google you couldn't be more wrong about Google's concern for user security. Actually, if you look at the company's track record on security technology creation and deployment, I think that point is unarguable. Perhaps what you really meant to say is that Google doesn't care about your privacy, which is different from (but connected to) security. From my perspective, I think that's also wrong. It seems to me that what Google wants to do is to get your permission to make a trade, your data for targeted advertising in exchange for Google's services, and if you don't want that trade, Google wants to enable you to opt out of it (hence all of the opt out tools, privacy dashboard, etc.). Obviously, if Google is not careful to protect users' privacy, no one will be willing to make that trade, so Google is very, very careful.

(Disclaimer: I'm a Google engineer, but I'm speaking for myself, not in an official capacity.)

Re:If you believe this

[swillden]

I know everybody talks about encryption, but the word itself is just the tip of security. What's the key size? What's the algorithm?

It uses Linux dm_crypt. Here's the source code that configures it, and protects the dm_crypt master key: https://android.googlesource.c...

What data is encrpyted?

The /data partition, which holds everything which isn't part of the system image. An easy way to understand the distinction is to note that on unrooted Android devices everything but /data is mounted read-only. So any data that is stored after the device leaves the factory is in /data, and is therefore encrypted, unless it's written to removable media (SD card).

Most of the rest of your post is speculation assuming that Google is intensively mining everything backed up. I'm quite certain that's not true, but I probably shouldn't comment in more detail.

The only thing it will do is keep your private information out of the hands of someone who picked up your lost phone and decided to keep it (or sell it).

Yes, that's what device encryption is for.

(Disclaimer: I'm an Android security engineer. I'm speaking for myself, not for Google.)

Re:If you believe this

[swillden]

Yep. Google addresses it internally by requiring two-factor auth and using Device Policy to enforce pasword, lock timeout, etc. requirements. Oh, and not letting Android devices on the corporate network, only on the partitioned guest network. It is a problem, no argument there.

Really?

[ArcadeMan]

Google has pointed out that Android already offers the same feature as a user option and that the next version will enable it by default.

Why isn't it already the default setting?

Re:Really?

[BarbaraHudson]

Because some of us really don't care if some droid somewhere is poking around in the text massages in our droids.

And anyone stupid enough to take nude selfies, maybe they need to learn that selfies are neither an art nor an art form? Take a lesson from Mother Nature - clouds leak (it's called rain).

I don't encrypt my phone data because I don't see any benefit for my own use, just more hassles. Just like I don't encrypt my on-disk or on-usb-key data. If/when I come into a situation where I need to, I will, but really, so far that hasn't happened.

Re:Really?

[apraetor]

You're right that most user data doesn't *need* to be encrypted, strictly speaking. As for nude selfies and whatnot -- if you don't like them, don't take them; just because you don't like them doesn't mean that people who WANT to take them deserve any less privacy, though. It might be dumb to have them on a device/account that can be so easily cracked, especially if you're a public figure, but that doesn't absolve the hacker of any wrongdoing.. they've still intentionally victimized someone.

Re:Really?

[swillden]

Google has pointed out that Android already offers the same feature as a user option and that the next version will enable it by default.

Why isn't it already the default setting?

(Android Security Team member here... though these are my own perceptions and opinions, not an official statement.)

Two reasons:

First, because it's not completely trivial to make it work correctly, all the time, every time, on hundreds of different devices. Android uses dm_crypt, so the foundation is solid, well-proven code, but that doesn't mean there aren't tricky corner cases. With the huge number and variety of Android devices out there, you can be certain that if there's a way it can go wrong, it will. So, conservatism suggests it's a good idea to make it optional for a while and shake out any issues. It's been optional for three years now, and is in use on many devices (I don't know how many; I'd guess tens of millions, though), so it's time to take the next step.

Second, performance was a problem. Not run-time performance -- AES is really fast -- but the initial encryption required reading and writing many gigabytes so it took a long time just to do that much I/O. Encrypting by default means that either the device has to be encrypted in the factory, which would be a major production bottleneck, or else users would have to wait 20 minutes for their phone/tablet to start up just after they unbox it. That's a bad user experience. For L this was optimized so it only encrypts blocks that are in use. Since on a new device very little of the data partition is in use, very little has to be encrypted. That makes the initial encryption very fast (a few seconds).

There's actually another device encryption-related improvement coming in L. I'd love to describe it in detail since I worked on parts of it, but the article doesn't mention it so I'll hold off.

Re:Really?

[BarbaraHudson]

So many people have learned the hard way that sharing nude pics or a racy video with just ONE person can lead to the whole world having it. As the beer commercial says, "Ex" says it all ...

Quote from a 1950 movie, Born Yesterday:

He always used to say, "Never do nothing you wouldn't want printed on the front page of The New York Times."

It's still good advice today. We're inundated with examples of what can happen. In too many cases, the victim is guilty of contributory negligence, at the very least. Example: "What do you mean, 1-2-3-4-5 isn't a good password?"

Dark Helmet: 1-2-3-4-5? That's the stupidest combination I've ever heard of in my life! That's the kinda thing an idiot would have on his luggage!

Banks have already established that your funds aren't covered if you use a stupid, easy-to-guess PIN.

Re:Really?

[swillden]

Android security team, eh? Are you the guy who thinks that my phone implicitly trusting the Chinese government, Turktrust, et al is perfectly reasonable, while at the same that constantly complaining about my own personally verified CA is "WorkingAsIntended"?

No.

Re:Really?

[WuphonsReach]

The primary reason to password protect and encrypt the phone is to protect against the mundane threat of someone who steals your phone, then tries to leverage that to gain access to your financial accounts or other accounts.

If you travel on any form of public transit, it's a risk. (Pickpockets, muggers, etc.)

Granted, most thieves are only after the phone for its hardware value. But others will dig into the phone and see what sort of personal information they can glean (emails, bank details, list of contacts, passwords) and then try and sell that to identity thieves.

For modern phones, storage encryption has minimal impact on battery life.

Having to enter a 4-10 digit number every time you unlock the phone is a minor hassle. However, there are tricks where you can tell the phone to only lock (after 15 minutes) if it can't see a certain bluetooth / wifi signal.

Re:Don't use a google account with Android.

[Anonymous Coward]

All I see from your comment is that you're also not using the Google spellchecker.

Re:Need to encrypt phone calls

[BradMajors]

Not legal. Under CALEA telephone service providers must enable law enforcement monitoring of calls.

Re:Why bother when Carrier IQ and friends exist ?

[Anonymous Coward]

You're right. Maybe Apple/Google cannot decrypt a phone that has been seized, but they can certainly be compelled by the government to push an OS update that enables a backdoor in a phone that is in active use.

Re:Why bother when Carrier IQ and friends exist ?

[Noah Haders]

what good is a phone when you are unable to speak?

Are they going to fix the bugs?

[wronkiew]

That's great that Google is going to enable device encryption by default. But are they going to fix the usability and security problems for Android L?

If you enable device encryption on Android, you can no longer back up and restore your data over USB or through third party tools. You can create encrypted backups over USB, but you can't restore them because of bugs in the ADB tools. The only way to back up and restore is by uploading your data to Google's cloud servers, where your data is much more likely to be purloined than if you had just left your device unencrypted in the first place.

When you enable encryption, you set a password. The encryption password becomes your lock screen PIN and there is no way to change it. So, which are you going to choose? A secure encryption password that you'll spend 15 seconds entering on the tiny keyboard every time you want to unlock your phone? Or a useable PIN that is trivial to crack if an attacker gets your encrypted data?

It's clear someone added device encryption to Android to check it off the list and didn't intend for anyone to use it. I hope their product team realizes this before they bring it to a wider audience.

Re:Are they going to fix the bugs?

[AmiMoJo]

I have a Nexus 5 with a long boot time encryption password and a shorter unlock pin. Seems it was already fixed.

Re:Are they going to fix the bugs?

[zlogic]

The encryption password becomes your lock screen PIN and there is no way to change it.

Wrong, the encryption password has to be entered when booting the phone only. It's even different screen (ugly Android 1.6-style buttons painted black).
I have a device with corporate policies enforced and have 3 codes to enter:
- Encryption password
- SIM PIN
- Lock PIN.
When device becomes locked after inactivity, I only need to use the lock PIN.

Re:Are they going to fix the bugs?

[wronkiew]

I'd be interested to know how that was done.

The cryptfs password/lock PIN issue is an open bug reported here.

Re:Why bother when Carrier IQ and friends exist ?

[Somebody Is Using My]

Do Android phones automatically update to the latest version? iPhones do not, as far as I am aware, and require the user to manually initiate the download and installation of the newest iOS firmware; this - of course - requires the user to be logged in already, at which point the data is accessible anyway.

In other words, it sounds like this proposed vulnerability involves you being on the other side of the airlock hatchway already.

show stopper

[multi io]

The device encryption feature is apparently designed to always use the lock screen password. So you're forced to have such a password, which you have to enter every time the device comes out of sleep mode, AND (much worse) it breaks essential apps like SkipLock that want to disable the lock screen under certain conditions, e.g. when you're within range of a known WiFi network, thereby relieving you of the need to enter your PIN about 5,000 times a day while you're sitting on your couch at home.

See also https://code.google.com/p/andr...

Unfortunately, this is a total show stopper for full device encryption.

Re:show stopper

[swillden]

I probably shouldn't go into too much detail but, yes, the Android team has thought about and addressed that issue with L.

Re:show stopper

[Geeky]

I've seen talk of automatically unlocking when connected to specific bluetooth devices or by location (which looks like it might require GPS?). That's handy, but I haven't seen anything about specific wifi networks. I don't want GPS running all the time because of the battery drain, but would like my phone unlocked on my home wifi. Preferably out of the box without needing a third party app that wants all sorts of permissions.

Off topic, but for me the biggest issue with (non-rooted) Android is the permissions model that forces all or nothing acceptance for permissions. I want certain apps, but want to refuse them access to, say, SMS messages. I can't do that. The permissions manager feature appeared briefly in, I think 4.3, but then disappeared. That alone is the thing that has me considering jumping ship to Apple.

Re:Good

[praxis]

and when user's complain their battery lasts much shorter as the CPU is busy encrypting and decrypting constantly, then they'll switch the default back... and when user's complain that they flip flop too much, they'll make it a giant setup screen option where new user's can complain about which option is on top.

iOS has encrypted most of its data most of the time already and iOS has not had significantly worse battery life than Android in the past. What's the crux here is not the addition of encryption, it's the location of the encryption key.

Encryption is the least of that problem!

[DigitAl56K]

The only way to back up and restore is by uploading your data to Google's cloud servers, where your data is much more likely to be purloined than if you had just left your device unencrypted in the first place.

As an Android fan, let me just say that these problems do not just stop with encryption. Unless you root your phone, you can't back it up properly because Google doesn't let you have access to your own files on your own f'ing device. Apparently nobody sees a problem in the fact that users are forced to make the decisions to either run stock or be able to access all their files. I'm sure it's to reduce piracy or something, but it's a nightmare. Unless your apps keep their data in an accessible folder or you let them keep all your settings in the cloud (if they even support that), just upgrading your handset to this years Nexus is going to mean data loss.

I get that it makes the security stronger, but Android badly needs some kind of super-user mode that makes the entire filesystem accessible to selected apps.

Re:Good

[Mike Buddha]

iOS, like Android, only encrypts all data if a user opts to put a pin in. iOS8 might be different, but all prior version of iOS only encrypted when a pin was entered.

Re:Good

[Rosyna]

Incorrect. iOS always encrypts all data with a master key based of secret data in the CPU. If you choose a pin/passcode, it is salted.

Re:Good

[Dr_Barnowl]

In addition to the notes that this is a minimal burden on most modern CPUs, Android L will offer much better battery life - on the same devices - owning to it's new execution environment, which will more than offset the additional cost.

I think it's a sop though - the problem, as demonstrated so well recently to a host of famous women, is not that your local device is terribly vulnerable. After all, we're talking one of the few pieces of data storage that most people will have on their person most of their waking hours.

The real problem is cloud storage. While much has been made of the tactics used to gain access to them, note that any sysadmin on the cloud services responsible likely has the same level of access. You'll only have "private" cloud when your device carrys a private encryption key that the service is not privy to - and this isn't going to happen on the big services (excepting MEGA, allegedly), because the reason they let you store your stuff on their cloud for free is because they can mine it for information. And could you really trust a "private" cloud client anyway? Who says the software doesn't leak your private key back to the author?

If you want private data, Free Software is really the only answer, and having your own private hardware would help too.

Different things...

[joh]

As others already said, iOS had mandatory full device encryption (that you even can't disable) since 2009, when the iPhone 3G added hardware for that. What was added now is a different thing (encryption of single apps data with the key dropped from memory as soon as the device is locked).

Full device encryption is not enough since the key needs to be in memory as long as the device runs (or no process will be able to access the file system when the device is locked).

Also Apple's full device encryption uses a key saved in a safe enclave in the SoC, while Google's uses the PIN or password you setup for unlocking your device. If you use a PIN, this is easily brute-forced. If you use a strong password you have to type this in every time you want to use your phone. With a swipe pattern you can't use encryption at all.

Still, it's a start. I would like to see some performance tests though, encryption in software isn't free.

Re:Good

[praxis]

If you read page nine of the iOS Security Guide, you'll learn that device storage is always encrypted with a unique key, regardless of the device lock settings.