Slashdot Mirror
NY Magistrate: Legal Papers Can Be Served Via Facebook
New submitter Wylde Stile writes with an interesting case that shows just how pervasive social networking connections have become, including in the eyes of the law. A Staten Island, NY family court support magistrate allowed a Noel Biscoch to serve his ex-wife legal papers via Facebook. Biscoch tried to serve his ex-wife Anna Maria Antigua the old-fashioned way — in person and via postal mail — but his ex-wife had moved with no forwarding address. Antigua maintains an active Facebook account, though, and had even liked some photos on the Biscoch's present wife's Facebook page days before the ruling. The magistrate concluded that the ex-wife could be served through Facebook. If this catches on, I bet a lot of people will end up with legally binding notices caught by spam filters or in their Facebook accounts' "Other" folders.
If legal documents can be sent over Facebook, then shouldn't communications on Facebook be regulated under the FCC telecommunications act?
This would include that private messages sent over Facebook may not be inspected by Facebook, and may not be used for targeted ads.
If Pandora's box is destined to be opened, *I* want to be the one to open it.
I never even knew Facebook had mail let alone folders.
Anything done on a computer is a crime under CFAA, if the prosecutor wants it to be. And if you make a fake FB account to deceive a judge and lie in court about it, you'll get the Aaron Swartz "hacker" treatment.
The judge may have said it can be used in this one case, but unless struck down by another court, it sets up a precedent for other judges to do the same.
The precedent is already there. (Leaving aside issues of which precedent is binding v. persuasive v. nobody cares).
Service by publication--you just put ads in generally available newspapers--is allowed in some courts when you can't reach a person, a leftover from the days when people read newspapers.
A few years ago slashdot posted an article when a judge allowed service by *email*. The reasoning was that an email to the person was more likely to reach them than service by publication, which would have been allowed.
When service by publication would be permissible, most savvy judges are likely to allow service by email, if it is within their discretion to allow it.