Car Thieves and Insurers Vote On Keyless Car Security
RockDoctor writes: The BBC reports that Britain's car thieves, rapidly followed by Britain's car insurance companies, have been expressing their opinions on the security of keyless car entry and/or control systems. The thieves are happy to steal them (often using equipment intended for dealer maintenance of the vehicles) and in consequence the insurance companies are refusing to insure such vehicles (or to accept new policies on such vehicles) unless they are parked overnight in underground (or otherwise secured) car parks. I guess I won't be considering buying one of those for another generation. If ever.
I've never been a fan of the keyless car design. But if I wanted a new car, I had little choice. And I knew I'd have no chance convincing car manufacturers to make a keyed version. All this time, I should have been making a fuss to the insurance industry instead.
Thank you insurance industry for making a sensible decision. Unfortunately, that may suck for anyone who owns such vehicles.
I have a car that uses a wireless key. After browsing the web trying to find more about the security, I found that you could buy a programmer that connects to the car's data port and programs a new key. What was surprising to me was how relatively easy it is to buy such a device and how quick the programming process was (about 30 seconds). A thief would have to get an entry into the car first (breaking a window, perhaps), but once that is done, it's relatively easy to just drive off with a newly programmed key. What I did was to disable to data port, not permanently, but more of a need to use basis. Since it works on obfuscation, this is not a type of security to be mass produced. Not knowing how exactly the port is disabled, it will take a long time to make it work, so I don't expect a thief to start taking the car apart. Wonder if you can claim for the insurance that the port is disabled. There are many other ways to steal a car, I just want to prevent the easy ones known today.
There's no such thing as "illegal download"
>According to BMW their so-called "security" is so secured that there are BILLIONS of combination in their "secure key" system
Well there's the problem right there - obviously they didn't take computer security seriously or they'd realize that billions of combinations hardly gives a brute-force hacking simpleton time tor their coffee to cool - I don't think anyone has considered 32 bit encryption keys secure since... ever, really. And that's assuming there's no vulnerabilities in the system. Meanwhile in order for the mechanic to be able to replace a lost key you need to install a gaping back door in every car you make, rendering your security system irrelevant except to the most casual of thieves.
--- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
>According to BMW their so-called "security" is so secured that there are BILLIONS of combination in their "secure key" system
Well there's the problem right there - obviously they didn't take computer security seriously or they'd realize that billions of combinations hardly gives a brute-force hacking simpleton time tor their coffee to cool - I don't think anyone has considered 32 bit encryption keys secure since... ever, really.
Given that physical keys can have only "thousands" of combinations and provide reasonable security (car thiefs will break the window rather than try to pick the lock), you don't need a bit 128 digital key to make a secure car door lock, you just need to rate-limit brute force attacks. no thief can spend the time testing thousands of physical keys in the lock door lock, and if the system stops listening for 5 minutes every N number of incorrect keys, then even a 32 bit digital key can be immune to a brute force attack (though the protocol has to protect against snooping)
And that's assuming there's no vulnerabilities in the system. Meanwhile in order for the mechanic to be able to replace a lost key you need to install a gaping back door in every car you make, rendering your security system irrelevant except to the most casual of thieves.
It needn't be a big gaping back door -- if every new car-key generation request has to be signed by the secure private key only known by the manufacturer, then stolen car-key programming equipment has a very short lifetime - it's only good until the equipment is reported stolen, and only validated service stations can get their car-key requests signed and it's trivial to track stolen cars back to the machine that generated the key.
Most of those billions of codes are easly circumvented by a replay attack. The cure is to lock and unlock your car with a physical key to prevent reading of the code. The other step is to add a switch to simply turn off the RF trancievers in the car when parking it in an unsecure location. A replay attack will fail when the RF is OFF.
The truth shall set you free!
Rate limiting would help a LOT, but may not be enough if the bad guys rig up a strong transmitter. If you are in a crowded parking lot, you probably don't much care which BMW you steal, the first one to unlock will be good enough.
It's not like BMWs are bargain basement cars, surely they could have spent a bit on an actually secure keyless entry system.
...The cure is to lock and unlock your car with a physical key to prevent reading of the code. The other step is to add a switch to simply turn off the RF trancievers in the car when parking...
Great point.
Once hackers started popping passenger doors remotely, I found out you could disable remote door unlock just by pulling the fuse on the receiver.
Now you need a physical smart key turn to open the door and disable the alarm.
Just picking the lock won't work either, because it's the smart key that disables the alarm.
The radios they use in these systems are ISM band, often 433MHz (Europe), 432MHz (Japan) or 915MHz (US). The bit rate is fairly low, often 9600 or maybe 30kb tops. Thus you can really only try maybe a couple of hundred keys per second, at the absolute limit.
Fortunately there is no need to brute force. Just set up a jammer, wait for someone to fail to notice that their car didn't lock as they were walking away, and attach your hardware to the car's debug port.
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC