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Launching 2015: a New Certificate Authority To Encrypt the Entire Web

Peter Eckersley writes: Today EFF, Mozilla, Cisco, and Akamai announced a forthcoming project called Let's Encrypt. Let's Encrypt will be a certificate authority that issues free certificates to any website, using automated protocols (demo video here). Launching in summer 2015, we believe this will be the missing piece that deprecates the woefully insecure HTTP protocol in favor of HTTPS.

3 of 212 comments (clear)

  1. Re:quick question by Peter+Eckersley · · Score: 5, Informative

    Actually the US Department of Defense and dozens of other governments have their own CAs with which they could issue a certificate for your domain, if they wished to. Here's a map we made of them using our SSL Observatory datasets.

    Nonetheless we should be able to use publication mechanisms such as Certificate Transparency to ensure that any compromise or compulsion of the Let's Encrypt CA could be quickly detected.

  2. Re:quick question by phantomfive · · Score: 5, Informative

    You can't. That gets at the root of the primary problem, and why web traffic isn't encrypted already.

    There are two issues, encryption and trust. When you connect to Google.com, how do you know that you've really connected to Google.com? Right now, because Verisign (or somebody) has vouched that the certificate comes from Google.com (ip address by itself isn't enough). Without that vouching, there are all kinds of MITM/redirection attacks that can happen.

    From a theoretical standpoint, encryption without trust is no more secure than plaintext transmission. However, from a practical standpoint, encryption blocks out a lot of script kiddies who sit on a wireless network with wireshark (incidentally, there is no way to verify that a WiFi SSID corresponds to a given base station, so if you're on WiFi you are almost always vulnerable to MITM attacks). The EFF, Mozilla, Cisco, and Akami are trying to raise the bar on the difficulty of the practical attacks.

    So we're moderately reducing the ease of the theoretical attack, but the big problem is still there, "is this website trusted, or just encrypted?" Traditionally no browser has had a way to distinguish, but it looks like Mozilla is going to, so that's a good thing.

    We still have the problem of trust though. It's probably the toughest problem in all of the fields of security and encryption.

    --
    "First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
  3. Re:quick question by Shakrai · · Score: 5, Informative

    If you're engaged in activities that would place you on the radar of a major nation-state's intelligence apparatus you shouldn't trust anyone. The only truly secure way to use encryption is to exchange keys (or better yet, one time pads) in person with those that you wish to communicate with. The web of trust/certificate authority model was never intended to provide protection in life or death scenarios, rather it was intended to protect day to day web browsing and e-commerce. By definition it requires that you trust people you've never met and will never meet. This is sufficient when the threat vector is nosy network administrators and script kiddies sniffing hotspot packets at Starbucks.

    The whole discussion here is laughable; there's probably a 10 to 1 ratio of people questioning this development vs. those welcoming it. I'm guessing that not a single one of the people in the former category is interesting enough to be on NSA's radar. Many of these same people were commenting in the stories about supercookies and condemning AT&T and Verizon for that behavior. Here's your solution to such shenanigans people....

    --
    I want peace on earth and goodwill toward man.
    We are the United States Government! We don't do that sort of thing.