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Norse Security IDs 6, Including Ex-Employee, As Sony Hack Perpetrators
chicksdaddy writes Alternative theories of who is responsible for the hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment have come fast and furious in recent weeks -- especially since the FBI pointed a finger at the government of North Korea last week. But Norse Security is taking the debate up a notch: saying that they have conclusive evidence pointing to group of disgruntled former employees as the source of the attack and data theft. The Security Ledger quotes Norse Vice President Kurt Stammberger saying that Norse has identified a group of six individuals — in the U.S., Canada, Singapore and Thailand — that it believes carried out the attack, including at least one 10-year employee of SPE who worked in a technical capacity before being laid off in May. Rather than starting from the premise that the Sony hack was a state sponsored attack, Norse researchers worked their investigation like any other criminal matter: starting by looking for individuals with the "means and motive" to do the attack.
HR files leaked in the hack provided the motive part: a massive restructuring in Spring, 2014, in which many longtime SPE employees were laid off. After researching the online footprint of a list of all the individuals who were fired and had the means to be able to access sensitive data on Sony's network, Norse said it identified a handful who expressed anger in social media posts following their firing. They included one former employee — a 10-year SPE veteran who he described as having a "very technical background." Researchers from the company followed that individual online, noting participation in IRC (Internet Relay Chat) forums where they observed communications with other individuals affiliated with underground hacking and hacktivist groups in Europe and Asia. According to Stammberger, the Norse investigation was eventually able to connect an individual directly involved in conversations with the Sony employee with a server on which the earliest known version of the malware used in the attack was compiled, in July, 2014.
HR files leaked in the hack provided the motive part: a massive restructuring in Spring, 2014, in which many longtime SPE employees were laid off. After researching the online footprint of a list of all the individuals who were fired and had the means to be able to access sensitive data on Sony's network, Norse said it identified a handful who expressed anger in social media posts following their firing. They included one former employee — a 10-year SPE veteran who he described as having a "very technical background." Researchers from the company followed that individual online, noting participation in IRC (Internet Relay Chat) forums where they observed communications with other individuals affiliated with underground hacking and hacktivist groups in Europe and Asia. According to Stammberger, the Norse investigation was eventually able to connect an individual directly involved in conversations with the Sony employee with a server on which the earliest known version of the malware used in the attack was compiled, in July, 2014.
Now being skilled and being laid of automatically makes you a crime suspect for having "means and motive".
For uns in IT business, we wouldn't be hired if we wouldn't have the knowledge that could also be used for blackhat purposes, and being laid of during a restructering is usually nothing an individual can control.
Thank you....
bickerdyke
And yet I was called a North Korean and other things for saying what is obvious.
Love the internet. So fuck you all. I was right and you FBI/President believing dumb fucks are wrong, again.
As I said before, the USA owes the NK a big fucking apology.
Be seeing you...
Because in corporate America they are the same thing.
You're making this too hard. You can upload terabytes of data using good old SSL or encrypt files with zip tools like 7-zip and there is nothing in the stream of data that will be recognized... that's what encryption is for.
The person wanting to get data out doesn't have to work hard at all to ensure it can't be recognized as it is being transmitted. The difficulty is in making sure that the users of the system don't notice the decrease in disk IO and loss of bandwidth. If they've got a good perimeter defense or the right heuristics for the server, they may notice "hey, that's more activity than usual" and respond, but that's about the only way to catch somebody in the act of transporting data out of a system.
Unless they're stupid. Which, with Sony's security, they could have been.
B) Eliminate all the stupid users. This is frowned upon by society.