Debris, Bodies Recovered From AirAsia Flight 8501

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Debris, Bodies Recovered From AirAsia Flight 8501

Posted by timothy on Tuesday December 30, 2014 @03:40AM from the sad-news-for-families dept.

Searchers have found traces of the crashed AirAsia Flight 8501, which lost contact with ground controllers shortly after requesting a weather-related course change. Reuters reports that both debris and some passenger remains have been recovered off the coast of Borneo, in a search complicated by waves "up to three meters high." From the report: About 30 ships and 21 aircraft from Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and the United States have been involved in the search. The plane, which did not issue a distress signal, disappeared after its pilot failed to get permission to fly higher to avoid bad weather because of heavy air traffic, officials said. It was travelling at 32,000 feet (9,753 metres) and had asked to fly at 38,000 feet, officials said earlier. Pilots and aviation experts said thunderstorms, and requests to gain altitude to avoid them, were not unusual in that area. ... Online discussion among pilots has centred on unconfirmed secondary radar data from Malaysia that suggested the aircraft was climbing at a speed of 353 knots, about 100 knots too slow, and that it might have stalled.

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Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 04:44 · Score: 0

Should an airliner's computers NEVER let a pilot take direct control? Pros/Cons?
1. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by ai4px · 2014-12-30 05:06 · Score: 4, Insightful
  
  The Air France flight 447 that crashed, as I understand it was because the pitot tube(s) froze over and the pilots lost their air speed indicator(s). It seems that in many Airbus crashes, the pilots are so accustomed to the automation that they forget how to fly the aircraft. Or they don't understand exactly how the automation works as was the case of an airbus that crashed because only one axis of the autopilot switched off unexpectedly. The aircraft was crabbing in yaw while the pilot was only controlling pitch by hand. Dunno, but it seems that more automation leads to more problems. Isn't this why the US Navy pilots subs manually all the time?
2. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by rubycodez · 2014-12-30 05:09 · Score: 1
  
  You imagine computers up to the task of flying in crowded airspace and bad weather?
3. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by pnutjam · 2014-12-30 05:15 · Score: 1
  
  Man, I'd hate to be in Airbus's shoe's when your expert testimony shows up in court.
  
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4. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by delt0r · 2014-12-30 05:28 · Score: 4, Insightful
  
  Sure as hell better than humans.
  
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5. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2014-12-30 05:32 · Score: 5, Informative
  
  Well in the case of Air France 447, an additional factor was that the least experienced pilot was in control of the aircraft at the time. Another factor was the joystick control was not visible to the other pilot and the throttle position is not indicative of actual throttle amount (electronic controls). The more experienced pilot was trying to deal with the all the computer failures and assumed that the flying pilot was diving when he was trying to climb. It wasn't until the captain got back into the cockpit (he was on a scheduled sleep break) that the senior pilots realized the plane was trying to climb. They tried to get the plane to dive but it appears the plane stalled and crashed into the ocean before they could do that.
  
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6. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 05:41 · Score: 0
  
  Studies have shown that people are really bad at paying close attention to a machine doing a task automatically and responding correctly when it fails.
  There was a study I saw within the last few months where they tested pilots who did most of their flying on automatic. They found that the pilots did not loose their ability to fly the planes completely manually, but they were very bad at correctly figuring out when the automation was not flying the plane correctly and compensating for it.
  I think we're reaching the point of diminishing returns on flight automation, it's better and safer when everything is going well, but when things do go wrong the automation can't handle it (in many cases, it's the automation that's going wrong), and the pilots aren't really able to take over on little or no notice.
7. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by OldSport · 2014-12-30 05:44 · Score: 4, Interesting
  
  It's interesting... most of the expert opinions I have heard say that the asynchronous nature of Airbus sidesticks was *not* to blame, and that the crash would not have happened if the pilots were properly communicating as per Cockpit Resource Management protocol. However, when you consider that the crash happened basically because a very junior pilot was pulling the stick back *the entire time* and the senior pilot did not realize this, I can't help but think that synchronous flight controls a la Boeing jets would have at least partially mitigated this problem (the senior pilot would have seen very clearly that the junior pilot was pulling back constantly). IANAP (I am not a pilot), but nevertheless... anyway, back to our regular scheduled programming.
8. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by wisnoskij · 2014-12-30 05:45 · Score: 1
  
  This, I watched a documentary about a crash a year ago. One instrument malfunctioned, the pilot then proceeded to ignore like 8 other instruments, and his cockpit window, and continue to slow down until he crashed and killed everyone. Pilot training has obvious gone way downhill, they are often less able to deal with instrument malfunctions than if we just put a simple non robust auto pilot in control.
  
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9. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by rubycodez · 2014-12-30 05:47 · Score: 4, Insightful
  
  no, that is not the case at the present time. Don't get your ideas about technology from sci-fi tv shows
10. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by wisnoskij · 2014-12-30 05:48 · Score: 1
  
  On second thought, I think he actually just continued to descend until he smashed into the ground. I think it was one of the altitude meters.
  
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11. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 06:10 · Score: 0, Flamebait
  
  Man, I'd hate to be in Airbus's shoe's when your expert testimony shows up in court.
  SHOES, not "shoe's", you illiterate cock-gobbling retard.
12. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 06:16 · Score: 0
  
  This, I watched a documentary about a crash a year ago. One instrument malfunctioned, the pilot then proceeded to ignore like 8 other instruments, and his cockpit window, and continue to slow down until he crashed and killed everyone. Pilot training has obvious gone way downhill, they are often less able to deal with instrument malfunctions than if we just put a simple non robust auto pilot in control.
  And just think, there was one on here about Airbus working on a "windowless cockpit" with all digital displays.
13. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by amorsen · 2014-12-30 06:16 · Score: 1
  
  Indeed, AF447 is one of many clear cases of blaming human pilots for being human. Humans are prone to make unfounded assumptions without checking them, and no amount of check lists or training will ever stop that. Another example was that the stall warning system blared loudly in the cockpit as soon as the pilot did the right thing and tried to fix the stall, whereas it was silent as long as the plane was deeply stalled.
  Either way, an emergency on a plane which is flying on autopilot is a bit like unpausing a racing game. It is a small miracle if pilots manage more than the most basic troubleshooting. Planes are in need of better user interfaces and autopilots which do not just give up and throw the problems at the humans.
  
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14. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2014-12-30 06:28 · Score: 2
  
  It's interesting... most of the expert opinions I have heard say that the asynchronous nature of Airbus sidesticks was *not* to blame, and that the crash would not have happened if the pilots were properly communicating as per Cockpit Resource Management protocol.
  There's blame and there are contributing factors. Accidents like these are normally a series of failures that leads to the accident.
  
  However, when you consider that the crash happened basically because a very junior pilot was pulling the stick back *the entire time* and the senior pilot did not realize this,
  In the Airbus, it is not a flight stick. It is a joystick. If I remember correctly this picture demonstrates the configuration of the joystick. If I remember correctly the flying pilot was in the right-side seat so it was not evident to the other pilot what he doing with the controls. Second, the other pilot isn't having scones and coffee while all of this is happening. The other pilot was dealing with a plethora of warnings and failures and trying to diagnose them all. Communication did break down.
  From the transcript Around 2 hr 12 min 32 sec:
  Left side pilot: "so go down "
  Captain: "No you climb there "
  Captain: "You’re climbing"
  Right side pilot: "I’m climbing okay so we’re going down"
  2 hr 13 min 40 sec
  Right side pilot: "But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while"
  Captain: "no no no don’t climb"
  Left side pilot: "so go down "
  From my interpretation, it appears the left is telling the right to dive and the captain is simply alerting the right that he is climbing. The right has misunderstood and is still pulling not pushing. In the second set, the left and captain realize that the right has been pulling the entire time. But it's too late.
  
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15. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by fustakrakich · 2014-12-30 06:43 · Score: 2
  
  I can't help but think that synchronous flight controls a la Boeing jets would have at least partially mitigated this problem...
  That, and a working angle of attack indicator would be most prudent to have on board. However, the accident is a result of a very common error, where a kind of 'tunnel vision' develops, and nobody remembers to fly the plane.
  
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16. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by bledri · 2014-12-30 07:07 · Score: 1
  
  This, I watched a documentary about a crash a year ago. One instrument malfunctioned, the pilot then proceeded to ignore like 8 other instruments, and his cockpit window, and continue to slow down until he crashed and killed everyone. Pilot training has obvious gone way downhill, they are often less able to deal with instrument malfunctions than if we just put a simple non robust auto pilot in control.
  Sounds a bit like Eastern Air Lines Flight 401. On that flight the auto-pilot was in the wrong mode. They thought the autopilot would maintain the current altitude, but it was in a mode that maintained whatever rate of climb/descent was input to the control yoke. The plane basically flew into the ground while everybody was trouble shooting a burned out light bulb.
  
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17. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by jbwolfe · 2014-12-30 07:23 · Score: 2
  
  ...because a very junior pilot was pulling the stick back *the entire time* and the senior pilot did not realize this
  The ECAM (electronic centralized aircraft monitor: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_centralised_aircraft_monitor) provides an aural alert to the pilots if both sticks are out of neutral. Further, the inputs are additive- one full up and the other full down is summed as zero. This is not to say they heard it- hearing is the first sense to diminish when under stress.
  
  I can't help but think that synchronous flight controls a la Boeing jets would have at least partially mitigated this problem
  That question has been debated ad nauseum. Still, Boeing have maintained the synchronous approach and Airbus have remained dual-independent and both have been well thought out in approach and execution. Potato, potahto.
  
  most of the expert opinions I have heard say that the asynchronous nature of Airbus sidesticks was *not* to blame
  I concur. I do not claim to be an expert but I am type rated in the A320 and have over 8000 hours flying them.
  
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18. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by jbwolfe · 2014-12-30 07:36 · Score: 1
  
  throttle position is not indicative of actual throttle amount (electronic controls)
  The autothrust system in my opinion is extremely well thought out. The thrust levers behave exactly like any other non- autothrottle system when it is disarmed or disengaged. They do not move with thrust changes when engaged, but if there is any doubt one can always operate manually. As for AF447, when they lost air data systems the thrust went to thrust lock until the levers were moved by the pilots: thrust was locked at last setting.
  
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19. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by pnutjam · 2014-12-30 07:46 · Score: 1
  
  lol
  
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20. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by jbwolfe · 2014-12-30 08:07 · Score: 1
  
  In the case of Airbus (excluding A300-A310 IIRC), there is no direct (cables, levers, pulleys, etc) movement of the stab/elevators and ailerons by the pilot. In normal law, the stick position schedules vertical acceleration and lateral roll rate. The rudder pedals directly command rudder surface movement via cables. The stick can only ever move the flight controls through computers. If there are multiple failures of redundant systems the computers revert to alternate then direct law- servos controlled by stick position with no envelope protections.
  So, in this case, yes. The computers will not ever let the pilot directly control the plane if I understand your question correctly.
  
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21. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by jbwolfe · 2014-12-30 08:12 · Score: 1
  
  ...as was the case of an airbus that crashed because only one axis of the autopilot switched off unexpectedly.
  Sounds like this accident: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593 Failure to understand the autopilots control wheel steering mode. Roll mode reverted to manual and pilots failed to recognize it.
  
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22. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 08:13 · Score: 5, Insightful
  
  The pilot did not try to fix the stall. He was pulling up all the time and even the dumbest student pilots know that that's the exact opposite of what to do in a stall. His (in)famous almost last words were "I've been at maxi-nose up for a while". For some reason that only he knows, he thought the plane was diving fast and that the instruments are wrong ("crazy speed" he said). In reality he first steered it above the plane's maximum service ceiling at which point the plane pretty much lost all its speed and subsequently fell down with a slight nose up pitch. The stall warning stopped when he pulled back because the plane slowed down even more and by design, the warning is not meant to be triggered when the plane lands and that was how low their speed was. A better system would of course somehow factor in altitude but then again, any pilot should know that something else than a stall recovery has happened if he's just pulled back. The saddest thing about the whole crash is that apart from the brief moment when the pitot tubes were frozen, there was nothing wrong with the aircraft. The tubes were heated so when they began working, all the pilots would've had to do was to trust their instruments. They had plenty of altitude to recover control of the aircraft and every instrument worked and every warning was correct. A display of shameful incompetence by Air France training.
23. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Zontar_Thing_From_Ve · 2014-12-30 08:18 · Score: 1
  
  Well in the case of Air France 447, an additional factor was that the least experienced pilot was in control of the aircraft at the time. Another factor was the joystick control was not visible to the other pilot and the throttle position is not indicative of actual throttle amount (electronic controls). The more experienced pilot was trying to deal with the all the computer failures and assumed that the flying pilot was diving when he was trying to climb. It wasn't until the captain got back into the cockpit (he was on a scheduled sleep break) that the senior pilots realized the plane was trying to climb. They tried to get the plane to dive but it appears the plane stalled and crashed into the ocean before they could do that.
  That's not how I understand it, based on the translation of the cockpit recording. The captain was allowed to take a break whenever he wanted and unfortunately he chose the time right before the plane entered a storm that led to the air speed tubes freezing over. I wouldn't call it "scheduled" as that sort of implies something like "At exactly 3 hours into the flight the captain will take a break" when the timing of the break was up to him. In fact, many were shocked at how early he took his break as usually the captain takes a break much later in the flight. But they didn't know for a while that he was apparently flying on only 1 hour of sleep as he had sleeping problems in his hotel, so that must have made him want to take his break early.
  
  The cockpit recording seems to indicate the senior co-pilot not helping as much as you might think. He did help some, but it seemed clear that he kept deferring in judgement to the guy flying the plane, which was a fatal mistake in hindsight. And by the time the captain arrived, which was too late to salvage the situation, the recording makes clear that nobody knew what exactly was going on and it was only with about 30 seconds to go before the crash that the captain and senior co-pilot realized what the junior co-pilot was actually doing at the controls.
  
  The whole thing was shockingly preventable. There was a long series of small decisions that were made where none of them alone was enough to have caused the accident but every one of them played a role in it. If even one of those decisions had been different, such as the captain taking a break later, the senior not the junior co-pilot being left to fly the plane (this is up to debate though) or the crew simply trying to avoid the weather as the other planes in the area had been doing, they'd have probably survived.
  
  Some aviation experts are speculating that the rapid expansion of budget airlines in Asia has led to training shortages and if this ends up being a similar accident to AF447 where an improperly trained pilot inadvertently puts the plane into a stall, all I can say is that this wasn't supposed to happen again. After AF447 the airlines were supposed to train specifically to prevent that kind of thing from happening again.
24. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 08:20 · Score: 0
  
  ...autopilots which do not just give up and throw the problems at the humans.
  So what do you propose an autopilot should do when it cannot make sense of the information it gets? Isn't that when pilots are supposed to earn their pay and feel the stripes on their shoulders? Arguably, at least in the majority of all Airbus crashes I've looked* at pilots not doing shit and just letting the automation handle it would've saved the day.
  *)I don't just watch Air Crash Investigation, I read the actual reports because I'm interested so whilst I'm no expert, I think I know more than the regular viewer.
25. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 08:50 · Score: 0
  
  That's just your opinion. I beg to differ based on what I - as an aviation fanatic (but not pilot due to medical reasons) - have learnt by reading every accident investigation report I've come across as well as a lot of other material. Admittedly, investigators are pressured to find fault with pilots because "one bad crew" is much preferable to both the airline and the aircraft manufacturer. However, the majority of crashes are due to human error and even when the original cause isn't human error, pilots often make mistakes when handling aircraft failures (I can immediately think of a couple of crashes due to pilots mistakenly shutting down the only functioning engine when the other one has caught fire). Especially true with Airbus - many lives would've been spared if the pilots had simply not done anything. The automated systems of all modern aircraft are exceptionally capable. Whenever improvising is required in an emergency, I would consider the best solution a remote control centre staffed 24/7 by the manufacturer. Test pilots are better than most pilots so test pilots that have pushed the aircraft to its limits in testing would know better. Flight engineers have been replaced by computers now and only limited data is normally available to pilots but in an emergency all the information could be streamed to engineers that are specialized on that aircraft (and preferably have even been designing it). All the technology for doing it exists. Heck, technology for tracking all aircraft at all times everywhere on the planet is already installed on all newish planes. Its use just hasn't been mandated (on pprune pilots facepalm at suggestions for new tracking technology after MH370 when the obstacle is that airlines don't want to pay for using it when they don't need it).
26. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Charliemopps · 2014-12-30 09:17 · Score: 1
  
  Really it is.
  Stall
  Stall
  Stall
  Then the captain returns: "Er what are you doing?"
  Not an easily shaken man apparently. He had less than a minute before they hit the water at that point.
  But even the inexperienced pilot wasn't that far off. He thought he had the speed, he just didn't know the airspeed was totally wrong.
  Then when the plane was crashing, he didn't realize what was happening. Maybe he thought the other pilot was nuts for going into a dive?
27. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2014-12-30 09:33 · Score: 1
  
  That's not how I understand it, based on the translation of the cockpit recording. The captain was allowed to take a break whenever he wanted and unfortunately he chose the time right before the plane entered a storm that led to the air speed tubes freezing over. I wouldn't call it "scheduled" as that sort of implies something like "At exactly 3 hours into the flight the captain will take a break" when the timing of the break was up to him.
  By scheduled I meant that all pilots are required to take a break during these long flights which explains why he was not in the cabin when the initial alarms went off. He returned to the cabin after a few minutes of the initial alarm.
  
  In fact, many were shocked at how early he took his break as usually the captain takes a break much later in the flight. But they didn't know for a while that he was apparently flying on only 1 hour of sleep as he had sleeping problems in his hotel, so that must have made him want to take his break early.
  
  The point isn't that when he took his break or how far into the flight or for what reasons. Before he took the break, everything seemed under control so he took his break.
  
  The cockpit recording seems to indicate the senior co-pilot not helping as much as you might think. He did help some, but it seemed clear that he kept deferring in judgement to the guy flying the plane, which was a fatal mistake in hindsight.
  
  In my recollection about procedure, it is the right-side pilot that flies while the left-side deals with other factors during an emergency like this. The left-side pilot was trying to figure out the alarms and what to do about them so that both pilots are not doing the same things.
  
  Some aviation experts are speculating that the rapid expansion of budget airlines in Asia has led to training shortages and if this ends up being a similar accident to AF447 where an improperly trained pilot inadvertently puts the plane into a stall, all I can say is that this wasn't supposed to happen again. After AF447 the airlines were supposed to train specifically to prevent that kind of thing from happening again
  One of the problems identified was that the crew did not follow proper procedures and ignored stall warnings as they assumed they could not trust that warning over the other alarms.
  
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28. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by amorsen · 2014-12-30 09:37 · Score: 0
  
  The stall warning stopped when he pulled back because the plane slowed down even more and by design, the warning is not meant to be triggered when the plane lands and that was how low their speed was.
  All the bad human interface design decisions have reasonable technical explanations. That does not make them good design decisions.
  If that stall warning had kept working, AF447 would likely not have crashed. If the autopilot had not panicked and disabled the normal computer control because of a single faulty sensor, AF447 would likely not have crashed. If the plane had synchronized sticks, the other pilot would likely have taken control and AF447 would likely not have crashed.
  Yet all the blame is put on the crew.
  
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29. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by amorsen · 2014-12-30 09:41 · Score: 1
  
  The autopilot should not be unable to make sense of the information it gets because of a single faulty sensor. This is the 21st century, computers can do better than that.
  
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30. Re: Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 10:54 · Score: 0
  
  Why is a vital sensor like that allowed to not be tripled so you can have a "two out of three" quorum decision?
31. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by rubycodez · 2014-12-30 11:00 · Score: 1
  
  Dear Fanatic, actual pilots say otherwise, the automatic systems presently in use CAN'T handle the craft in many situations. sorry.
32. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 11:00 · Score: 0
  
  From the movie Idiocracy, which has already predicted such things like the Transformers Age of Extinction being the #1 grossing moving of 2014, by a wide margine comes:
  Dr. Lexus: Don't worry scro'! There are plenty of 'tards out there living really kick ass lives. My first wife was 'tarded. She's a pilot now.
33. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 13:41 · Score: 0
  
  Wrong. It got contradictory information "airspeed disagree" was the precise alarm and current designs don't permit it to do automagically what the pilots are supposed to do then. That is, x degrees pitch up and throttle at y % until the pitots work again, which should be fast since they're heated (I don't recall the specifics for A330 but it's in the 1-10 degrees and 80-90 % range). I see no reason why an autopilot couldn't be programmed to do such a thing which is a so called "memory item" (i.e. procedure pilots must remember without looking at checklists). However, there is a lot of inertia in the system (opposition from pilots who're used to their way of flying as well as regulatory oversight). And someone wiser than me can probably say what additional considerations are necessary before the autopilot can do that.
34. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 14:14 · Score: 0
  
  Your argument is nonsense. The stall warning was shouting until the very end but the crew never even mentioned a stall so unless you add some robotic arms to the autopilot that grab the pilot and shake him until he realizes that there's a stall, I see no way to make it better.
  Unnecessary alarms have, however, had bad consequences - at least one MD-80 was lost because the captain pulled a few circuit breakers simply to shut off unnecessary alarms prior to take-off and then didn't get a no flaps warning when actually taking off. And whilst it's possible to make a design which doesn't permit such shutting down of alarms, it doesn't change the mental blocking of them. Thus I don't think it was a bad design decision because the incompetence by that crew was so astounding that an aircraft design shouldn't accomodate to it.
  An autopilot can by definition not panic and it didn't disable any control. The computer did switch to alternate law since without airspeed information it couldn't provide the stall protections it normally does. One of the first things the crew did was to mention the switch to alternate law so they were aware that they could stall the aircraft but clearly didn't think they actually did.
  Synchronized side-sticks would be a horrible idea. Synchronized yokes (like old hydraulic aircraft or Boeing's FBW which simulates hydraulic controls) are a possibility but never side-sticks. The display shows what input is given and the clear deviation from traditional flight controls is intentional to make sure that pilots don't think "the old way" or expect any feedback from the flight surfaces via the side-stick (there's no sensible way of doing it anyway). Comac and Bombardier have followed the Airbus example with side-sticks and I think Mitsubishi too but I'm too lazy to look it up. A persistent rumor on pprune and other pilot forums is that when Boeing began designing their first FBW (the 777) they conducted a survey and it turned out that most pilots would've preferred a side-stick but as a stupid matter of prestige they instead went with a yoke so that they wouldn't appear to imitate Airbus.
35. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by OldSport · 2014-12-30 14:47 · Score: 1
  
  Did the crew acknowledge alternate law? I haven't read the entire CVR transcript but I was under the impression that they didn't. Or, at the very least, the PF (Bonin, the younger guy) didn't seem to know what it meant.
  Even if the display shows inputs, it's a lot harder to pay attention to a display with a little dot waggling around on it than a big old yoke pushing into your nutsack, especially when you're on a turbulence roller coaster and trying to figure out twenty-three other issues at the same time. Also, the inputs won't be averaged out as per Airbus's sticks. I don't know. While it's clear that pilot error was the primary factor I'm still not fully convinced that there aren't issues in the Airbus design that exacerbated the situation. (Not affiliated with Boeing or a "U-S-A! U-S-A!" wanker type, either, by the way.)
36. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 15:50 · Score: 0
  
  You see, I disagree. I think that the primary reason Air France Flight 447 crashed is not only due to the pitot tube freezing, but also because of niggers.
37. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by jrumney · 2014-12-30 16:04 · Score: 1
  
  Dunno, but it seems that more automation leads to more problems.
  Statistically, 2014 is the year with fewest plane crashes since the era of mass aviation began. Two of those were (Boeing, not Airbus) 777s loaded with passengers, which skewed the passenger death statistics to a level that has not been seen for 10 years or so, but as more automation comes into aviation, the trend is definitely leading to fewer problems, not more, more so if you account for the fact that the number of flights and passengers is continuing to grow, especially in areas like South East Asia.
38. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 23:06 · Score: 0
  
  Yes, at 2h 10 min 22.1 s the slightly less incompetent pilot says "alternate law protections-(law/low/lo)". So he clearly understood that they only have the alternate law protections and not the normal law ones (which include the all important stall prevention).
  It is of course true that in this particular case a control column might have made the other pilot notice but if such "notification" is needed, the plane is not flown as it has been designed to with specific tasks performed by each pilot. The PNF (pilot not flying) should be watching the instruments (arguably also the alarms which increased his workload) and thus see the PF input (or autopilot input for that matter). The averaging of controls is also part of the intended way of flying an Airbus since the only moment when both should have their hand on their respective side-sticks is if one pilot needs to hand control over to the other whilst steering manually. In such situations too a column might of course be easier.
  The side-stick was developed for good reasons since FBW aircraft are different than hydraulics. The A300 and A310 had traditional control columns (like practically all other jets as well at the time) so it certainly wasn't a "let's not look like Boeing" idea. It was to make pilots drop their old hydraulic intuition and learn the new. Boeing went a different route - they tried to make the 777 and 787 maintain the "feel" of hydraulics so the computer steers it as a pilot would expect a traditional aircraft to behave in response to such input.
  I'm not biased either - at least not for nationalistic reasons - since I'm not even from the same continent as Airbus or Boeing for that matter. However, since I'm interested in aviation I get aggravated when I repeatedly see some American nationalist slashdotters post misinformation about Airbus and then other American nationalists mod it up. I feel just as safe on either manufacturer's plane (maybe with an exception for the 787 until it has seen more use) but - as AF447 showed - supposedly reputable airlines might have criminally incompetent crews. Maybe the captain wouldn't have let this happen, if he had been in the cockpit but he wasn't and he had decided not to be. Despite the ITCZ being straight ahead.
39. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by delt0r · 2014-12-31 03:38 · Score: 1
  
  No they don't. I know a few test pilots. They know real life flesh and blood pilots days are numbered.
  
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40. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2014-12-31 04:10 · Score: 1
  
  With the pitot tubes covered in ice the airspeed would have been completely wrong. An issue was the throttle position is not true to the actual throttle amount. On the Airbus, it has autothrust so that the throttle itself doesn't move but the computer changes the speed according to what is needed.
  
  JOHN COX: The thrust levers themselves, the throttles, don't move. Unlike some other airplanes, where you can feel the throttle in your hand moving, with Airbus aircraft, that throttle doesn't move with auto-thrust engaged, so you have to look at specific engine power indications.
  When the auto-pilot shut off, it didn't reset the throttle amount to the position, it stayed where the setting had been by autothrust.
  
  NARRATOR: The power indication is displayed here, on the central control panel. But if auto-thrust switches off while the engines are in low power, the crew might lose track of the low thrust level.
  JOHN COX: If you're very task-saturated, your concentration's going to be directly in front of you. What's the power output of the engines? You're going to have to physically turn your attention and look to the center console area..
  This is not going to be done as frequently as looking at, at the things right in front of you. It, it's certainly going to be in the scan; the question is, "How often?".
  NARRATOR: The aircraft is now nearer the lower end of its safe speed range. But overloaded by fault warnings, the crew might not realize they need to increase power..
  
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41. Re: Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2014-12-31 04:15 · Score: 1
  
  There are 3 sensors on that Airbus but they were all the same type. On earlier flights of other planes it had been found that the pitot tubes were icing up and there was a plan to replace them with other types that didn't ice up. The aircraft was scheduled to have them replaced but it never made it.
  
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42. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2014-12-31 04:22 · Score: 1
  
  From what remember a major breakdown in procedure was that the pilots didn't follow training to take control of the aircraft by setting at 85% thrust and 5 degrees first then trying other things if that didn't work.
  
  NARRATOR: As they [simulator pilots] edge around the storm, Alder triggers the critical moment of Flight 447: he fails all three airspeed indicators.
  SIMULATOR CO-PILOT: Okay, we have NAV ADR 1 fault. We have unreliable airspeed.
  NARRATOR: The automatic flight control systems shut down.
  SIMULATOR CO-PILOT: We're flying with no auto-pilot or auto-thrust.
  SIMULATOR CAPTAIN: Okay. Autopilot's off. I have control.
  SIMULATOR CO-PILOT: You have control.
  NARRATOR: If their actual airspeed rises or falls by as little as 10 knots, they could suffer a catastrophic loss of control. But the pilot uses standard procedures, learned in training. He moves the throttle levers to set thrust at exactly 85 percent.
  SIMULATOR CAPTAIN: And I'm selecting...I've got 85 percent set.
  NARRATOR: Then, he raises the elevators to pitch the nose up at precisely five degrees. With engines at 85 percent power, and five degrees upward pitch, the aircraft should always settle at the same safe speed.
  
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43. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by rubycodez · 2014-12-31 04:24 · Score: 1
  
  Wrong, you are speaking of a future that hasn't happened yet. Real present day systems are limited, research before spewing.
44. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by iggymanz · 2014-12-31 04:26 · Score: 1
  
  And your test pilot friends are out of work? No, they still fly planes? Oops, you lose.
45. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2014-12-31 04:41 · Score: 1
  
  If that stall warning had kept working, AF447 would likely not have crashed.
  Even towards the end, there were stall warnings. They were being ignored because the other failures kept the crew busy.
  
  If the autopilot had not panicked and disabled the normal computer control because of a single faulty sensor, AF447 would likely not have crashed.
  The autopilot did not panic. The Airbus had 3 pitot tubes and they all failed. Since the autopilot can no longer determine airspeed it cannot accurately compute throttle and altitude settings. So it shut off and alerted the pilots that it was shutting off; however, since the airspeed indicators failed this triggers other alarms.
  
  If the plane had synchronized sticks, the other pilot would likely have taken control and AF447 would likely not have crashed.
  My understanding is there is a procedure for emergencies. The Pilot Flying (PF) usually is the right-side pilot. The Pilot Not Flying (PNF) is the left-side and deals with the computer, instrumentation, etc while the PF flies. Now there are procedures for the PNF to take control by declaring like "Taking control" or "My aircraft". This alerts the PF to stop inputs and he acknowledges relinquishing control "You have control" or "your aircraft". That did not happen in this case. At best both pilots never communicated when the PNF should or would take over.
  Synchronized sticks may have helped but the more distressing problem was a communications and training breakdown.
  
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46. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by delt0r · 2014-12-31 06:31 · Score: 1
  
  It a romantic idea that we are better than machines for many tasks. The only thing holding it back right now are old planes with little automation, and Romanticism.
  
  For military applications they don't even need to all that good. Just not pass out in high g.
  
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47. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by delt0r · 2014-12-31 06:33 · Score: 1
  
  You do realize that many/most of the new planes are impossible to fly without the computer right? We put flesh bags in the loop out of tradition and romanticism.
  
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48. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-31 06:49 · Score: 0
  
  The stall warning stopped when he pulled back because the plane slowed down even more and by design, the warning is not meant to be triggered when the plane lands and that was how low their speed was.
  That's why even small plane manufacturers like Piper and Lear have "squat switches" on the landing gear that are connected to the stall warning system. That way the stall warning always sounds (as necessary) when the airplane is not sitting on it's landing gear. While I can't say for certain that A320's connect their squat switches to the stall warning system, (they're can also be used for other things like thrust-reverser deploy and spoiler auto-deploy), I would say it's a strong possibility that they do. If the plane was in a stall state and the warning went silent, then I would expect someone pop'd the circuit breaker.
49. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by iggymanz · 2014-12-31 07:17 · Score: 1
  
  You're confused, having a computer in the system responding to throttle and yoke movements to move control surfaces is not what we're discussing here. The flesh bags are in the loop and your life as passenger depends on them; some occassional bad landings with body count prove the point
50. Re: Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-31 11:26 · Score: 0
  
  You are true aso hole
51. Re: Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-31 11:48 · Score: 0
  
  Not so Boeing is better aircraft
52. Re: Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-31 11:54 · Score: 0
  
  This so.true they are designed to.land in zero zero conditions
53. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by amorsen · 2014-12-31 22:05 · Score: 1
  
  Even towards the end, there were stall warnings. They were being ignored because the other failures kept the crew busy.
  Read the cockpit transcript. The stall warnings stopped whenever the crew member pulled the stick back and made the stall worse. (They stopped because the computer was programmed to treat the ridiculously low airspeed indications as instrument failures and disregard them).
  
  The autopilot did not panic. The Airbus had 3 pitot tubes and they all failed.
  It has 2 pitot tubes and 1 failed. Apart from that the aircraft was in perfect condition. The failing pitot tube recovered during the fall, so all equipment worked correctly.
  
  Since the autopilot can no longer determine airspeed it cannot accurately compute throttle and altitude settings. So it shut off and alerted the pilots that it was shutting off; however, since the airspeed indicators failed this triggers other alarms.
  The autopilot shut off and the computer put the plane into alternate law, where pilots are allowed to do stupid things like stall the plane. The computer had one perfectly working airspeed indicator to rely on, but instead it panicked.
  
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54. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2015-01-01 06:36 · Score: 1
  
  Read the cockpit transcript. The stall warnings stopped whenever the crew member pulled the stick back and made the stall worse. (They stopped because the computer was programmed to treat the ridiculously low airspeed indications as instrument failures and disregard them).
  I have. That's not what I read in the transcript. 2 h 10 min 03: Cavalry charge (autopilot disconnection warning)
  2 h 10 min 10,4: SV: stall
  . . .
  2 h 10 min 13,0: SV stall
  . . .
  2 h 10 min 41,6: Weâ(TM)re in... yeah weâ(TM)re in climb
  2 h 10 min 51,4: SV Stall
  (for the next minute until 2 h 14 min 01,7 there are stall warnings)
  
  It has 2 pitot tubes and 1 failed.
  This is incorrect:
  
  On 12 August 2009, Airbus issued three Mandatory Service Bulletins, requiring that all A330 and A340 aircraft be fitted with two Goodrich 0851HL pitot tubes and one Thales model C16195BA pitot (or alternatively three of the Goodrich pitots)
  
  Apart from that the aircraft was in perfect condition. The failing pitot tube recovered during the fall, so all equipment worked correctly.
  The pitot tubes failed because of icing. There would be no ice when they were recovered so "working correctly" isn't exactly true as the conditions of the accident were not in place when they were recovered.
  
  The autopilot shut off and the computer put the plane into alternate law, where pilots are allowed to do stupid things like stall the plane. The computer had one perfectly working airspeed indicator to rely on, but instead it panicked.
  Do you know what happens when one of the pitot tubes fails in these conditions? It give erratic readings. So the autopilot cannot determine which one of the 3 readings is correct. It's not "panicking" if it is meant to do that.
  
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55. Re: Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2015-01-01 06:51 · Score: 0
  
  Define better. If you say safer = better and go by statistics, Boeing humbly disagrees with you:
56. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by amorsen · 2015-01-01 09:08 · Score: 1
  
  I am not sure why you think the part you copied from the transcript contradicts what I said. The stall warnings sounded multiple times, whenever airspeed got high enough (i.e. the pilot was doing the right thing) to make the system believe the readings.
  
  The pitot tubes failed because of icing. There would be no ice when they were recovered so "working correctly" isn't exactly true as the conditions of the accident were not in place when they were recovered.
  The pitot tubes were working correctly for the majority of the accident, precisely because there was no ice on them for the majority of the accident. Yet the computer system stuck in alternate law, encouraging the pilot to do the entirely wrong thing.
  
  Do you know what happens when one of the pitot tubes fails in these conditions? It give erratic readings. So the autopilot cannot determine which one of the 3 readings is correct. It's not "panicking" if it is meant to do that.
  It was programmed to panic. How else would it do it? It is not sentient.
  It is a classic case of throwing the error at the operator. Computer systems used to do that all the time, but today we do better.
  
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57. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by Anonymous Coward · 2015-01-01 23:56 · Score: 0
  
  You have a weird definition for panic if you argue that non-living things can do so. The computer did precisely what it should and the traditional definition of panicking implies that you do something stupid and irrational or become "paralyzed". Until now, both Airbus and Boeing (and Embraer and FBWs) give the pilot the final word on what to do in an emergency, which is why the computer did not have the authority to do anything else except hand it to the pilot, which it did. So is doing what you should do to panic? Now, if you argue that it should have remained in control, I definitely agree with you - I would absolutely give the computer more authority but there's a lot of inertia in the system to overcome before pilots first become passengers in the cockpit and later nonexistent (pilot unions, passenger trust in computers etc.).
  If you insist on blaming the computer and treat it as a living thing, you're quite unfair and I feel sorry for the computer - it was not permitted to do anything else than what it did and to its great dismay it followed proper procedure until the fatal end. Because of the inertia in the system and distrust in computers a switch to alternate law can only be reverted by maintenance on the ground when they've examined the aircraft. A precaution to satisfy those who fear that an erratic computer would regain control. The same applies for Boeing btw. except it's called "secondary mode".
58. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by delt0r · 2015-01-02 03:49 · Score: 1
  
  Occasional? Pilot error is by far the leading cause of crashes. Mechanics screwing up is probably 2nd.
  
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59. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2015-01-02 04:13 · Score: 1
  
  I am not sure why you think the part you copied from the transcript contradicts what I said. .
  No you said that the stall warning stopped when the pilot pulled up (read above). That is not correct. The stall warnings happened continuously throughout the time until the condition was corrected. It was never corrected.
  
  The stall warnings sounded multiple times, whenever airspeed got high enough (i.e. the pilot was doing the right thing) to make the system believe the readings
  No that is also incorrect. Stall warnings are when there is not enough lift. Most of the time (and in this accident), this is when the airspeed is too low or the angle of attack is too high. Stalling at high speeds is possible but not in this case especially since the pilot was climbing not diving.
  
  The pitot tubes were working correctly for the majority of the accident, precisely because there was no ice on them for the majority of the accident.
  
  The pitot tubes were to be replaced per schedule because they had a tendency to ice up during flights. I point you to the wiki article on the flight as multiple incidents led to the replacement advisory.
  
  Yet the computer system stuck in alternate law, encouraging the pilot to do the entirely wrong thing.
  The computer did not get "stuck" in alternate law. The computer with conflicting airspeed readings goes to alternate law by design. This is basic flight (and computer system) protocols. As for "encouraging the pilot to do the entirely wrong thing", I don't know where you get this idea: The computer did not goad the pilots into climbing nor told them what to do. The computer realized it could not fly the plane according to its program and switched to alternate law giving the pilots full control of the aircraft. It is up to the pilots to fly manually (which they are supposed to be trained to do).
  The problem is the pilots did not follow training or procedures. It may be an increasing problem as more pilots rely too much on autopilot. This has been identified as a trend in all airlines as more airlines are created with more flights and more planes. The US is also subject to this problem; however, the US has a larger pool of ex-military pilots who were trained to fly manually.
  
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60. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by amorsen · 2015-01-02 04:32 · Score: 1
  
  The stall warnings happened continuously throughout the time until the condition was corrected. It was never corrected.
  This is a factual bit we disagree about.
  See e.g. Stall warning controversy haunts AF447 inquiry
  After 54s, the stall warning started cutting out because the airspeed approached zero.
  While the stall alarm sounded continuously for 54s the captain, urgently called back from a rest break, re-entered the cockpit just as it ceased. The warnings then became intermittent, owing to A330 logic that cuts out the alarm if airspeeds become invalid
  SNPL president Jean-Louis Barber said the pitot failure "constituted the trigger" and the pilots then faced a "delicate, unexpected" and "totally novel" situation.
  It insists the design of the stall warning "misled" the pilots. "Each time they reacted appropriately the alarm triggered inside the cockpit, as though they were reacting wrongly. Conversely each time the pilots pitched up the aircraft, the alarm shut off, preventing a proper diagnosis of the situation.
  
  No that is also incorrect. Stall [wikipedia.org] warnings are when there is not enough lift. Most of the time (and in this accident), this is when the airspeed is too low or the angle of attack is too high.
  Do you really think you need to tell me what a stall is? Yes, the stall happened because airspeed was too low. However, the stall warnings did the worst thing possible: turn off when airspeed is low and turn on when airspeed increases.
  
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61. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2015-01-02 05:34 · Score: 1
  
  This is a factual bit we disagree about.
  You can read in the transcript. The stall warnings never stopped. They didn't alarm all the time but they didn't stop. The plane eventually stalled because the pilots did not correct the problem. I refer you to the final report of the accident not the opinion of a pilot's union.
  
  The aeroplane went into a sustained stall, signalled by the stall warning and strong buffet. Despite these persistent symptoms, the crew never understood that they were stalling and consequently never applied a recovery manoeuvre. The combination of the ergonomics of the warning design, the conditions in which airline pilots are trained and exposed to stalls during their professional training and the process of recurrent training does not generate the expected behaviour in any acceptable reliableway.
  That is unless you want to argue with conclusions of the official report.
  
  Do you really think you need to tell me what a stall is?
  When you posted something factually incorrect about what a stall is, I expect you to admit that you posted factually incorrect information. I'm not a professional pilot but I know enough about aviation to know what a stall is. Stalling due to high speeds is unlikely especially when that was not the case in Air France 447. There were climbing; their air speed was not too high. They were stalling because their air speed was too low and the AoA was too high; they just didn't believe the warnings.
  
  Yes, the stall happened because airspeed was too low. However, the stall warnings did the worst thing possible: turn off when airspeed is low and turn on when airspeed increases.
  There were a number of contributing factors to this accident, but you seem desperate to dismiss that the fact that the pilots made errors that led to the crash and blame everything else. The computer did not "panic"; it did exactly what it was supposed to do. The stall warnings while intermittent did alert the pilots to the exact situation that caused the plane to crash. This was a recoverable situation, and the pilots did not apply the proper procedures: Establish initial control then deal with the situation. Instead the crew panicked not the computer.
  
  More generally, the double failure of the planned procedural responses shows the limits of the current safety model. When crew action is expected, it is always supposed that they will be capable of initial control of the flight path and of a rapid diagnosis that will allow them to identify the correct entry in the dictionary of procedures.
  
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62. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by amorsen · 2015-01-02 05:49 · Score: 1
  
  They didn't alarm all the time but they didn't stop
  You have a strange definition of stop.
  
  There were climbing; their air speed was not too high. They were stalling because their air speed was too low and the AoA was too high; they just didn't believe the warnings.
  I do not know where you get the impression that we disagree about this. Of course they stalled because their speed was too low and the AoA was too high.
  
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63. Re:Pilot Proof Airbus? by UnknowingFool · 2015-01-02 06:59 · Score: 1
  
  You have a strange definition of stop.
  Again I refer you to the transcript. From the initial stall warning at 2 hr 10 min, there are stall warnings in every minute. Then the plane crashed.
  
  I do not know where you get the impression that we disagree about this. Of course they stalled because their speed was too low and the AoA was too high.
  Your conclusions have been wrong about Air France 447 because you have been wrong about the facts. The conclusions of the BEA specifically contribute the accident to the pilots and a number of other factors including the pitot tube design. However, the failure of the pitot tubes should not have led to a crash by themselves. You seem to want blame everything else except what is clear in the report. The computer did not "panic". The stall warning did correctly identify the problem that occurred. The pilots under a number of alarms did not establish initial control. There was a communications breakdown between the pilots. The pilots ignored the stall warning until too late.
  
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I expect this to be evidence of a crash site by Latent+Heat · 2014-12-30 04:51 · Score: 2

That they found debris and human remains is evidence that they found where this plane ended up . . . in contrast with the Malaysia flight where the authorities may never find out what really happened, and people in the affected countries will never be sure of the fate of their family members.
1. Re:I expect this to be evidence of a crash site by sycodon · 2014-12-30 05:13 · Score: 2
  
  They are slaving in the Ice Mines of IO for the Zaranthians.
  
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Stall? by Sperbels · 2014-12-30 05:04 · Score: 1

I'm not anything close to an expert, but wouldn't a stall be easily recoverable at 32,000+ feet? If a plane fell from this altitude without any radio contact I would think it would be some kind of catastrophic structural or mechanical failure.
1. Re:Stall? by CohibaVancouver · 2014-12-30 05:07 · Score: 1
  
  I'm not anything close to an expert, but wouldn't a stall be easily recoverable at 32,000+ feet?
  Depends what caused the stall. If the engines ingested a tremendous amount of hail and water and flamed out then the crew may not have been able to start them again. They could still have gotten out of the stall into a glide, but with no power there would have been nowhere to go...
2. Re:Stall? by Sperbels · 2014-12-30 05:11 · Score: 1
  
  Yeah, but they would have a controlled descent in this scenario and would have radioed for help, wouldn't they?
3. Re:Stall? by ai4px · 2014-12-30 05:15 · Score: 3, Insightful
  
  Could've been busy trying to fly the aircraft. Order of Operatons.... Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
4. Re:Stall? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 05:17 · Score: 0
  
  One would think. Lack of radio contact could mean something catastrophic.
5. Re:Stall? by sycodon · 2014-12-30 05:19 · Score: 3, Informative
  
  Modern Engines are designed to ingest tremendous amounts of water and still run.
  A Qantas airliner suffered a catastrophic engine failure ad returned to the airport. After landing, the engine was still running and spewing fuel everywhere. They poured foam and water directly into the engine for 30 minutes before it finally quit running.
  You can watch a documentary on it here.
  
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6. Re:Stall? by tlhIngan · 2014-12-30 05:24 · Score: 4, Interesting
  
  I'm not anything close to an expert, but wouldn't a stall be easily recoverable at 32,000+ feet? If a plane fell from this altitude without any radio contact I would think it would be some kind of catastrophic structural or mechanical failure.
  Or a cumulonimbus (CB) cloud. Pilots are generally advised to stay 20 miles AWAY from storm clouds because of intense up and down drafts.
  It's likely the pilot was trying to do that when denied by ATC - and towering CB can go up to the stratosphere (literally - it's why they get their anvil shape).
  No plane can outfly the up or downdrafts which can be several thousand feet per minute. Fly into it and 32,000 feet can be gone in just a few minutes. Never mind wind shear which can basically rob an airplane of all airspeed.
  Embedded CBs are even scarier.
7. Re:Stall? by ai4px · 2014-12-30 05:28 · Score: 2
  
  Air France Flight 447 stalled at 38,000 feet with an attitude between 35 and 45. If they'd known that their airspeed as below stall, they could have simply dipped the nose and gained airspeed. But the pilots seemed confused the whole way to the sea. Same may have happened here.
8. Re:Stall? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 05:31 · Score: 1
  
  At 38,000 feet the difference between overspeed and underspeed (stall) can be as little as 10-12 knots. Many airplanes behave similarly in both conditions however recovery procedures are very different. There have been a number of accidents due to pilots not being able to tell the difference. For more information see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coffin_corner_%28aerodynamics%29
9. Re:Stall? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 05:41 · Score: 0
  
  Modern airliners have a glide ratio near 20:1. In case of a flame out at 6 miles up, they could glide 100+ miles and have plenty of time to talk with air traffic controllers about where to go.
10. Re:Stall? by CohibaVancouver · 2014-12-30 05:42 · Score: 1
  
  Modern Engines are designed to ingest tremendous amounts of water and still run.
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T...
11. Re:Stall? by sycodon · 2014-12-30 05:50 · Score: 1
  
  1988 is hardly "modern" in the context of jet engines.
  This, is modern.
  
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12. Re:Stall? by jbwolfe · 2014-12-30 07:50 · Score: 2
  
  Stalls in swept wing aircraft at high altitude are difficult to recover from. It takes time and patience to avoid secondary stalls, and usually a significant loss of altitude. AF447 was flyable all the way to impact but improper recovery technique complicated by confusing systems failures were big links in the chain of events.
  I have no doubt the FDR's will be found and I think the similarities between these two events is significant.
  
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13. Re:Stall? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 09:04 · Score: 0
  
  Radio for help? How would traffic control help? Energize the teleport transporter to get everyone off the plane?
  There is no help. Any second wasted on shouting "mayday, mayday" over the radio is a second wasted. That only happens in movies.
14. Re:Stall? by Charliemopps · 2014-12-30 09:24 · Score: 1
  
  I'm not anything close to an expert, but wouldn't a stall be easily recoverable at 32,000+ feet? If a plane fell from this altitude without any radio contact I would think it would be some kind of catastrophic structural or mechanical failure.
  Base on the reports of the weather I've been reading, it was about as bad as it gets for turbulence. They suspect the craft got hit by multiple lightening strikes as well. I've been on a plane when lightening has struck it before and while not immediately dangerous it's like being inside a flashbulb going off. It's terrifying. I couldn't imagine it happening multiple times while getting thrown around by turbulence.
  Imagine being on a roller-coaster, inside a paint shaker while someone repeated shown a flashlight in your eyes... then try and pull one of the most sophisticated mechanical devices ever created by man out of a stall...
15. Re:Stall? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 10:56 · Score: 0
  
  What I don't understand about this incident is why the ATC denied their request. It seems insane for the very reasons you're mentioning. I'm actually somewhat surprised the pilots didn't ignore the ATC in that regard.
16. Re:Stall? by DigiShaman · 2014-12-30 11:24 · Score: 1
  
  Jet engine ingestion test. How is it the flame doesn't burn out still eludes me. Brilliant engineering!
  
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Re:Pissy Frost by NotDrWho · 2014-12-30 05:05 · Score: 1

There was also the option of them continuing to recover nothing (ask Malaysian Airlines)

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SJW's don't eliminate discrimination. They just expropriate it for themselves.
Reporter asks "What's the condition of the bodies? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 05:07 · Score: 0

"Dead, with no improvement expected," responds rescue worker.
Lufthansa had an incident which might be related. by spacefight · 2014-12-30 05:17 · Score: 4, Informative

Lufthansa went through a 4000fpm rate of descent incident a couple of weeks ago. The loss of altitude had been caused by two angle of attack sensors having frozen in their positions during climb at an angle, that caused the fly by wire protection to assume, the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310.

http://www.aeroinside.com/item...
cnn.slashdot.org by Yakasha · 2014-12-30 05:21 · Score: 1

nt
daytime crash? by supernova87a · 2014-12-30 05:42 · Score: 1

What I find somewhat puzzling is how this happened in daylight. In AF447 and others where pilots lost control or were confused by conflicting instrument readings, it was during night or poor visibility and they lost reference to the horizon. This was at 7am Singapore time, and although there were storm clouds, I would have thought that at least for some portion of the incident, the horizon would have been visible?

This of course assumes that the problem was a loss of attitude control due to instruments.
1. Re:daytime crash? by Verminator · 2014-12-30 06:28 · Score: 1
  
  Day or night is irrelevant if the aircraft was in IMC (Instrument Maneuvering Conditions) - exterior view is useless for attitude control when you're in the soup.
  
  --
  "The more corrupt the state, the more it legislates." - Tacitus
2. Re:daytime crash? by bledri · 2014-12-30 07:13 · Score: 1
  
  What I find somewhat puzzling is how this happened in daylight. In AF447 and others where pilots lost control or were confused by conflicting instrument readings, it was during night or poor visibility and they lost reference to the horizon. This was at 7am Singapore time, and although there were storm clouds, I would have thought that at least for some portion of the incident, the horizon would have been visible? This of course assumes that the problem was a loss of attitude control due to instruments.
  They were likely in clouds (remember they were trying to avoid a thunderstorm.) They probably had extremely poor visibility.
  
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West Caribbean crash was similar by 140Mandak262Jamuna · 2014-12-30 06:03 · Score: 2

West Caribbean was flying an older plane, MD-80 I think. The pilot had turned on de-icers which bleed hot compressed air from the engine. That resulted in engine having less power/thrust. The plane was nearly at its service ceiling at that time. Turning on the de-icers reduced the service ceiling to FL310 and the plane was at FL330 or so. Plane was flying through severe storm, vertical gusts stalled the plane. The plane went into a stall, the co-pilot correctly diagnosed it and reported it to the captain. But captain tried to climb to FL350, way above the service ceiling with de-icers. Plane stalled and fell to the ground.
This Air Asia plane was asking permission to climb to FL380 from FL310 in a storm. But as others have noted, Air Bus has issues with pitot tubes icing over and the flight control computers getting confused.

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sed -e 's/Chuck Norris/Rajnikant/g' joke > fact
Re:Lufthansa had an incident which might be relate by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 06:12 · Score: 0

Seems more likely that AirAsia was brought down by the storm they were trying to dodge, no?
370 + 17 + 8501 by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 06:36 · Score: 0

You do the math!
Re:Lufthansa had an incident which might be relate by fustakrakich · 2014-12-30 06:36 · Score: 2

Yes, there is an Airworthiness Directive (caution:pdf) about that little issue. For some some reason, Airbus won't give the pilots an angle of attack indicator either. It is one of the most basic and important things to know when flying a fixed wing aircraft.

--
“He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
Poor AirAsia by fustakrakich · 2014-12-30 06:47 · Score: 1

You gotta have just a little sympathy...

--
“He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
1. Re:Poor AirAsia by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 08:57 · Score: 0
  
  AirAsia is notorious for its bad safety. I think it's one of the airlines in Asia which have "pay to fly" FOs. That's right, there are people who can afford to pay 50k$ per year for the chance to fly as a FO and some cash-strapped airlines in Asia take them up on the offer (and for more money, you can eventually be upgraded to captain). Frankly, it's strange that there aren't more crashes there.
2. Re:Poor AirAsia by dgatwood · 2014-12-30 10:44 · Score: 1
  
  From what I've read, you're completely wrong. This crash broke an eighteen year perfect record of zero fatalities for this airline, and this particular airline (unlike many others in the region) does not do pay-to-fly.
  
  --
  Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.
what? by slashmydots · 2014-12-30 07:39 · Score: 1

"radar data from Malaysia that suggested the aircraft was climbing at a speed of 353 knots, about 100 knots too slow, and that it might have stalled. "
I thought climbing too quickly stalls an engine. Why would climbing slowly in denser air that can run the engines better cause it to stall? Any pilots know what they're talking about? (or do they mean it was going too slow while climbing as opposed to climbing at too low of a rate).
1. Re:what? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 07:59 · Score: 0
  
  Not an engine stall, an aircraft stall. The plane was moving too slowly to generate enough lift to fly.
2. Re:what? by Lab+Rat+Jason · 2014-12-30 08:02 · Score: 1
  
  I think that 353 knots refers to forward airspeed... meaning that more airspeed is required to climb without stalling... such speed might be appropriate for lower altitude, like a landing profile, but not for climbing while at altitude. I'm not a pilot though, this is just my understanding.
  
  --
  Which has more power: the hammer, or the anvil?
3. Re:what? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 08:58 · Score: 1
  
  Yes. A rate of climb at 353 kts (vertical speed) would mean reaching 30000 ft in about 50 seconds. Rate of climb is typically given in feet/minute (typical values up to +/- 5000 ft/min).
  The thrust / power generated by the engines is used to overcome drag, accelerate, and climb. Normally, at higher speeds more power is needed to overcome drag, leaving less power to climb. Except when reducing speed so much that the lift generated no longer is sufficient, and the engine output is creating the remaining lift (nose-up attitude allows this, but typically such condition is not very stable). Somewhere in between is the best climb (most power available to climb).
  Going too slow while climbing reduces the rate of climb (up to down to zero), and puts the plane in an ugly flying state, no longer aerodynamically, but on the thrust of the engine. Slightly slower (or not perfectly balanced, in ugly weather), and things are over.
4. Re:what? by ceoyoyo · 2014-12-30 09:09 · Score: 2
  
  Engines don't stall, wings do. If your wings aren't passing through the air fast enough or are at too high an angle of attack (or both) the airflow over them becomes turbulent and the amount of lift the wing generates drops abruptly.
  In aircraft with straight wings that can result in you being screwed. Aircraft with swept wings are generally designed so that the inside, further forward part of the wing stalls first. That means that a stall drops the nose, lowering the angle of attack and increasing airspeed. When that happens, so long as you have sufficient altitude and follow the correct procedure for the aircraft, stalls are recoverable. Correct procedure usually involves some variation of "stop trying to pull out of the dive until you have sufficient airspeed".
  A plane climbing at a slow speed in a storm could mean they were trying to climb at too high an angle of attack and stalled. Or it could be more complicated. Thunderstorms have lots of strong winds. If the plane started climbing in a strong head wind and then flew out of that wind zone, it could stall abruptly.
5. Re:what? by ceoyoyo · 2014-12-30 09:13 · Score: 1
  
  PS: a speed in knots indicates airspeed, not climb rate. Climb rates are in feet per minute or, rarely, m/s.
6. Re:what? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 09:41 · Score: 0
  
  The blades in a turbine engines can stall too, caused by turbulent airflow and resulting in an engine flameout.
  Here's a case where 2 pilots were screwing around in an empty jet, stalled the wings which spun the aircraft which stalled the engines:
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pinnacle_Airlines_Flight_3701
7. Re:what? by Virtucon · 2014-12-30 09:55 · Score: 1
  
  there is compressor stall. and the FAA does have air worthyness directives to cover specifically A320/321 aircraft regarding problems with compressor stall. Until they recover the flight data and cockpit voice recorders all of the information being put out there is speculative.
  
  --
  Harrison's Postulate - "For every action there is an equal and opposite criticism"
8. Re:what? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 17:48 · Score: 1
  
  "throw a frozen goose through it."
  That will result in a sudden loss or significant reduction of power. The engine will not keep trucking.
  The frozen goose test is about ensuring that the engine does not suffer an un-contained engine failure. That is, no shrapnel leaves the engine pod, where it can further damage the aircraft. I'm unaware of any modern turbo-fan engine that can survive a frozen goose and keep on trucking. (Severe hail can do the same thing). This is why (still) so many aircraft incidents are caused by bird strike.
9. Re:what? by thegarbz · 2014-12-30 17:57 · Score: 1
  
  Engines can stall, especially turbines, compressors etc. The mechanism for stalling a turbine is the same as stalling a wing, flow and pressure imbalances prevents the blades from pushing air. They have been known to stall in the past but it's painfully obvious when they do, they make a really loud bang repeatedly several times a second and start shaking the wing.
10. Re:what? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-31 07:00 · Score: 0
  
  In aircraft with straight wings that can result in you being screwed. Aircraft with swept wings are generally designed so that the inside, further forward part of the wing stalls first.
  You're talking about twist or washout. And it applies to straight-wing'd airplanes as well. Yes, the idea is to have the inner portion of the wing stall before the outer, but that's in order to maintain control effectiveness, (ailerons are usually on the outer part of the wing), as the plane approaches/enters a stall.
11. Re:what? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-31 07:03 · Score: 0
  
  they make a really loud bang repeatedly...
  That and the really cool fire that shoots out the back of the motor. :)
Re:West Caribbean crash was similar by elbonia · 2014-12-30 07:46 · Score: 2

I belive you are thinking of flight 708 which crashed in Aug 05. The captain was very fatigued since the crew had not received regular paychecks in several months, and the captain had reportedly been forced to moonlight as a bartender to provide income for his family.
Dilution of Suspicion in Tragedy (DOSIT) by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 08:02 · Score: 0

Who was on that flight that posed possible and probable trouble for the world's oligarchs? This should always be QUESTION ZERO.
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Re:West Caribbean crash was similar by fnj · 2014-12-30 08:28 · Score: 1

Any pilot who can't recover from a stall in 10,000 vertical metres is not even worthy of the job description. It is incomprehensible. Even in zero visibility in a piece of video game garbage like an Airbus, he's got an altimeter, right?
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Why do they want to climb? by Milharis · 2014-12-30 10:49 · Score: 1

It's probably not the (only) reason for the crash, but I don't understand why they want to climb in this situation. The Air France flight did the same IIRC.
They can't hope to outclimb a CB and at FL390, the difference between stall speed and VNE gets pretty damn small.
Maybe it was too late to do anything else, but then they really need to improve their weather forecast in the area.
1. Re:Why do they want to climb? by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 17:53 · Score: 0
  
  Climbing has its advantages at times. Often, it's to avoid turbulance, which is frequently associated with a specific altitude range. Or it can be to escape the clouds and gain better visibility by getting a clear look around, so the pilots can avoid flying into the really nasty parts of the storm.
Pilot has the Last Word by sycodon · 2014-12-30 11:03 · Score: 1

It should be noted that the Pilot is responsible for the safety of everyone on board and has the very last word on it.
Assuming that the pilot was trying to avoid a dangerous thunderstorm that he had reason to believe would imperil the aircraft and passengers, he could have and should have changed course and/or altitude and tell ATC to fuck off, but keep them apprised at the same time so they can move others out of the way.

--
When Fascism comes to America, it will call itself Anti-Fascism, and tell you to give up your guns.
1. Re:Pilot has the Last Word by jrumney · 2014-12-30 16:47 · Score: 1
  
  So had sycodon been pilot, we would have been picking up the remains of two plane loads of passengers right now, due to a mid-air collision between his plane and the one that was flying an intersecting course at 34000 feet at the time air traffic control denied permission to climb from 32000 to 38000 feet.
2. Re:Pilot has the Last Word by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 17:43 · Score: 0
  
  " he could have and should have changed course and/or altitude and tell ATC to fuck off"
  A pilot can _only_ do this iff they have declared an emergency. Falsely declaring an emergency, or deliberately ignoring ATC directions is a good way to lose your license. Ignoring ATC instructions not only endangers you're own aircraft, but others that are sharing the sky.
3. Re:Pilot has the Last Word by sycodon · 2014-12-31 02:46 · Score: 1
  
  Declare the Emergency, advise ATC of your intentions, and they move everyone out of the way. That's the way it works.
  
  --
  When Fascism comes to America, it will call itself Anti-Fascism, and tell you to give up your guns.
4. Re:Pilot has the Last Word by sycodon · 2014-12-31 02:47 · Score: 1
  
  And he should have declared an Emergency if he thought the weather in front of him was dangerous.
  
  --
  When Fascism comes to America, it will call itself Anti-Fascism, and tell you to give up your guns.
Re:Lufthansa had an incident which might be relate by Admiral_Bob2000 · 2014-12-30 12:56 · Score: 1

There was a very similar crash involving frozen/jammed angle-of-attack (AOA) sensors with another A320 back in 2008, XL Airways flight 888T:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
In this case it was caused by aircraft maintenance personnel not covering up the sensors properly when repainting the livery, causing paint-related or cleaning chemicals to fill the gaps inside the AOA sensor housing and later freeze in-place once the aircraft was airborne - which caused confusion among the pilots when the aircraft's flight envelope protection didn't work as expected during some test manoeuvres (since the AOA sensors were sending conflicting information to the ADIRU).
Regarding AOA gauges on Airbus aircraft - I find it rather perplexing that the early A320s had an analogue AOA gauge (left of the primary flight display screen) - here's a demonstration video dating back to 1988 where the pilot clearly points to the AOA gauge while demonstrating the flight envelope protection:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?...
If you look at photos of the cockpits of the A320-1xx series aircraft, most of them have this gauge installed. I can't figure out why Airbus would remove it (instead of at least integrating it into the main display at the very least).
Re:Lufthansa had an incident which might be relate by Admiral_Bob2000 · 2014-12-30 13:02 · Score: 1

Correction: I should say "similar incident", not "crash", sorry (although the XL888T flight was a crash).
Re:West Caribbean crash was similar by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-30 18:08 · Score: 0

If it were a Cessna, yes. But a commercial airliner is a very different beast.
Consider that the aircraft's forward speed in cruise is nearly 1000 ft / sec.
If that forward speed is converted to downward vertical speed through mishandling or other unfortunate situation, then a ground impact is less than a minute away.
Consider that the next time you are smugly crusing at 35,000 ft on a typical commercial flight.
Commercial airline crews generally have plenty of time to deal with most abnormal situations. They will refer to the emergency procedures handbook, and read through the appropriate checklist. This typically takes several minutes. In a stall situation, it's typically all over long before there's time to troubleshoot the problem in a systematic fashion. Don't forget, when you're cruising at altitude, the ground is just a minute away - much closer than it might seem...
Re:West Caribbean crash was similar by Anonymous Coward · 2014-12-31 06:06 · Score: 0

Wow, the Republicans really do hate us. Forcing a pilot to work two or more jobs to make ends meet is ridiculous. They really do have contempt for everyone that works for a living.