NSA Official: Supporting Backdoored Random Number Generator Was "Regrettable"
Trailrunner7 writes In a new article in an academic math journal, the NSA's director of research says that the agency's decision not to withdraw its support of the Dual EC_DRBG random number generator after security researchers found weaknesses in it and questioned its provenance was a "regrettable" choice. Michael Wertheimer, the director of researcher at the National Security Agency, wrote in a short piece in Notices, a publication of the American Mathematical Society, that even during the standards development process for Dual EC many years ago, members of the working group focused on the algorithm raised concerns that it could have a backdoor in it. The algorithm was developed in part by the NSA and cryptographers were suspect of it from the beginning. "With hindsight, NSA should have ceased supporting the dual EC_DRBG algorithm immediately after security researchers discovered the potential for a trapdoor. In truth, I can think of no better way to describe our failure to drop support for the Dual_EC_DRBG algorithm as anything other than regrettable," Wertheimer wrote in a piece in Notices' February issue.
Parse his words carefully. He never admits that the NSA actually engineered the backdoor into the algorithm, he only states that he regrets supporting the algorithm after other people pointed out it was backdoored.
This is basically equivalent to the mealy-mouthed apologies you hear from young children after they've done something wrong but absolutely refuse to fess up about it.
To ensure it's inclusion as default in RSA products.
Yup. $10M to use it as the default encryption mode. They also tried to require it for FIPS certification so pardon my gasps of disbelief.