Bank Hackers Steal Millions Via Malware
An anonymous reader writes: When cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Lab was called in to investigate ATMs that had begun dispensing cash without input from users, they expected to find a simple problem. Instead, they found the ATMs were just the tip of the iceberg. The bank's internal computer systems were completely compromised, and in addition to the slow but steady siphoning of funds through physical machines, a criminal group was quietly transferring millions of dollars into foreign bank accounts. A report set to be published on Monday shows the attack extended to over 100 banks in 30 nations.
"Kaspersky Lab says it has seen evidence of $300 million in theft from clients, and believes the total could be triple that. But that projection is impossible to verify because the thefts were limited to $10 million a transaction, though some banks were hit several times. In many cases the hauls were more modest, presumably to avoid setting off alarms." Kaspersky Lab is unable to name the banks involved because of non-disclosure agreements, and no banks have come forward to acknowledge the breach. "The silence around the investigation appears motivated in part by the reluctance of banks to concede that their systems were so easily penetrated, and in part by the fact that the attacks appear to be continuing."
"Kaspersky Lab says it has seen evidence of $300 million in theft from clients, and believes the total could be triple that. But that projection is impossible to verify because the thefts were limited to $10 million a transaction, though some banks were hit several times. In many cases the hauls were more modest, presumably to avoid setting off alarms." Kaspersky Lab is unable to name the banks involved because of non-disclosure agreements, and no banks have come forward to acknowledge the breach. "The silence around the investigation appears motivated in part by the reluctance of banks to concede that their systems were so easily penetrated, and in part by the fact that the attacks appear to be continuing."
We can and do use the insecure internet to securely transmit information.
All to often we do it wrong though. Doing it wrong means we can be fooled.
Sometimes we do it wrong on a technical level, such as using out of date encryption, fundamentally broken encryption, or worse.
Sometimes we do it on a human level, such as not occasionally verifying that the account-holder or bank employee is the one and only person who has used his credendials recently using a non-technical means.
Sometimes we do it wrong in our business practices, such as by not doing frequent-enough random audits and not forseeing that a particular type of attack is worth monitoring for. I will grant some leeway here in that "ridk management" != "risk elimination."
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.