OPSEC For Activists, Because Encryption Is No Guarantee
Nicola Hahn writes: "In the wake of the Snowden revelations strong encryption has been promoted by organizations like The Intercept and Freedom of the Press Foundation as a solution for safeguarding privacy against the encroachment of Big Brother. Even President Obama acknowledges that "there's no scenario in which we don't want really strong encryption."
Yet the public record shows that over the years the NSA has honed its ability to steal encryption keys. Recent reports about the compromise of Gemalto's network and sophisticated firmware manipulation programs by the Office of Tailored Access Operations underscore this reality.
The inconvenient truth is that the current cyber self-defense formulas being presented are conspicuously incomplete. Security tools can and will fail. And when they do, what then? It's called Operational Security (OPSEC), a topic that hasn't received much coverage — but it should.
Yet the public record shows that over the years the NSA has honed its ability to steal encryption keys. Recent reports about the compromise of Gemalto's network and sophisticated firmware manipulation programs by the Office of Tailored Access Operations underscore this reality.
The inconvenient truth is that the current cyber self-defense formulas being presented are conspicuously incomplete. Security tools can and will fail. And when they do, what then? It's called Operational Security (OPSEC), a topic that hasn't received much coverage — but it should.
How many pointless articles could be avoided if authors and editors understood the difference between a necessary condition and a sufficient condition? Of course comsec is not a solution per se, Ulbricht can tell you all about that! (And how many more pointless discussions could be avoided if everyone knew "per se" = "by itself".)
Wonder what the public key field is for?
If I'm the only one who can unlock your encrypted communications, then it's in my best interest to have everyone encrypt their communications, because then, I'll be the only one with total situation awareness.
It won't be in any of your interests, of course, because you'll be handing me my advantage on a silver platter... but you're all far too shortsighted to pay attention to such things.
Of course Obama and the NSA want you all using strong encryption. Stupid of you to give them what they want, though.
-1 Uncomfortable Truth