OPSEC For Activists, Because Encryption Is No Guarantee

Nicola Hahn writes: "In the wake of the Snowden revelations strong encryption has been promoted by organizations like The Intercept and Freedom of the Press Foundation as a solution for safeguarding privacy against the encroachment of Big Brother. Even President Obama acknowledges that "there's no scenario in which we don't want really strong encryption."

Yet the public record shows that over the years the NSA has honed its ability to steal encryption keys. Recent reports about the compromise of Gemalto's network and sophisticated firmware manipulation programs by the Office of Tailored Access Operations underscore this reality.

The inconvenient truth is that the current cyber self-defense formulas being presented are conspicuously incomplete. Security tools can and will fail. And when they do, what then? It's called Operational Security (OPSEC), a topic that hasn't received much coverage — but it should.

Comments

Have the courts determine facts first, not press.

[sethstorm]

[article]

That presumes that such information comes from parties interested in fact-finding and have not betrayed the trust of other individuals to gain it. Right now, such information from Snowden cannot be relied on as fact, but as a source of disinformation until a court can properly clear it.

Treating him and the "journalists" and "activists" as fugitives/co-conspirators is the only proper course of action until such are brought to due process. While the evidence against him is certain to convict, that does not give license to hide - it only gives license for others to find and bring him/others in.

Of course, that may be disheartening enough to have people do (-Infinity, Troll/Disagree/Overrated/Flamebait), but modbombing does not change the truth.