Lawsuit Claims Major Automakers Have Failed To Guard Against Hackers
Lucas123 writes: A Dallas-based law firm has filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California claiming Ford, GM and Toyota all ignored basic electronic security measures that leave vehicles open to hackers who can take control of critical functions and endanger the safety of the driver and passengers. The suit, filed on behalf of three vehicle owners and "all others similarly situated" is seeking unspecified damages and an injunction that would force automakers to install proper firewalls or encryption in vehicle computer bus systems, which connect dozens of electronic control units. "Toyota, Ford and GM have deliberately hidden the dangers associated with car computer systems, misleading consumers," attorney Marc Stanley said. The lawsuit cites several studies revealing security flaws in vehicle electronics. A 2013 study by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency found researchers could make vehicles "suddenly accelerate, turn, [and] kill the brakes." A study released last month by Sen. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) also claims automakers have fallen far short in their responsibility to secure their vehicles' electronics.
Yay, more class action lawsuits. Car owners prepare to get your 30 cent rebate forms ready! Lawyers, buy a new vacation home!
They're suing because, theoretically, some third party could make them the victim of a crime? Good luck with that.
In a 2013 study that was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), two researchers demonstrated their ability to connect a laptop to two different vehiclesâ(TM) computer systems using a cable, send commands to different ECUs through the CAN, and thereby control the engine, brakes, steering and other critical vehicle components
So you're telling me that if you have direct physical access to a car's ECU, you can issue commands to it? No shit sherlock. That is THE WHOLE POINT of the CAN bus. The only alternative would be to close down the bus and only allow "authorized" accessories to be connected to it - hello sky-high diagnostic fees and goodbye to useful bluetooth OBD connectors.
Call me when this can be done wirelessly. Oh and yes I did read the "What the companies failed to note is that the DARPA study built on prior research that demonstrated that one could remotely and wirelessly access a vehicleâ(TM)s CAN bus through Bluetooth connections, OnStar systems, malware in a synced Android smartphone, or a malicious file on a CD in the stereo" blurb - which still failed to materialize an actual working example of exploiting a CAN wirelessly.
Yet you don't see people demanding bomb sniffing technology to be added to all cars. If someone can get enough access to your vehicle to hook a cable into it, it's pretty much game over.
People would still want to know how it all works so they aren't stuck going to the dealer for service. So how do you reconcile the two?
That's how it generally works already. Important stuff is on one CAN bus (ECU, ABS pump, auto trans controller if it has auto trans, airbags, etc). All the secondary stuff like door modules (controls locks, windows, etc), cabin illumination, the radio/navi and whatnot are on a secondary CAN bus (or LIN, or..).
This way if your rear door module dies and manages to take down the (secondary) bus, the car still runs.
I don't see much point in securing it, as you need physical access anyway. I'd rather see it go the other direction, standard, open interface, instead of each manufacturer using a proprietary communication scheme. (CAN only defines lower layers).
This is like suing computer makers for people being able to hack a computer they have physical access to. It's not possible to prevent.
Sent from my PDP-11
Clearly some lawyer has some teenaged kids he's looking to put through school. But food for thought here. Having just gotten into analysing the ECMs in my car and figuring out how to analyse the performance characteristics of my car, I appreciate the ability to figure out what's going on with the vehicle without paying $1000's to the mechanic. That being said, I have serious doubts that a public/private key cryptographic authentication mechanism on the vehicle ECM would be shared with the consumer that purchased said vehicle and would ultimately eliminate the ability of people to work on their vehicles.
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