Chinese CA Issues Certificates To Impersonate Google

Trailrunner7 writes: Google security engineers, investigating fraudulent certificates issued for several of the company's domains, discovered that a Chinese certificate authority was using an intermediate CA, MCS Holdings, that issued the unauthorized Google certificates, and could have issued certificates for virtually any domain. Google's engineers were able to block the fraudulent certificates in the company's Chrome browser by pushing an update to the CRLset, which tracks revoked certificates. The company also alerted other browser vendors to the problem, which was discovered on March 20. Google contacted officials at CNNIC, the Chinese registrar who authorized the intermediate CA, and the officials said that they were working with MCS to issue certificates for domains that it registered. But, instead of simply doing that, and storing the private key for the registrar in a hardware security module, MCS put the key in a proxy device designed to intercept secure traffic.

Comments

The Web of trust only works

[Virtucon]

When we all agree to the same rules.

Re:The Web of trust only works

[Anonymous Brave Guy]

Trusting many different CAs has proven to be a bad idea

Trusting any one of many different CAs has obvious vulnerabilities, as this case demonstrates (and it's not exactly the first time the problem of an untrustworthy CA has been observed in the wild). The current CA system isn't really a web of trust, because it ultimately depends on multiple potential single points of failure.

One way or another, in the absence of out-of-band delivery of appropriate credentials, you have to trust someone, so I suspect the pragmatic approach is to move to a true web-of-trust system, where you trust a combination of sources collectively but never trust any single source alone, and where mistrust can also be propagated through the system. Then at least you can still ship devices/operating systems/browsers seeded with a reasonable set of initial sources you trust, but any single bad actor can quickly be removed from the trust web by consensus later while no single bad actor can undermine the credibility of the web as a whole. Such a system could still allow you to independently verify that the identity of a system you're talking to via out-of-band details if required.

Re:Are the CAs that do this revoked?

[BenJeremy]

THIS.

Make an example out of them, at the very least. I doubt MCS or CNNIC will do anything to disengage themselves from the Chinese government (Most likely culprit here). Revoke their authority and put an end to this nonsense.

Re:Google wants a monopoly...

[Shoten]

...on processing of your private information. It is in its interests to make sure everything is secure until the moment it reaches their servers.

And if you live there, China wants a monopoly on knowing your private information...plus incarcerating you and even killing you to harvest your transplantable organs should it find that it doesn't like something it learns about you. Like that you think Tibet should be free. Or if you worship the wrong god.

Please do try to keep a sense of perspective?

Re:One-sided relationship

[nitehawk214]

Because American voters can't see past the end of their noses. If congress enacted laws that increased prices on their Wallmart goods, they would be voted out so fast. Coupled with this the fact that the lobbies of corporations want to keep the status quo that keeps them rich.

Re:Are the CAs that do this revoked?

[Anonymous Coward]

So are we going to revoke Verisign's root CA certificate (and screw up the millions of websites that use their certs) when we eventually find out that the NSA strong-armed them into doing the same thing?

Bet the US can as well ...

[gstoddart]

Can't pretty much any high enough level certificate authority issue any damned certificate it wants?

You think America or any other country can't do this stuff? You think they don't?

Sorry, but when every other damned nation is spying and lying, WTF difference is it when China does it? You don't get to pretend it's OK for one country but not another.

Until we start designing stuff which is inherently more secure, and which doesn't have back doors for government .. this is the state of security. You may or may not have it, you have no control over that fact.

America doesn't want people to bypass their spy apparatus any more than China does. Let's not pretend this is any different.

Re:Bet the US can as well ...

[SuricouRaven]

The big difference is that China got caught. I'm sure the US has this capability too - but they use it only in targeted intercepts, so as to maintain deniability.

Re:Are the CAs that do this revoked?

[Holi]

If we are serious about trust then yes, otherwise this isn't the beginning of the end, it's just the end. If the cert's cannot be trusted and we are not willing to take the steps to preserve that trust then the whole internet economy goes poof.

Re:One-sided relationship

[gstoddart]

And, so what?

American spy agencies fuck with everybody else on the planet. Are you laboring under the belief you are special little flowers or something?

On behalf of the rest of the world, listening to Americans complain about what the Chinese are doing is pathetic.

Because you don't seem to give a shit about how we feel about you spying on us.

Revoke the certs

[Imagix]

At a _minimum_ MCS's rights need to be revoked. There needs to be an independent audit of any cert that CNNIC has issued _at CNNIC's expense_, and of their operations (both CNNIC, and the organizations to which they've issued certs), or CNNIC should have its rights revoked as well. MCS is completely untrustable, and CNNIC has to prove that they are currently trustable. CNNIC's operations need to be audited or they may just turn around an issue a new cert to MCS. (Or "MCS" with a new name)