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Are Bug Bounties the Right Solution For Improving Security?

saccade.com writes Coding Horror's Jeff Atwood is questioning if the current practice of paying researchers bounties for the software vulnerabilities they find is really improving over-all security. He notes how the Heartbleed bug serves as a counter example to "Linus's Law" that "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." "...If you want to find bugs in your code, in your website, in your app, you do it the old fashioned way: by paying for them. You buy the eyeballs. While I applaud any effort to make things more secure, and I completely agree that security is a battle we should be fighting on multiple fronts, both commercial and non-commercial, I am uneasy about some aspects of paying for bugs becoming the new normal. What are we incentivizing, exactly?

2 of 58 comments (clear)

  1. Enough eyeballs and heartbleed ... by QuietLagoon · · Score: 5, Interesting

    ... He notes how the Heartbleed bug serves as a counter example to "Linus's Law" that "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow."...

    I think the big issue with the Heartbleed bug was that the OpenSSL code base was so egregiously poorly written and maintained that eyeballs started bleeding whenever they looked at it. imo, the OpenSSL code base never had enough eyeballs looking at it to make its bugs shallow. It was painful to look at, so eyeballs avoided looking at it.

    .
    I still think that Linus' Law hold true, or at least is a very good guideline. I think exceptions like the OpenSSL code base are needed to hone the point that Linus' Law makes.

    I also take issue with the headline, as I do not think there is any one right solution for improving security. The improvement of security is a multi-faceted endeavour and an ongoing process.

    1. Re:Enough eyeballs and heartbleed ... by OzPeter · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I think the big issue with the Heartbleed bug was that the OpenSSL code base was so egregiously poorly written and maintained that eyeballs started bleeding whenever they looked at it. imo, the OpenSSL code base never had enough eyeballs looking at it to make its bugs shallow. It was painful to look at, so eyeballs avoided looking at it.

      I agree. Heatbleed is not a counter example, it is simply evidence that the original "Linus's Law" was not complete. A better version of it would be

      Given enough eyeball hours, all bugs are shallow

      With the definition of "enough" being dependent on the complexity of the code in question.

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