Google To Propose QUIC As IETF Standard

As reported by TechCrunch, "Google says it plans to propose HTTP2-over-QUIC to the IETF as a new Internet standard in the future," having disclosed a few days ago that about half of the traffic from Chrome browsers is using QUIC already. From the article: The name "QUIC" stands for Quick UDP Internet Connection. UDP's (and QUIC's) counterpart in the protocol world is basically TCP (which in combination with the Internet Protocol (IP) makes up the core communication language of the Internet). UDP is significantly more lightweight than TCP, but in return, it features far fewer error correction services than TCP. ... That's why UDP is great for gaming services. For these services, you want low overhead to reduce latency and if the server didn't receive your latest mouse movement, there's no need to spend a second or two to fix that because the action has already moved on. You wouldn't want to use it to request a website, though, because you couldn't guarantee that all the data would make it. With QUIC, Google aims to combine some of the best features of UDP and TCP with modern security tools.

Comments

What is wrong with SCTP and DCCP?

[jd]

These are well-established, well-tested, well-designed protocols with no suspect commercial interests involved. QUIC solves nothing that hasn't already been solved.

If pseudo-open proprietary standards are de-rigour, then adopt the Scheduled Transfer Protocol and Delay Tolerant Protocol. Hell, bring back TUBA, SKIP and any other obscure protocol nobody is likely to use. It's not like anyone cares any more.

Re:What is wrong with SCTP and DCCP?

[WaffleMonster]

SCTP, for one, doesn't have any encryption.

Good, there is no reason to bind encryption to transport layer except to improve reliability of the channel in the face of active denial (e.g. TCP RST attack). A feature QUIC does not provide.

Managing transport and encryption in a single protocol makes the resulting system more brittle and complex. Improvements to TCP helps everything layered on top of it. Improvements to TLS helps everything layered on top of it.

Not having stupid unnecessary dependencies means I can benefit from TLS improvements even if I elect to use something other than IP to provide an ordered stream or I can use TCP without encryption and not have to pay for something I don't need.

QUIC integrates a TLS layer into it, in a way that avoids a lot of connection setup time.

TCP+TFO + TLS extensions provide the same zero RTT opportunity as QUIC without reinventing wheels.

I have yet to hear a coherent architectural justification for QUIC that makes sense... The reason Google pushes it is entirely *POLITICAL* this is the path of least resistance granting them full access to the TCP stack and congestion algorithms without having to work to build consensus with any other stakeholder.

Re: What is wrong with SCTP and DCCP?

[Anonymous Coward]

No they don't.
IG TLS frames are unalgned with the transport framing, then a packet loss causes a delay in the interpretation of any data of that TLS frame until the packet is recovered. The means, practically, that TLS on TCP is lots slower when there is any packet loss. .. And packet loss is fairly common, at between 1.5 and 3% on "good" networks,and far worse in placed like India.

Re:What is wrong with SCTP and DCCP?

[swillden]

SCTP, for one, doesn't have any encryption.

Good, there is no reason to bind encryption to transport layer except to improve reliability of the channel in the face of active denial (e.g. TCP RST attack).

I disagree. To me there's at least one really compelling reason: To push universal encryption. One of my favorite features of QUIC is that encryption is baked so deeply into it that it cannot really be removed. Google tried to eliminate unencrypted connections with SPDY, but the IETF insisted on allowing unencrypted operation for HTTP2. I don't think that will happen with QUIC.

But there are other reasons as well, quite well-described in the documentation. The most significant one is performance. QUIC achieves new connection setup with less than one round trip on average, and restart with none... just send data.

Improvements to TCP helps everything layered on top of it.

True, but TCP is very hard to change. Even with wholehearted support from all of the major OS vendors, we'd have lots of TCP stacks without the new features for a decade, at least. That would not only slow adoption, it would also mean a whole lot of additional design complexity forced by backward compatibility requirements. QUIC, on the other hand, will be rolled out in applications, and it doesn't have to be backward compatible with anything other than previous versions of itself. It will make its way into the OS stacks, but systems that don't have it built in will continue using it as an app library.

Not having stupid unnecessary dependencies means I can benefit from TLS improvements even if I elect to use something other than IP to provide an ordered stream or I can use TCP without encryption and not have to pay for something I don't need.

So improve and use those protocols. You may even want to look to QUIC's design for inspiration. Then you can figure out how to integrate your new ideas carefully into the old protocols without breaking compatibility, and then you can fight your way through the standards bodies, closely scrutinized by every player that has an existing TLS or TCP implementation. To make this possible, you'll need to keep your changes small and incremental, and well-justified at every increment. Oh, but they'll also have to be compelling enough to get implementers to bother. With hard work you can succeed at this, but your timescale will be measured in decades.

In the meantime, QUIC will be widely deployed, making your work irrelevant.

As for using TCP without encryption so you don't have to pay for something you don't need, I think you're both overestimating the cost of encryption and underestimating its value. A decision that a particular data stream doesn't have enough value to warrant encryption it is guaranteed to be wrong if your application/protocol is successful. Stuff always gets repurposed and sufficient re-evaluation of security requirements is rare (even assuming the initial evaluation wasn't just wrong).

TCP+TFO + TLS extensions provide the same zero RTT opportunity as QUIC without reinventing wheels.

Only for restarts. For new connections you still have all the TCP three-way handshake overhead, followed by all of the TLS session establishment. QUIC does it in one round trip, in the worst case, and zero in most cases.

There was much valid (IMO) criticism of SPDY, that it really only helped really well-optimized sites -- like Google's -- to perform significantly better. Typical sites aren't any slower with SPDY, but aren't much faster, either, because they are so inefficient in other areas that request bottlenecks aren't their problem, so fixing those bottlenecks doesn't help. But QUIC will generally cut between two and four RTTs out of every web browser connection. And, of course, it also includes all of the improvements SPDY brought, plus new congestion management mechanisms which are significantly bette

Re:What is wrong with SCTP and DCCP?

[epiphani]

I have yet to hear a coherent architectural justification for QUIC that makes sense... The reason Google pushes it is entirely *POLITICAL* this is the path of least resistance granting them full access to the TCP stack and congestion algorithms without having to work to build consensus with any other stakeholder.

Many years ago, in an earlier life, I tried to make changes through the IETF to an existing protocol. I was responsible for one of the major IRC servers, and still am though IRC is effectively in maintenance only. IRC is a shit protocol - really, embarrassingly bad. So I set up a conversation - grabbed the developers of all of the major clients and servers, and got us all on a mailing list to try to do something about it. We ALL knew it was bad, and we all knew it needed serious overhaul - if not a complete scrapping. We'd even fantasized about a non-tcp multipathing protocol that would be more appropriate for IRC. But like hell that was gonna happen.

This was a group of people that, for the most part, didn't make money from IRC. It was a hobby. We had no corporate agendas, no major impacts to our livelihoods, and the only constraint to implementation was our own time. In the six months we spent, we managed to publish one draft to the IETF. It expired and we effectively gave up. Building consensus is hard, time consuming, and quite honestly not worth the effort when you're talking about this kind of thing.

Google is in a position to just do it, and honestly, I'm fine with that. Otherwise everyone would pop up with an opinion, and nobody would get anywhere. That's why we haven't seen anything come up to rival TCP, even though TCP is pretty bad for a lot of applications.

The only point at which I'd have a problem is if their QUIC protocol isn't completely open and free, and totally unencumbered by intellectual property constraints (patents, etc). Otherwise, go for it - and give me a protocol api/sdk in C so I can give it a shot.

Stupid NAT.

[SuricouRaven]

It's impossible to introduce any new transport-layer protocols now, because the vast majority of connected devices are behind at least one layer of NAT, and that means transport protocols can only work if the router support them. We're stuck with TCP and UDP, and no chance of deploying any potentially better alternatives.

Bring on IPv6! Coming soon since 1998.