POS Vendor Uses Same Short, Numeric Password Non-Stop Since 1990

mask.of.sanity writes: Fraud fighters David Byrne and Charles Henderson say one of the world's largest Point of Sale systems vendors has been slapping the same default passwords – 166816 – on its kit since 1990. Worse still: about 90 per cent of customers are still using the password. Fraudsters would need physical access to the PoS in question to exploit it by opening a panel using a paperclip. But such physical PoS attacks are not uncommon and are child's play for malicious staff. Criminals won't pause before popping and unlocking. The enraged pair badged the unnamed PoS vendor by its other acronym labelling it 'Piece of S***t.

Comments

Not a Piece of Shit

[EmagGeek]

The fact that the vendor did not use a strong password does not make the system a "piece of shit." It just means that the vendor did not use a strong default password.

Re:Not a Piece of Shit

[rmdingler]

Indeed, and any retailer who entrusts all their monetary transactions to a manufacturer's default password is probably going to slip up somewhere anyway.

Re:Not a Piece of Shit

[AmiMoJo]

It was probably the customers who demanded the weak default password too. Anyone who has ever developed a system like this knows that the users are basically morons and won't be able to look up the default password in the manual (which they lost years ago) and will call your tech support line instead.

I used to write software for fire alarms and the customers demanded the default password on everything (which was the first four digits of the manufacturer's phone number, back in the late 80s before the great re-numbering). Often they wanted a sticker on the damn alarm panel with the password printed on it, preferring instead to rely on locking the cabinet with a key. The fire alarm panel could control various vents and fans that were designed to extract smoke from a burning building, but people liked to use them for day-to-day climate control as well.

Most people don't care about security. If they get hacked it's someone else's fault, they are the victim. They just want an easy life and cool breeze in the summer.

Re:Not a Piece of Shit

[SCPaPaJoe]

One of the requirements of PCI compliance with the credit card companies is that you don't use default passwords in any equipment tied to the card transaction.

Re:Not a Piece of Shit

[Just Some Guy]

provide a secure configuration guide so that customers are aware of everything they need to do in order to properly configure their stuff

So much this. In the Slashdot echo chamber we presume that everyone in the world should be the security experts we are. No one outside forums like this thinks the way we do. Your average mom & pop grocer doesn't know about security, can't imagine what a "default password" is or why it would be bad, and sees a POS as an appliance much like a refrigerator or stove.

Tell a restaurateur that they're stupid for not changing the default password, and they're likely to tell you how your stupid home food storage and cooking methods are likely to give you listeriosis. We are experts in our domain, and expecting everyone else to care about it (especially while remaining ignorant of their specialties) is a major failing on our part, not theirs.

Re:Not a Piece of Shit

[tlhIngan]

Indeed, and any retailer who entrusts all their monetary transactions to a manufacturer's default password is probably going to slip up somewhere anyway.

Except it's likely the retailer doesn't know about it period. They buy a POS system, and it's actually installed, programmed and setup by the company they purchased it from. A lot of POS systems (excepting custom designed ones or franchisees who often have to purchase a specific unit from the franchiser) are purchased, set up, and installed by companies who do this. In fact, a lot of it is blocked out for customers (i.e., the retailer) by the manufacturer. The programming information and interface setup is often provided only to installers who are under orders to never reveal it to the retailer.

Sure, the retailer has a few "controls" (they could add/remove products from inventory, do inventory and other day-to-day operations) but other ones including setting it up with a server, or even setting tax rates or categories (non taxable, partially taxable, fully taxable, etc) require an installer to do it.

The retailer might not know of the password's existence or it could even be locked away under a anti-tamper seal put in by the installer so the retailer doesn't try to ... experiment.

Unfortunately...

[Anonymous Coward]

the 10% who managed to change the default password replaced it by 12345

Re: useless story

[Anonymous Coward]

Based on it being 6 digits starting with 166, I'd say it is VeriFone. Their card terminals have the same kind of 6 digit code starting with 166.

Not quite accurate

[gatkinso]

The vendor recently updated the default password to "166832".

Re:useless story

[Hartree]

It's VeriFone. Anyone who's been a credit card terminal tech could tell you that. Hypercom has a well known default password as well. Any competent fraudster trying to reprogram the pad would know it as well.

They have to put in something at the factory, so they put in a default. It's supposed to be changed when the system is programmed and set up.

I used to have the default password for VeriFone's 101 pin pads in muscle memory due to having set up so many of them. (Yes, part of the setup was changing the default to something else.)

Re:But it does

[beelsebob]

Which is why vendors shouldn't ship products with default passwords at all. Instead, they should require all users to set a password when the system is first installed.