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Submersible Photographs WW2 Japanese Sub's Long-Lost Airplane Hangar
Zothecula writes: Until the 1960s, Japan's three I-400-class subs were the largest submarines ever built. They were so large, in fact, that they could each carry and launch three Aichi M6A Seiran amphibious aircraft. The idea was that the submarines could stealthily bring the planes to within striking distance of US coastal cities, where they could then take off and conduct bombing runs. Now, for the first time since it was scuttled at the end of World War II, one of the sunken subs' aircraft hangars has been photographed. The M6A on display at the Air and Space Museum's Udvar-Hazy Center is worth seeing, if you get a chance.
the link to gizmag pulls up a giant best buy ad whose (x) to close button doesn't work.
In the beginning, Barbarossa was launched with the assumption that the Soviet Union would collapse quickly. This did not happen, for various military, economic and political reasons. On this basis, the Germans attempted to convince the Japanese to strike at Great Britain at places like Singapore and Hong Kong late in 1941 and facilitate their war against Britain. They kept the Japanese in the dark about Barbarossa.
Amidst the signs of obvious failure just short of victory in Russia, the Germans tried to convince the Japanese in October and November of 1941 to attack the Soviets from Manchuria. This failed, as the Japanese already had plans to invade the Philippines, Singapore, Borneo, and all associated islands to secure oil supplies. Moreover, they had concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviets they preferred to keep in place. So the Soviets ended up at war with just Germany and Italy. The Japanese ended up at war with just Britain and the US. The Germans, however, ended up at war with all three major Allied powers, by foolishly declaring war on the US just after Pearl Harbor.
The German DoW was predicated on a weak American response to Europe based on the Japanese threat. The agreement to focus on Germany between the Anglo-American powers confounded this idea. Even Mussolini believed that the focus would be on the Pacific after the Japanese attack, hence his declaration of war on the US, which seems insane considering the results just over a year later.
At that point, Hitler's (and Goebbels', judging by his diaries) only hope was for a cleavage between the Soviets and the Anglo-American powers. There was about zero chance of this happening with Roosevelt championing the alliance, but that was what he hoped for. When Roosevelt died and nothing changed, this is the point where he gave up hope and we can then segue to the events of "Downfall".
I don't think Hitler hoped for actual military victory post-Stalingrad. He hoped for delay in the war's end game to present a political situation he could take advantage of. His thoughts were rational, I believe, but unlikely from this vantage point to ever bear fruit.
HBI's Law: Frequency of calling others Nazis is directly correlated with the likelihood of the accuser being Communist.
"To the Japanese, machines of war--from the heavy machine guns to the tank--are only incidentals in warfare. We Americans realize that the infantry must perform the tasks of actually taking over the ground and holding it, but we use every available machine of war to prevent unnecessary losses. In contrast, the Japanese do not conceive of substituting the shock action of war machines for the shock action of infantry, and they merely strengthen the shock action of troops by the assistance of the machines. The Japanese Army is an army of men, supported by machines of war; ours is an army using machines of war. This is a fine distinction and perhaps not readily understood, but every statement of Japanese military policy bears this out.
A Japanese who has not tasted defeat will attack with a dash and a magnificent disregard for himself. When he has been set back on his heels, just once, he loses that zip and comes back without confidence and impelled by a morbid feeling toward death that might be worded as "Come on, let's get it over with."
He has found himself up against things he can't understand: For example, the way we use artillery (the Chinese never used it against him like that, and he doesn't know what to do about it); the fact that we prefer to sit back and stop him with well aimed rifle and machine-gun fire, and not fight it out with the bayonet; the fact that when we meet him with a bayonet we don't break and run; and, above all, the fact that his basic idea--that skill, bravery, and cold steel alone will win the war--is wrong."
-- "Japanese Warfare as Seen by U.S. Observers" from Intelligence Bulletin, May 1943
Shutting down free speech with violence isn't fighting fascism. It IS fascism!
I always thought the most practical combination of aircraft and submarine was the FA 330, a rotary-wing kite used by Nazi submariners to get their lookout higher to see farther. It was tethered and unpowered, but it was quick to set up, simple to use, and provided a great benefit to the sub in the last few days before radar.