Bug Exposes OpenSSH Servers To Brute-Force Password Guessing Attacks
itwbennett writes: OpenSSH servers with keyboard-interactive authentication enabled, which is the default setting on many systems, including FreeBSD ones, can be tricked to allow many authentication retries over a single connection, according to a security researcher who uses the online alias Kingcope, who disclosed the issue on his blog last week. According to a discussion on Reddit, setting PasswordAuthentication to 'no' in the OpenSSH configuration and using public-key authentication does not prevent this attack, because keyboard-interactive authentication is a different subsystem that also relies on passwords.
The unofficial official FreeBSD security posture: two layers, where the outer layer has a singular purpose in life.
Protecting sshd using spiped
Dictonary doesn't really mean English Dictonary, but a sorted list of common passwords and variations. Then just cycling through all of the entries. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.... The dictonary may well be based of stats and possible characters not used in english grammer.
Momento Mori
Time to leave OpenSSL and its vulnerability of the week behind.
This has nothing to do with OpenSSL other than that OpenSSH uses OpenSSL. This is a bug in OpenSSH itself.
Truth is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it ain't goin' away. - Elvis Presley (source: imdb.com)
I have a web server at home running openssh, open to the world (for reasons that are not critical here). I regularly have various idiots trying to hack in to it, which I find amusing.
The majority of attempts are done on root. It is not unusual to have thousands of attempts in 24 hours. They'll never get in that way; not because the root password is difficult (it is difficult enough that a few thousand guesses would not likely be sufficient) but rather because like any sane person I don't allow root to log in through ssh.
Occasionally I see "white pages" attempts, going through long lists of common names. They make usually no more than 3 attempts at each name (I presume one attempt is blank, haven't bothered to see what the others are). The problem with that strategy is that they pretty well never hit a valid name. Being as my ssh server won't respond any differently to a valid name than to an invalid one, they never get any useful feedback on that endeavor.
Now, important systems (say at large corporations) are probably targeted by more dedicated attempts than what gets directed at my server. I mostly see script kiddies from China who give up after 24-36 hours. These kids certainly won't benefit from this bug.
That said, I will still patch my server.
Damn_registrars has no butt-hole. Damn_registrars has no use for a butt-hole.
trying to move away a bit from the open source stuff just to avoid nasty surprises like this.
You don't know if there are more or fewer bugs in proprietary stuff since most bugs and vulnerabilities aren't made public and as such I do have to ask if this is really an informed decision on your part and not just bias -- you're seeing a lot more exposed bugs and vulnerabilities in F/OSS - stuff because they're more openly publicizing such details, thus you start to believe that there are more bugs and vulnerabilities in F/OSS - stuff to begin with.
I'd recommend a decent admin. An admin who, having to leave password authentication enabled for whatever reason, fails to secure his machines with good passwords (which is what this bug exploits) isn't competent to administer such "mission critical" hardware.
The first entry in my dictionary is now 'O0k9uehry&6$83'. Check and mate.
Most linux users don't know this, but the man pages were named after Chuck Norris. Chuck Norris fsck'ing hates noobs!
It's appears to be a non-issue for CentOS 6/7 as ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to "no" by default, which also sets KbdInteractiveAuthentication to "no" (the suggested work-around).