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Microsoft Creates a Quantum Computer-Proof Version of TLS Encryption Protocol
holy_calamity writes: When (or if) quantum computers become practical they will make existing forms of encryption useless. But now researchers at Microsoft say they have made a quantum-proof version of the TLS encryption protocol we could use to keep online data secure in the quantum computing era. It is based on a mathematical problem very difficult for both conventional and quantum computers to crack. That tougher math means data moved about 20 percent slower in comparisons with conventional TLS, but Microsoft says the design could be practical if properly tuned up for use in the real world.
Especially if the choice is between your data being secure or not.
Taking guns away from the 99% gives the 1% 100% of the power.
It is based on a mathematical problem very difficult for both conventional and quantum computers to crack.
Ah, that would be my federal tax return.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
TFA doesn't say what they're replacing the integer factorization problem with. Useless.
The reason for using math based cyphers is to reduce memory usage. You have a few hundred bytes and can generate the encryption key to encode/decode the message with it. Using math makes your encryption weak to advances in computers and algorithms, where using a one time pad stored in your petabyte file server is possible now, and the NSA would have to hack your computers or break in (for physical access) or control the companies that make your hardware and software to beat that.
The new quantum-proof version of TLS generates encryption keys using a different mathematical problem that's believed to be beyond the practical reach of both conventional and quantum computers. [emphasis added]
Okay, now you can "hahahahaha" all you want.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
They went into Shor's Algorithm, ECC, and such... but the article doesn't seem to show what algorithm they decided to go with that is resistant to quantum factoring.
Are they going with something lattice based?
Would be nice to have more details on what they came up with... 20% performance can be important, but what is more important is how the algorithm resists different attacks.
This article is about a waste of time.
Microsoft has developed an encryption method resistant to quantum computers, it claims. Alright? What is that method? How does it differ from current encryption techniques? Why is that well suited to encrypting against quantum computers? How did you come to that conclusion, given that you don't have one to test against? Are we just supposed to believe Microsoft when they say "Trust us, this is secure"?
To fight the war on terror, stop being afraid.
Ya, right. They'll just track your fucking battery instead.
Just like script was supposed to be asic proof..
Because we all know how well Microsoft secures things against traditional computers right?
The problem with one-time pads is securely exchanging the key and protecting it between the time of exchange and time of use.
If I want to open an account with an online bank or shop at an online store with no local brick-and-mortar location, either I have to drive/fly/whatever out to their nearest location or we have to agree on some mutually-trustworthy person to transport the key between us.
I guess we could agree to transport the key across the Internet, but to do so without weakening security would mean using another one-time pad or similarly-long key to protect the one-time-pad in transit. And around and around we go.
Now, what MIGHT be feasible would be for my bank to ship me a one-time "pad on a chip" that is sealed in a tamper-evident package and have me ship them a different one-time pad in a similar package. The "tamper-evident"-ness of the package would have to be foolproof of course, and there are probably a few other steps I'm leaving out, but you could, theoretically, exchange one-time pads at a distance without having to resort to quantum computers, meeting in person, or particularly trusting your courier. This wouldn't guarantee the pads wouldn't be lost-in-transit, only that they wouldn't be compromised-in-transit.
No, doing things with keys that can either be generated and securely exchanged on the fly or with keys that are public/private is much more practical.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
If I knew how to get 1GB of unique data (be in OTP pad or the real data) from the sender to the receiver in secrecy I wouldn't need encryption in the first place.
The value of a one-time pad is that if you can get data securely to someone else only during certain time periods, you can exchange your pads at that time then you can exchange data securely whenever you want to (well, until you use up your pad).
It's really useful when one party, say, a government, is free to "broadcast" the encrypted information, say, over shortwave radio, and the other party, say, a spy, is only a listener. For the spied-upon country to detect the shortwave radio the spy is using will be very difficult, especially if it's in a country where such things aren't outlawed (scratch North Korea). If the spy can sneak into the country with his one-time-pad (say, maybe it's buried in a hearing aid or something) then he's good to go.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
The super awesome part is that Microsoft automatically shares your encryption keys with your Skype friends so that they can read your https traffic too!
When (or if) quantum computers become practical they will make existing forms of encryption useless.
Uh, no. It will only make breaking certain popular public-key cryptosystems practical. There are quantum-safe public-key systems, and most symmetric ones are also safe (at best, using a quantum computer with symmetric systems is equivalent to halving the key size — with an obvious way to compensate).
"Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
I think I deciphered the message hidden within your comment, but as a woman I'm afraid that I cannot be of any help to you.
Your encrypted message was:
Decrypted, it reads:
Maybe somebody else here could be of assistance?
Is it needs to show you loads of ads in order to protect your data, albeit add free wil be available at a litle extra cost.
... THE trusted name in Computer Security.
A large number of people religiously state Software Patents are evil and should never be permitted.
If the claims by Microsoft are true, then a Patent should be granted for this "mathematical" discovery.
It is a significant improvement in security over existing encryption, and so deserves Patent protection.
I think that Patents should only protect PUBLICLY AVAILABLE products.
In this case Microsoft can sell IIS Server / Edge Web browser ($0 cost) with enhanced encryption and the Patent will protect them from competition.
Patent Trolls should be destroyed. They way to do this is to only allow legal action if you actually sell a product and other companies are reducing your sales or profits. If there is no reduction in sales or profits, your maximum gain from a Patent should be limited to $0.
It is so secure that a machine that hasn't been invented cannot break the code! However, with an abacus, all bets are off.
“He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/226372/postquantTLS.pdf
Post-quantum key exchange for the TLS protocol from the ring learning with errors problem
Abstract
Lattice-based cryptographic primitives are believed to offer resilience against attacks by quantum
computers. We demonstrate the practicality of post-quantum key exchange by constructing ciphersuites
for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that provide key exchange based on the ring learning
with errors (R-LWE) problem; we accompany these ciphersuites with a rigorous proof of security. Our
approach ties lattice-based key exchange together with traditional authentication using RSA or elliptic
curve digital signatures: the post-quantum key exchange provides forward secrecy against future quantum
attackers, while authentication can be provided using RSA keys that are issued by today’s commercial
certificate authorities, smoothing the path to adoption.
Our cryptographically secure implementation, aimed at the 128-bit security level, reveals that the
performance price when switching from non-quantum-safe key exchange is not too high. With our R-LWE
ciphersuites integrated into the OpenSSL library and using the Apache web server on a 2-core desktop
computer, we could serve 506 RLWE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 HTTPS connections per second for a 10 KiB
payload. Compared to elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman, this means an 8 KiB increased handshake size and a
reduction in throughput of only 21%. This demonstrates that post-quantum key-exchange can already be
considered practical.
... to believe that Quantum Computers don't already exist in the wilds of this planet.
Remember the Connection Machine? Massively parallel production computer that
sported 65,536 processors in the very early 90's. Its job was to relate huge piles of data
in realtime, like the motion of air molecules under helicopter blades. American Express
had one to analyse buying patterns. Then nothing--the company that made them literally
evapourated. The Wikipedia page for this remarkable technology is downright embarassing.
Guess what the Connection Machine's OS was called?
PRISM.
No shit.
I'm one of the authors of the research that was described in the article. Here's a link to our research paper for more information: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/5...
"Microsoft says the design could be practical if properly tuned up for use in the real world."
If it's only 20% slower than the existing algorithm, it already sounds quite practical for use. Unless I'm missing something, like the NSA whispering to Microsoft that it needs to keep this under wraps for now with claims it's impractical in the real world for Reasons.
Well, maybe some of the hardened distros, but your run of the mill distros have so much on them that hasn't been scrubbed from a security standpoint that it makes Windows look merely like swiss cheese instead of confetti.
If you are serious about security but still want a "full featured", not-so-rare-that-almost-nobody-has-heard-about-it, modern OS that runs on and takes advantage of a modern PC, look at either the security-hardened Linux distros, OpenBSD and other security-hardened BSDs, or maybe a custom-stripped-down version of Windows with all unnecessary services turned off AND having it sitting behind a special-purpose, minimalist, hardened firewall appliance. Oh wait, that wouldn't be a "full featured OS", nevermind.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
CFRG meeting. Mixing post-QC RNG into the TLS pre-master secret.
Forward secrecy even if QC cracks RSA or ECC.
Like with anything Microsoft, I just wait on the nice folks at TPB to crack it.
Except time works in your favor, you exchange the key at t=0, you update it regularly via the encrypted link, and to intercept this, an attacker needs to catch the first key exchange and all subsequent communications since they might include a new key update.
Since you don't know who your target is until t=n (sometime later), you would have to man-in-the-middle everyone all the time.
And to defeat that man- in-the-middle attack a simple adhoc key exchange, e.g. send it via email, and let the key update once.
So now your attacker needs to also catch all email too, post it to a forum, .... they need to intercept all those comms too.... send it by post, they need to intercept that too. You can see how it would be impractical to do this.
Really the certificate authorities have been shown to be NSA fronts and NSA/GCHQ were able to intercept tens of millions of TLS sessions, so the system needs to change to eliminate the certificate authority.
When TFA doesn't even mention the name of the underlying algorithm, could you at least skim through TFSlides and link to Wikipedia? Would spare all of us the guesswork next time.
What is going to happen when the FBI ask MS to give them the code to make modifications before it is compiled? As with Vista+, MS will bend over and say Please Insert!