Why Car Info Tech Is So Thoroughly At Risk
Cory Doctorow reflects in a post at Boing Boing on the many ways in which modern cars' security infrastructure is a white-hot mess. And as to the reasons why, this seems to be the heart of the matter, and it applies to much more than cars: [M]anufacturers often view bugs that aren't publicly understood as unimportant, because it costs something to patch those bugs, and nothing to ignore them, even if those bugs are exploited by bad guys, because the bad guys are going to do everything they can to keep the exploit secret so they can milk it for as long as possible, meaning that even if your car is crashed (or bank account is drained) by someone exploiting a bug that the manufacturer has been informed about, you may never know about it. There is a sociopathic economic rationality to silencing researchers who come forward with bugs.
and thousands of people die the same moment because some terrorist pressed a button. Of course, well informed, as the big data terrorist is, they will find out whether you are a muslim and your wife wears a burqua with even their ankle being covered all day, they will spare your car if you are one.
We only see risks where we've seen the risk actually causing harm. This is also a reason why its so hard to find motivation to fight against climate change.
Someone in the car industry needs to stand up and say "There will be no networked computers in my vehicles."
-- Thou hast strayed far from the path of the Avatar.
Disagree. Proprietary software is just as buggy and sometimes extremely buggy. There may even be NDA agreements that forbid revealing any bugs to third parties.
There are arguments that can be made that state the stakes are higher now (due to the interconnectedness of systems), and it is plain that the attack surface of just about anything is larger, but those still are symptoms, not causes.
On the flip side of that, those with power and money have amassed more, and that interconnectedness plays to their advantage, resulting in the psuedo-regulated oligarchy we see across most industries and governments today.
The invisible hand of the free market is a hand that will push all to wrack and ruin if allowed to be completely free.
Silence is a state of mime.
> You should read the articles. Because CAN is a multi-master communications
> bus any device on the bus has write access at the hardware level - it's only
> software controls that limit whether a device can write to the bus or not. Which
> is why the government-mandated ODBC-II interface is such a bad idea,
> because anyone can plug in to the CAN bus with a standardized connector
> and get complete control of a vehicle.
Why is so much unnecessary, security-risky, stuff connected to that device? In a worst case, have separate buses...
* the "entertainment" bus for wifi for "teh interweb", streaming audio, etc.
* the "critical" bus that controls car operation. Have it only *PHYSICALLY* accessable, i.e. only via physically plugging a probe into a jack. And none of the devices connected to the "critical" bus are radio/wifi/bluetooth/whatever-else externally accessable.
I'm not repeating myself
I'm an X window user; I'm an ex-Windows user
Hey right wing dumbass.... Union people don't design the cars, nor do they decide to ignore problems with them.
As to insulation from competition: you mean like making sure that we didn't have a race to the bottom like we do now? Because 30 plus years of right wing economics have worked so well for everyone. Just look at how wages and productivity have gone up! Oh, wait. Productivity has gone through the roof and wages have gone nowhere.
Even the front runner in your own party gets that 'free trade' is a disaster you know. That the rest of the party establishment hates his guts is rather telling too.
...M]anufacturers often view bugs that aren't publicly understood as unimportant, because it costs something to patch those bugs, and nothing to ignore them...
If it costs nothing to ignore security bugs that can cause car crashes and human injury, then clearly the cost of ignoring such bugs is far too low.
.
The question becomes, how can security bugs be made expensive to ignore and cheap to fix?
NDAs in proprietary software is there for a reason - to protect the software vendor against revelations that they have done wrong, all the way from copyright infringement (like breaking an open source license condition in their solution), backdoors, security shortcuts etc. If it possibly can exist it will exist in the closed code.
As being involved in the car industry - I can agree upon the observation. Just look at the Autosar platform, it's a collection of bugs in tight formation that has been sold to the car industry as the greatest solution since the invention of the stone axe. But for everyone that have been working with internet solutions it's revealed to be a very clunky solution that doesn't really improve things, it just adds overhead.
Today the car industry starts to look at Ethernet as a replacement for CAN, but then there are complaints about it causing a higher power consumption and therefore there's a "need" to do quirky solutions like separating traffic on VLANs on the same physical bus, and that separation into VLANs is enough to offer sufficient security against intrusions and overload attacks (intentional through malware or unintentional through bugs).
In addition to this it's worth to realize that when you buy a car you only buy the hardware, you aren't permitted to know anything about the software. So essentially the manufacturer could say that you can keep the car but we have to erase the software in it - leaving you with a 2 ton shell of steel and plastics.
If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.