Inside the Booming, Unhinged, and Dangerous Malvertising Menace
mask.of.sanity writes: The Register has a feature on the online malicious advertising (malvertising) menace that has become an explosively potent threat to end-user security on the internet. Experts say advertising networks and exchanges need to vet their customers, and publishers need to vet the third party content they display. Users should also consider script and ad blockers in the interim. From the article: "Ads as an attack vector was identified in 2007 when security responders began receiving reports of malware hitting user machines as victims viewed online advertisements. By year's end William Salusky of the SANS Internet Storms Centre had concocted a name for the attacks. Since then malvertising has exploded. This year it increased by more than 260 percent on the previous year, with some 450,000 malicious ads reported in the first six months alone, according to numbers by RiskIQ. Last year, security firm Cyphort found a 300 percent increase in malvertising. In 2013, the Online Trust Alliance logged a more than 200 percent increase in malvertising incidents compared to 2012, serving some 12.4 billion malvertisement impressions."
It costs money to vet customers.
For once we get to see the tragedy of the commons at work in an industry that deserves it.
If it's increasing, that means it's profitable. Don't expect things to change until there is an expensive lawsuit.
Until then, practice safe browsing, use ad block......even if you like to support websites by looking at their ads, it's not worth the risk right now.
"First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
But I agree with the general premise. It's just that the picture generally gets complex - let me explain.
The way an ad gets served is this. Places that show ads (websites, mobile websites, in-app ad spaces) are inventory. Inventory is of varying quality - an ad on the front page of the NYT is costly, whereas an ad on housewiferecipes.com or something is dirt cheap. Small sites sell their inventory to brokers, who pack it up with other sites to sell on advertising exchanges (the firm I work for runs one of these exchanges).
On the other side of the issue, advertisement costs money. A firm wanting to run ads will contract with an online media agency, which will create an ad and then find inventory to place the ad in. The firm commits to spending X amount of money for Y amount of impressions (hits), so if the agency can find inventory that performs (hits whatever ad metrics required, such as 'time in ad' or 'number of clicks') while being dirt cheap, it pockets the rest. If multiple agencies bid on the same inventory, the price of that inventory goes up (and the website runner makes more money), so it's a game of scooping up cheap inventory on random sites at the times they're cheap.
Typically, a given source of inventory (a site) will contract out to a large number of brokers in order to guarantee that at least one of them will, upon request, be able to serve an ad in the space. 90% of ad networks vet their ads to run clean, because running a malware ad is essentially a death sentence if you ever want to run any kind of premium ad (the ones that make you a lot of money) or buy premium ad space (lots of premium advertisers will specify they only want premium space, like the front page of the NYT). Above-the-board ad networks will run clean, vet their stuff, and charge a higher exchange fee, whereas unscrupulous networks (many based in eastern europe) will charge a lower fee and let all sorts of shit go through.
What does this mean? An attacker with a crafted ad that can beat cheapo mal-detection can buy cheap inventory on a shady network, intentionally outbid other people and pay a minor premium for that cheap inventory, and get their ads wherever they want. The ad network will get shut down if it was really egregious (since running a malware ad can theoretically open you to litigation from other advertisers on your network), but for every network that shuts down there's another that can pop up promising minimal overhead and minimal vetting.
The only real market solution is to whitelist a certain number of ad networks, and have sites commit to only running ads from those ad networks, but this segments the internet into the haves (premium inventory, high quality sites, premium ad networks, premium ads, all expensive) and the have nots (mom and pop sites with mediocre inventory that nobody visits because of the chance of getting cancer from the shit networks they have to run). Beyond that, this problem is unlikely to go away - it's simply too easy to game the system and put whatever you want into many adspaces.
Advertising companies obviously cannot ensure clean ads or do not care. Users are responsible for protecting their machines. The only sensible thing is to block all ads without distinction and permanently. This industry has nobody but themselves to blame for their inevitable decline.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
This is why I am not on board with the idea of https everywhere. Recently, I started seeing obviously malware ads in the middle of Words With Friends (OK, maybe Words with Friends is malware!!). Configuring my squid proxy, I was able to block not only the site that was serving the ads (gaseview.com), but also the ad network that I think was providing the links to the malware ads (mopub.com).
With https everywhere it is much more difficult to block such ads.
The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
please forgive my ignorance, if my prejudice is in any way misguided, but i am under the impression that the attack vector, in actual fact, is flash, as i cannot see how a simple image, or even a "normal" video, could possibly compromise a target machine, whereas i understand adobe is full of holes, deliberate or otherwise.
or, to put it another way, i've never seen a machine compromised, to date, after wiping adobe (hack, spit) from the system.
while i'm at it - am i correct to believe the company was actually responsible for jailing a man, a foreign national, without charges, for well over a year, in direct response to his having exposed the insecurity of an adobe "security" mechanism?
Well that was mighty TimeCube. I kind of get that you don't like AdBlock+, but I had to engage my geocities -> english translator. Really kind of sad /. won't let you change fonts and colors, because that would have been amazing.
I'm using Ublock myself.
Doubleclick isn't exactly your eastern europe shaddy site : http://www.theverge.com/2014/9...
You are probably not responsible and involved, and thank you for the informative post, I am sorry but your "we are vetting ad" in view of big network serving malware, sounds more like trying to stem the flow of the blood while pretending one is not wounded.
"The only real market solution is to whitelist a certain number of ad networks"
No the real only solution is to blacklist *all* ad network until they accept responsibility and utterly disable any scripting in their advertising, only serving sanitized text and sanitized image. And that is the minimum.
C. Sagan : A demon haunted world:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0345409469/
visit randi.org
They're getting ever more sophisticated. I got some sort of malware the other day that actually poses as a Windows update, which puts a permanent icon in my system tray with regular (3 or 4 times a day) popups about a "free upgrade to Windows 10". Luckily I don't fall for that kind of thing but I don't know how I got the virus in the first place.
== Jez ==
Do you miss Firefox? Try Pale Moon.
FTFY. The phenomenon is not limited to advertising networks.
Also, anyone that tries to make me feel bad about using an ad blocker is trying to tell me that they have a right to shove ads into my eyeballs. They can go fuck themselves with a chainsaw; my eyes, my rules. I am not obligated to punch your monkey.
Never underestimate the power of stupid people in large groups.
WWF is a horrible app.
Yeah, but where else can I watch panda wrestling?