Systemd Absorbs "su" Command Functionality
jones_supa writes: With a pull request systemd now supports a su command functional and can create privileged sessions that are fully isolated from the original session. The su command is seen as bad because what it is supposed to do is ambiguous. On one hand it's supposed to open a new session and change a number of execution context parameters, and on the other it's supposed to inherit a lot concepts from the originating session. Lennart Poettering's long story short: "`su` is really a broken concept. It will given you kind of a shell, and it's fine to use it for that, but it's not a full login, and shouldn't be mistaken for one." The replacement command provided by systemd is machinectl shell.
Just like he considers exit statuses, stderr, and syslog "broken concepts." That is why systemd supports them so poorly. He just doesn't understand why those things are critical. An su system that doesn't properly log to syslog is a serious security problem.
machinectl shell is only incidentally similar to su. Its primary purpose is to establish an su-like session on a different container or VM. Systemd refers to these as 'machines', hence the name machinectl.
http://www.freedesktop.org/sof...
su cannot and does not do that sort of thing. machinectl shell is more like a variant of rsh than a replacement for su.
Did an editor even glance at this piece of crap before it was posted?
a su command functional
a) "an su." Write it like you'd say it.
b) what's a "command functional"?
c) you've got all the right words... just not necessarily in the right order
a lot concepts
I think you accidentally a word.
It will given you kind of a shell
Can it has cheezeburger too?
systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
Emacs is extensively documented.
It's only in the systemd architecture that the init system is the component that manages all flavours of namespace. Therefore your argument is circular.
OpenRC++
openrc init scripts are fairly straight forward.
Coupled with gentoo's baselayout, and the config file layout is fairly normalized also.
I currently run Ubuntu 14.04, and see where part of systemd has already begun its encroachment on what *had* been a great Linux distro. My only actual full-on experience so far with systemd is trying to get Virtualbox guest additions installed on a CentOS7 vm... I've installed those additions countless times since I started using VBox, and I think I could almost do the install in my sleep.. Not so with CentOS7.. systemd bitches loudly with strange "errors" and when it tells me to use journalctl to see what the error was, there *is* no error.. But still the additions don't install... I'm soooooo NOT looking forward to the next LTS out of Ubuntu, which I'm told will be infested with this systemd crap... Guess its time to dust off the old Slackware DVD and get acquainted with Pat again... GO FUCK YOURSELF, POETTERING.....
THANK YOU, Edward Snowden!! Americans owe you a debt of gratitude (whether they know it or not..)
The main thing I noticed with Ubuntu 15.04 at work is that rather than startup becoming faster and more deterministic as claimed, it's actually slower and randomly fails due to what looks like some race condition, requiring me to reset the machine. So the general experience is "meh", plus annoyance that it's actually degraded the reliability of booting.
I also suffered from the "we won't allow you to boot if your fstab contains an unmountable filesystem". So I reformatted an ext4 filesystem as NTFS to accomplish some work task on Windows; this really shouldn't be a reason to refuse to start up. I know the justification for doing this, and I think it's as bogus as the first time I saw it. I want my systems to boot, not hang up on a technicality because the configuration or system wasn't "perfect". i.e. a bit of realism and pragmatism rather than absolutionist perfectionism--like we used to have when people like me wrote the init scripts.
You can ALWAYS "break out" of chroot.
If you get a shell in one of my chroot's used for security, then.....
In short: I think chroot is plenty good for security. There's no way in hell you are breaking out, without a straight up kernel arbitrary execution exploit.
> In short: I think chroot is plenty good for security
Check man chroot. The authors of chroot say it's useless for security. ,and more than security professionals like myself do. Let's find out.
Perhaps you think you know more than they do
> you get a shell in one of my chroot's used for security, then..... /dev, /proc, or other special filesystems
ur uid and gid are not going to be 0. Good luck telling the kernel to try and get you out.
There aren't going to be any
Gonna be kind of tthough to have a ahell without a tty, aka /dev/*tty* /dev. Can't launch a process, including /bin/ls, without /proc, so you're going to need proc. Have a look in /proc/1. You'll see a very interesting symlink there.
So yeah, you need
> mounted noexec
Noexec is basically a suggestion, not an enforement mechanism . Just run ld /path/to/executable. ld is the loader/lilinker for elf binaries. Without ld ,you can't run bash, or ls. With ld, noexec is ignored.
My company does IT security for banks. Meaning we show the banks how they can be hacked. When I say chroot is not a security control, I'm not guessing.