Slashdot Mirror
Advertising Malware Affects Non-Jailbroken iOS Devices
An anonymous reader writes: Malware called YiSpecter is infecting iOS devices belonging to Chinese and Taiwanese users, and is the first piece of malware that successfully targets both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices, Palo Alto Networks researchers warn. What's more, the techniques it uses for hiding are making it difficult to squash the infection. YiSpecter's malicious apps were signed with three iOS enterprise certificates issued by Apple so that they can be installed as enterprise apps on non-jailbroken iOS devices via in-house distribution. Through this kind of distribution, an iOS app can bypass Apple's strict code review procedures and can invoke iOS private APIs to perform sensitive operations.
Let the griping begin. Queue the fanboys from both sides.
So this doesn't work for apps downloaded from the iOS app store. For the vulnerability to work, you first have to download and install an Enterprise certificate, then you have to download and install an infected app from a specific third party website signed with that Enterprise certificate. This isn't really a vulnerability, this is the specific application path for installing custom enterprise apps at your private business. Don't go around installing unknown junk and you'll be fine.
YiSpecter's malicious apps were signed with three iOS enterprise certificates issued by Apple so that they can be installed as enterprise apps on non-jailbroken iOS devices via in-house distribution.
So Apple should revoke the certificate. Why is this a problem? What makes this newsworthy? What am I missing?
It should surprise nobody that malware makers find security holes. Apple is no exception. But the entire point of certificates is that they can be revoked in the event there is a problem. Revoke the certificate which should then disable the app. If it doesn't work this way then something is wrong and the certificate is pointless.
Every now and then, I read a comment from someone about how Apple must "hate" the jailbreakers, because they keep closing off the flaws which make jailbreaks possible. The reality -- as effectively demonstrated in this instance -- is that the flaws which allow jailbreaks also just happen to open your phone up to malware. Apple is far more concerned with what a malicious entity might do to their customer base through these flaws, then with what the jailbreakers are doing to their own phones. Would, that more people understood this.
Doesn't matter. If there is a security flaw where a certificate has been compromised then the only correct response it revoke the certificate. Yes this could be highly inconvenient but the danger of not revoking the certificate and disabling the vulnerability is worse. A certificate that isn't revoked when necessary is worse than useless. If the danger does not justify a certificate then what is the point of issuing one in the first place?
Indeed. In this case, it appears that the owner of the certificate (Yingmob Interaction Technology Co) is the author of the malware. Apple will likely revoke the certificate, revoke their developer credentials, blacklist/flag the developers that are on the corporate account, and seek civil penalties.
If the cert belonged to a big enterprise company like HP/IBM, you're still absolutely correct. Apple would revoke the certificate, and HP/IBM would thank them and apologize for their ineptitude at keeping their PrivKey safe.
In other words, Apple products are not well designed for use in the enterprise market.
Actually if you have a somewhat recent update, iOS 8.4 or 9.0 then the exploit is fixed. So enterprise users who get patches are just fine.