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Criminals Hacked Chip-and-PIN System By Perfecting Point-of-Sale Attack (net-security.org)
An anonymous reader writes: When in 2010 a team of computer scientists at Cambridge University demonstrated how the chip and PIN system used on many modern payment cards can be bypassed by making the POS system accept any PIN as valid, the reaction of the EMVCo and the UK Cards Association was to brand the attack as "improbable." After all, the researchers used a bulky tech setup that had to be carried around in a backpack but, as it ultimately turned out, a year later an engineer based in France found a less obvious way to perform the attack.
Improbable anybody would do it..
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
Just good to mention that Chip & PIN cards would not have prevented the Target breach in any way as mentioned in Brian Krebs follow up article:
https://krebsonsecurity.com/20...
"0 – The number of customer cards that Chip-and-PIN-enabled terminals would have been able to stop the bad guys from stealing had Target put the technology in place prior to the breach (without end-to-end encryption of card data, the card numbers and expiration dates can still be stolen and used in online transactions)."
If you read TFA, you'll see that the issue exists because people wanted the card to be able to be used without the PIN present, presumably in cases where a PIN terminal wasn't available. All that the hack does is convince the card to process the transaction as if it was a chip-and-signature transaction, which most places can choose to trigger by hand.
As long as you want cards to work without the PIN, they will be vulnerable to being told to work without the PIN. That's just a fact, unfortunately.
The other benefits of chip transactions, the best of which is that each transaction is unique rather than simply a relay of TRACKDATA with a M_ID and an amount attached to it (basically making stolen card transmissions worthless instead of the current "just as good as a real card"), still remain and are highly significant.
You're special forces then? That's great! I just love your olympics!
You'd think it would be obvious, but an attack never gets less good over time.
Of course the research attack was large and bulky. It had a full laptop in a backpack and a bunch of not very dense electronics and stuff since it was part of a research demo. Research demos are generally the minimum required to prove that something works.
Once an attack has been found the only vaguely sensible thing to assume is that it gets better, easier and more slick over time.
Then again, the banks were idiots in the first place and tried legal threats to keep it quiet. Because as we all know that makes security holes vanish.
SJW n. One who posts facts.
Just good to mention that Chip & PIN cards would not have prevented the Target breach in any way as mentioned in Brian Krebs follow up article
The CC number would have been compromised. But the PIN would be secret. The whole point of the PIN is that the CC# alone is not enough to complete a transaction.
Just good to mention that Chip & PIN cards would not have prevented the Target breach in any way as mentioned in Brian Krebs follow up article: https://krebsonsecurity.com/20... "0 – The number of customer cards that Chip-and-PIN-enabled terminals would have been able to stop the bad guys from stealing had Target put the technology in place prior to the breach (without end-to-end encryption of card data, the card numbers and expiration dates can still be stolen and used in online transactions)."
Correct. Chip & PIN would not have solved anything.
To provide an example...I used my Chip card the other day. The vendor was having an issue with their chip reader, so the POS operator put in an override to allow it to be swiped. So another easy way to by pass the Chips? Make a hack that makes the system think the reader is unusable.
Truth is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it ain't goin' away. - Elvis Presley (source: imdb.com)
This doesn't seem to be right. To make online transactions you need the CCV number on the back of the card. That number is not normally transmitted when you make a chip-and-pin payment. At least, that's the way it works in Europe, maybe the US chip-and-pin system is different.
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
Chip and PIN is secure if used:
1. With the card present
2. With a PIN pad
3. With online validation
Which is all it ever guaranteed.
Chip and Signature should help reduce card cloning attacks because unless the cryptographic key on the chip can be read the application request cryptograms will never be correct so the transactions will be flagged. What happens in the case of an ARQC validation failure is up to your bank, but they can hardly refuse a refund if they approve a transaction where the ARQC validation failed. (Well, they can, but they're likely to get shafted for it eventually)
However what this attack enables is allowing stolen cards to be used because the fake chip would pass through the request to generate the ARQC to the chip card. So if your card's stolen, report it quickly. It's the same problem with the contactless cards. If it's stolen it can be used until it's blocked for the smaller amounts that it allows, but it's difficult to clone (I won't say impossible but I have not heard of it being done) because there's cryptographic key on the chip which generates a cryptogram that has to validate before the transaction will be approved.
Chip of any flavour does not stop card-not-present fraud, so internet fraud and over-the-phone purchase fraud will continue unabated. It solves a different problem.
Rational thought is the only true freedom
"I used my card in the old insecure mode several times and then am surprised when the card got skimmed"? Really?
We in the US have chip and signature, and are therefore immune to any such attack involving a PIN.