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First New US Nuclear Reactor In Two Decades Gets Permission To Begin Fueling (ieee.org)

An anonymous reader writes: The Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar nuclear power plant began construction in 1973. The plant's first reactor was completed in 1996, and it began operation. Work on the second reactor paused in 1988, and only resumed in 2007. That reactor is now complete — the first newly-operational Generation II reactor since the 1990s. The new reactor has been granted an operational license, and it will soon begin fueling. While the Gen II reactors aren't unsafe, they're much less safe than the Gen III AP1000s. "Compared to a Westinghouse Gen II PWR, the AP1000 contains 50 percent fewer safety-related valves, 35 percent fewer pumps, 80 percent less safety-related piping, 85 percent less control cabling, and 45 percent less seismic building volume. ... If an accident happens, the AP1000 will shut itself down without needing any human intervention (or even electrical power) within the first 72 hours."

34 of 167 comments (clear)

  1. Stupid by Nemyst · · Score: 4, Insightful

    This is what the stupid scaremongering of the media, some politicians and many environmentalists ends up causing: instead of building Gen III or even Gen IV plants, we're finishing ancient Gen II plants because that's all that's been approved, decades ago. They are quite literally the cause for nuclear energy's relative safety concerns.

    If the government could make its mind up and stop wasting time, the US could rapidly diminish and even eliminate its reliance on fossil fuels without even having to suffer through energy shortages. Allow breeder reactors on top and you'd also eliminate the whole nuclear waste scare while being that much more efficient and cost-effective.

    1. Re: Stupid by binarylarry · · Score: 2

      Yeah but won't someone thingof the oil company execs and investors? This nuclear shit is going to fuck them over.

      Those lamborghinis arent going to gold plate themselves, you know? Now think about the poor metalurgists and day laborers whom will be out of work. Oh what's that? You didn't think about them?

      I didn't think so.

      --
      Mod me down, my New Earth Global Warmingist friends!
    2. Re:Stupid by RightwingNutjob · · Score: 5, Interesting

      I am. I have a job as an engineer in the military industrial complex. I've also been told to drop what I'm doing because of $BULLSHIT_ADMINISTRATIVE_REASON only to have to pick it up again a year or more later and waste time getting myself and the right people back on track. I've also seen my colleagues do the same, and I've seen all of get screwed by the fact that after $WAITING_PERIOD, the resources we had marshalled the first time around aren't quite so easy to marshal the second time around, especially when you pull the rug out from under people enough times, they don't want to work for/with you the next time when for real, I swear, we have the funding to finish it, promise. If it's true for the 10M programs I've worked on, it's true times a hundred for a billion-dollar power plant.

    3. Re:Stupid by MrKaos · · Score: 2, Interesting

      [sic]This is what the stupid scaremongering of the media, some politicians and many environmentalists ends up causing: instead of building Gen III or even Gen IV plants, we're finishing ancient Gen II plants because that's all that's been approved, decades ago.

      The 2005 Energy act prevents entities like that and local governments from interfering with the placement and approval of Nuclear facilities, including Reactors. Compliance for building a nuclear reactor was established by the NRC's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission so it has very little to do with the groups you mentioned.

      They are quite literally the cause for nuclear energy's relative safety concerns.

      I'd suggest that it is more the operator of the facilities not complying with the manufacturers recommended operating conditions for the reactors. Windscale, TMI, Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents all came about due to problem with the operator's procedures and had very little to do with the groups you mentioned.

      If the government could make its mind up and stop wasting time, the US could rapidly diminish and even eliminate its reliance on fossil fuels without even having to suffer through energy shortages. Allow breeder reactors on top and you'd also eliminate the whole nuclear waste scare while being that much more efficient and cost-effective.

      The Act mentioned above allows budget for those programs. Breeder reactors *create* more plutonium because they transmute the additional two fuel elements placed in them (palladium and lithium IIRC) into plutonium.

      It is not a scare though, it is a valid concern as Fukushima has really shown us that storing the spent fuel at reactor sites is a really bad idea when things go wrong.

      Burner reactors are a much better idea and EBR tested the reactor component of an Integral Fast Reactor facility (known as IFR) that actually *burns* plutonium at around 15-20% of the fuel load (compared to the 0.3% of existing BWR/PWR). Such technology answered pro and anti nuclear concerns by addressing issues of (spent) fuel storage (now fuel for this technology), reprocessing and reactors into a single facility. Additionally the reactor could consume depleted uranium.

      Personally, I think the solution for the Nuclear industry is to start with some sites around the US capable of containing the waste products and design it so that it can also contain reprocessing *AND* reactor facilities in the belly of a granite mountain. That way you save on the energy inputs required to demolish the IFR reactor safely by disposing of it "in-situ". By my calculations such a reactor facility would have a roughly 1.5Tw hour advantage, per reactor, over a Gen III designs, over the lifetime of the reactor.

      Unfortunately Clinton halted development on this revolutionary reactor design and W.Bush funded it's demolition, clearly showing apolitical motivations for preventing anything that could destabilize the oil and coal industries hold on the energy industry. I imagine a technology that answered infrastructure issues by producing electricity (coal) and hydrogen (vehicle fuel) would not be popular with established energy producers.

      My reading of the act suggests that oil and coal companies are using approvals for more modern reactors as a way to access taxpayer funded financial incentives as those companies receive substantial funding from tax payers even if they just propose to build a reactor and then don't do it. It's all contained in that act for anyone to read.

      There is nothing in the act that I could see that would prevent such infrastructure being planned and developed. Funding exists in the act and is available until 2025. The current 4-8 year political structure precludes any such visions manifesting as few politicians have an appetite for things that exceed their term in office coupled with educating the populous about why certain issues have to be solved.

      --
      My ism, it's full of beliefs.
    4. Re: Stupid by LWATCDR · · Score: 3, Insightful

      "Yeah but won't someone thingof the oil company execs and investors? This nuclear shit is going to fuck them over."
      Funny how such a stupid post get a 3.
      Less than 3% of the electricity in the US comes from oil.
      Coal, and natural gas are the two big fossil fuels used for electrical power in the US. While you do have some cross over between oil and natural gas it is not 100% as far as companies.
      BTW the same thing holds true for anyone that says that solar and wind will help cut the US's dependence on foreign oil.
      They are lying.

      --
      See my blog http://ilovecookes.blogspot.com/ for light hearted technical information.
  2. Re:Hooray! by TWX · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Have you ever visited a construction site after construction was stopped for any significant amount of time?

    I've been to a couple of commercial construction sites (ie, mostly steel and concrete, versus wood for residential) where construction had stalled for a couple of years after the property value collapse, and crews were literally having to break-up concrete because unfinished exposed rebar ends had rusted and that rust expanded the rebar down into the concrete, causing cracks to begin in that concrete.

    That was after only a couple of years. Imagine how bad it would get after close to 30 years. Buildings already have enough problems when they're finished if they don't get regular maintenance over the course of decades, but unfinished buildings that are not environmentally sealed will undoubtedly fare far, far worse.

    I know that nuclear reactors are supposed to be structurally overengineered simply due to the nature the forces they contain, but starting out with a handicap due to building structural problems doesn't sound like the greatest plan, and that's before account for all of the other technical changes that have been engineered through the decades. We've already seen problems in younger reactors that were finished approximately on their original timetables, this seems like it's asking for more.

    --
    Do not look into laser with remaining eye.
  3. Re:Less Valves etc by fustakrakich · · Score: 5, Insightful

    My car has two doors, does that make it less safe then a car with 4 doors?

    Well yeah, if you had to go through all of them to get out...

    --
    “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
  4. Re:...hours? by ChumpusRex2003 · · Score: 5, Informative

    The AP1000 has 72 hours of decay heat removal capability in the event of total loss of onsite power. If no action is taken to replenish cooling water, then decay heat would cause overheating and overpressure of the containment building and require venting of the containment building to the atmosphere. Radioactivity release from such venting is likely to be low unless meltdown or fuel damage has already occurred. Due to the large inventory of water within the containment building, decay heat is unlikely to result in meltdown for many days following the exhaustion of the containment cooling water.

    In order to ensure integrity of the containment, additional cold water would need to be pumped into the containment building roof tank within 72 hours. This could be by restoration of the electrical supply, use of diesel powered water pumps held on site, use of portable water pumps held near site, or by use of fire pumps.

    The ESBWR which is the main competitor to the AP1000, meets the Gen3+ requirement of 72 hours of decay heat removal without operator intervention. Like the AP1000, no diesel or grid power is necessary to meet this requirement. Like the AP1000, the ESBWR has 2(N+1) redundant UPS systems with 72 hours of battery autonomy for shutdown control and monitoring equipment. However, the ESBWR has a 7 day reserve of cold water for containment cooling. In the event of operator inaction, the UPS batteries will deplete after approximately 72 hours, but passive containment cooling will continue for up to 7 days before water tanks would need to be replenished.

  5. Re:...hours? by ChumpusRex2003 · · Score: 4, Informative

    The AP1000 has a number of on-site and internal reserve water tanks, holding close to 1 million gallons of demineralized water.

    The plant has several electric pumps capable of transferring water from the bulk tanks to the containment cooling system, which could be connected to portable generators in a serious emergency. The plant also has multiple connection ports for portable pumps allowing water to be transferred into the containment cooling system from the bulk tanks or from fire engines/water tankers.

    As the containment cooling tanks are at atmospheric pressure, only low pressure pumps are required, unlike at Fukushima where emergency response teams were trying to use pumps to inject water into the reactors at dozens of atmospheres of pressure.

  6. Less is more? by Dereck1701 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    The article goes on for quite a bit about how much less "safety related hardware" newer plant designs have but I highly doubt that that says anything about how safe a reactor is or not. What DOES make a difference is fail safes, regular inspections, backups, emergency response plans, all with a design double checked by someone with a high school level of common sense. What has caused most of the major nuclear disasters? Rank stupidity. Fukushima was caused by the idiotic placement of backup generators and associated control hardware, in a basement and the subsequent failure of plant operators to call for necessary resources. Chernobyl was caused by them futzing with the reactor outside of normal operating procedures and then activating an emergency system that was not designed to handle those modifications. Three Mile Island was caused by a lack of appropriate sensors to recognize a lack of coolant in the reactor caused by a faulty relief valve. Knowing the reactor coolant level/pressure/temperature with certainty, having the ability to shutdown the reaction, and the ability to keep the reactor cool are the only things you need to prevent 99% of nuclear disasters. I'm not saying that designing a nuclear plant is easy, but keeping your backup cooling systems above water, not experimenting with a full sized nuclear reactor & knowing if your coolant is pouring out of a relief valve would seem to be no brainers that shouldn't have been missed.

    1. Re:Less is more? by AmiMoJo · · Score: 2

      Fukushima was caused by the idiotic placement of backup generators and associated control hardware

      That certainly exacerbated the problems are Fukushima, but was not the cause.

      The earthquake damaged the plant, including the emergency cooling system and parts of the plant monitoring system. Then the tsunami did further damage and made inspecting critical parts of it impossible. Even after the emergency pumps failed, there was a working backup. They had fire engines on site that were pumping coolant into the reactors, or so they thought.

      What turned an emergency into a disaster was the damage to the emergency cooling system. The operators were unable to monitor what was happening, and so didn't realize that a critical valve was in the wrong position. Most of the water that they pumped in was syphoned off into holding tanks, rather than going to the reactors.

      You must expect everything to break, and have some foolproof backup plan, and then a backup plan for when that doesn't work. The AP1000 design is an improvement, but there are still ways in which it could fail catastrophically. Unlikely ways, but magnitude 9 earthquakes and 15m high tsunamis were considered pretty unlikely too.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    2. Re:Less is more? by thegarbz · · Score: 2

      The article goes on for quite a bit about how much less "safety related hardware" newer plant designs have but I highly doubt that that says anything about how safe a reactor is or not.

      Actually it does. When using the HAZOP / LOPA techniques which have been common in plant design for years you consider every safety related device as a Layer Of Protection. If you're targeting a common residual risk, then having less Layers Of Protection implies the process is either of an inherently safer design (likelihood of risk is reduced) or that the consequence of a major incident is lower. This is fundamental to how safety related devices are assigned; you start with where you are, and where you want to be, and then assign layers of protection to get you there.

      Now instantly someone may point out that if the residual risk is the same then you're not actually safer in the, which is true but this leads me to ....:

      Rank stupidity. Fukushima was caused by the idiotic placement of backup generators and associated control hardware, in a basement and the subsequent failure of plant operators to call for necessary resources. Chernobyl was caused by them futzing with the reactor outside of normal operating procedures and then activating an emergency system that was not designed to handle those modifications. Three Mile Island was caused by a lack of appropriate sensors to recognize a lack of coolant in the reactor caused by a faulty relief valve.

      What you are describing is called systemic faults which are a function of design (as opposed to random failures which are a function of statistics). With less required layers of protection there's less scope to screw them up and less effort required to maintain them in good working order. Preventing the above incidents should have been no brainers but unfortunately the entire process industry (not just nuclear but all process / production plants) learns through incidents. Looking back through the problems these sites experienced they are now the first thing we look at when designing process plants (low flow through a valve and high flow through a valve, are both HAZOP cases that are considered for every line in the process at design stage these days, and designers don't allow operations to override safety systems inherent in the design anymore).

      Never under-estimate the stupidity of people that need to be accounted for during the design process. Just as a personal example at a plant I worked at we found a valve jammed open with a stick, it was left there by a maintenance worker who was doing a maintenance job by a procedure which required him to "bypass" the safety system. The solution was not to punish the worker or fix the procedure but rather provide an approved software based bypass method complete with a standing alarm to operations to track when the bypass is in place so when someone bypasses a safety system (and someone WILL bypass the safety system) it can't be forgotten about.

  7. Re:...hours? by swb · · Score: 2

    Could they use the heated containment water to drive a Stirling engine which would pump more water?

    I'm not a nuclear scientist (let alone a rocket scientist), but somehow it seems like there's a way to (relatively simply) use the heat from containment cooling to pump water.

    And is there a reason the containment water couldn't be a loop with a cooling stage so it could be self-replenishing? It seems to make more sense if you consider the idea of the containment heat being used to drive pumps which circulated the water.

    I'm sure there are good reasons why this is a Rube Goldberg perpetual motion kind of an idea, but it seems like a way where as long as it generates heat it could pump its own cooling.

  8. Re:42 YEARS!?? by PopeRatzo · · Score: 4, Funny

    To be fair, the 42 year delay was so that they could convince the people of Tennessee that electricity wasn't the work of the devil.

    --
    You are welcome on my lawn.
  9. Re:...hours? by im_thatoneguy · · Score: 3, Informative

    There is a loop but it's the massive cooling tower. If however though the piping between the containment vessel and the cooling tower is destroyed you want a means of cooling outside of the intended infrastructure.

  10. Re:...hours? by aaarrrgggh · · Score: 4, Informative

    The backup cooling is a gravity fed system, once-through. The goal is simplicity for an emergency operation.

    Anything more complex is really just duplicating the primary cooling system.

  11. Re:Other way. Less likely to have a door problem. by CrimsonAvenger · · Score: 2

    The other way around. Simpler is more reliable. Suppose that each year, 1 door of 1,000 fails. Your car has two doors, so the odds you'll have a door failure are 2/1000, or 1/500. My car has four doors, so the odds that one of mine will fail is 4/1,000, or 1/250.

    Pedant Mode...ON.

    More properly, the failure rate of two doors in your example would be 1 - (999/1000)^2. For four doors, it would be 1 - (999/1000)^4.

    Which gives you numbers pretty close to the 1/500 and 1/250 you mentioned. The divergence increases as the number of doors increases....

    --

    "I do not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it"
  12. Here are details regarding the need by raymorris · · Score: 5, Informative

    Here are full details, with appropriate references, about the idea ending the reliance on fossil fuels in the US requires nuclear to be a significant part of the energy mix:
    https://docs.google.com/docume...

    The summary is that solar, wind, hydro, and geothermal can make an important contribution, providing a significant portion of our energy needs. A very significant portion cannot be solved by those four choices - for reliable, steady power in huge amounts the choices are fossil fuels or nuclear.

  13. Lots of power by tomhath · · Score: 5, Informative

    As I understand it the US has about 18GW of solar PV installed capacity with about a 28% capacity factor - so roughly 5 GW of actual power generation.

    These two reactors together will generate about 2.2GW with a 90% factor, or around 2 GW.

    One power plant, 40% of the capacity of all PV in the country.

    1. Re:Lots of power by ScentCone · · Score: 4, Funny

      One power plant, 40% of the capacity of all PV in the country.

      Well sure, but what happens when the sun goes down, causing that nuclear plant to stop generating power until the next morning, huh? How about THAT Mr. Smartypants?

      --
      Don't disappoint your bird dog. Go to the range.
    2. Re:Lots of power by Solandri · · Score: 4, Informative

      As I understand it the US has about 18GW of solar PV installed capacity with about a 28% capacity factor - so roughly 5 GW of actual power generation.

      PV solar capacity factor for the U.S. is about 14.5%, about 18.5% for the desert southwest for fixed-mount panels. This is a physical limitation imposed by geometry, the movement of the sun, and typical weather conditions.

      The 28% capacity factor the EIA gives for PV solar is for utility-scale PV solar installations. These generally track the sun and/or use concentrators (for some odd reason, capacity factor for PV with concentrators is calculated based on the panel's max generation without a concentrator - i.e. they can theoretically exceed 100% capacity factor).

      Power generation for PV solar in the U.S. for 2015 (Jan-Jul) has been 13,841 GWh. Divide that by the 5113.5 hours in 7 months and you get 2.7 GW average production. That's missing the fall and winter months for the latter half of the year so the average generation by December will be slightly lower than that. Doubling the Jan-Jun production yields an annual average of 2.6 GW. If you divide 2.6 GW by the 18 GW of installed capacity, you get a 14.4% capacity factor as expected.

      These two new reactors will generate 77% as much power as all of the country's installed PV solar.

  14. No one wants a beta reactor by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I think that no new nuclear reactors have been built in the United States, because no one wants a beta gen III+ nuclear reactor. In the West, there were 3 different nuclear reactors, Areva's EPR reactor, Westinghouse's AP1000 reactor, and GE's ESBWR reactor. GE decided to exit the nuclear reactor business. Several AP1000s, and EPRs have been under construction in Europe and China since the late 2000s. The EPR reactor in Finland is considered a screw up, and is getting major design changes. China hasn't been reporting many problems. Maybe China is better at building stuff, they haven't found the problems, or the problems have been kept secret. The UK thinks China is better at building stuff. None of the EPR, or AP1000 reactors has started commercial electricity generation, so the waiting game is a smart one for now.

    1. Re:No one wants a beta reactor by nojayuk · · Score: 2

      No-one wants a beta reactor, they want something that will predictably generate electricity at a reasonable cost. That's why virtually every reactor being built today, including the four new-build AP-1000s at Vogtle and Summer as well as the dozens of reactors under construction in China and elsewhere are an evolutionary development of the PWR/BWR concept. The design effort has been concentrated in ever greater cost efficiencies and safety enhancements in larger and more efficient designs generating more electricity per reactor unit.

      There are a couple of new power reactor designs not based on the well-tested PWR/BWR concept but even they are evolutionary; the new Russian BN-800 fast reactor which started up last year is an offshoot of the BN-350 and BN-600 reactors built in the 1970s and the Chinese modular pebble-bed HTR-PM now being built is using technology licenced from the Germans who had the ill-fated AVR and HTHR-300 pebble-bed reactors operating in the 1980s.

  15. Re:42 YEARS!?? by Applehu+Akbar · · Score: 2, Insightful

    "To be fair, the 42 year delay was so that they could convince the people of Tennessee that electricity wasn't the work of the devil."

    No, the time was spent vainly trying to convince liberals of that fact.

  16. Re:Hooray! by dbIII · · Score: 3, Informative

    Considering how long it takes to get turbine rotors for coal fired units of a smaller size (~ 5 years) a lot of it was probably waiting for parts. There's a bit of a queue for rarely produced items.

  17. Re:42 YEARS!?? by DeathElk · · Score: 2

    What about folks from Bucksnort? Or folks from Lynchburg bearing delicious gifts?

  18. Re:Message from Greens by DeathElk · · Score: 3, Funny

    No, that's a message from Bruce Dickinson.

  19. It was that way by dfenstrate · · Score: 3, Informative

    That was the regulatory regime beforehand, and it resulted in the most colossal waste of money ever: Shoreham

    The combined (construction & operating) license regulatory regime is intended specifically to prevent such wasteful endevours, The design, construction, and operation of the facility is approved largely upfront to ensure the plant can actually be operated when it's built.

    --
    Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms should be the name of a store, not a government agency.
    1. Re:It was that way by Orgasmatron · · Score: 2

      COSTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS - WHAT WENT WRONG?

      A major source of cost escalation in some plants was delays caused by opposition from well-organized "intervenor" groups that took advantage of hearings and legal strategies to delay construction. The Shoreham plant on Long Island was delayed for 3 years by intervenors who turned the hearings for a construction permit into a circus. The intervenors included a total imposter claiming to be an expert with a Ph.D. and an M.D. There were endless days of reading aloud from newspaper and magazine articles, interminable "cross examination" with no relevance to the issuance of a construction permit, and an imaginative variety of other devices to delay the proceedings and attract media attention.

      But the worst delay came after the Shoreham plant was completed. The NRC requires emergency planning exercises for evacuation of the nearby population in the event of certain types of accidents. The utility provides a system of warning horns and generally plans the logistics, but it is necessary to obtain cooperation from the local police and other civil authorities. Officials in Suffolk County, where Shoreham is located, refused to cooperate in these exercises, making it impossible to fulfill the NRC requirement. After years of delay, the NRC changed its position and ruled that in the event of an actual accident, the police and civil authorities would surely cooperate. It therefore finally issued an operating license. By this time the situation had become a political football, with the governor of New York deeply involved. He apparently decided that it was politically expedient to give in to the opponents of the plant. The state of New York therefore offered to "buy" the plant from the utility for $1 and dismantle it, with the utility receiving enough money from various tax savings to compensate for its construction expenditures. This means that the bill would effectively be footed by U.S. taxpayers. As of this writing, there are moves in Congress to prevent this. The ironic part of the story is that Long Island very badly needs the electricity the Shoreham plant can produce.

      --
      See that "Preview" button?
  20. Re:Hooray! by MaestroRC · · Score: 5, Informative

    A couple of comments. I worked at Watts Bar for 6 years - from just before they restarted construction until 2013. I now work out at one of the new reactors under construction at VC Summer.

    First off, WBN2 and WBN1 share structures. Actually, all the structures except for the reactor building itself is shared. The units are what is considered an "opposite hand" configuration, which means that essentially a piece of equipment, piping, or valve on the far west side of the plant for U1 would be on the far east side, at the same northing, for U2 with everything matching up in the middle. The units also share many systems, and in order for them to start up U1, they had to have those systems (and many of the U2 pumps, valves and other support equipment) in service. The units also share a control room, spent fuel pool, diesel generators, and more. The only completely independent structure is the reactor building, which was structurally complete when they halted construction. Most everything inside was complete (major equipment set, piped in, etc). Most of what was lacking were control systems, instrumentation, and some valves. Also, all of this equipment was under temperature and humidity controls during the layup period.

    One other thing - all of these structures are reinforced concrete. The unique thing about concrete is they get stronger with age unless you have something like saltwater causing problems. They're also *very thick* and *heavily reinforced* concrete - as in, the age isn't a handicap at all.

    --
    I hate sigs...
  21. Re:Hooray! by khallow · · Score: 2

    So what? A coal plant burns *3000 tons* of fuel every day. THAT'S LIKE A MILLION TASR BOMBAS!

    Please think of the stray dogs.

  22. Re:Message from Greens by rjforster · · Score: 2

    Did you notice it was delivered at twelve minutes to midnight? Ten minutes early.

  23. Re:42 YEARS!?? by Grishnakh · · Score: 2

    As the other guy said, you're confusing environmentalists with NIMBYs, but also, you're confusing two groups of environmentalists. The smart environmentalists are pro-nuclear, or at least, anti-coal and anti-fossil-fuel and in favor of nuclear as an alternative to those for the time being until better sources can be made more economical.

    Yeah, unfortunately there's a bunch of dumb anti-nuclear people out there who don't want any nuclear power, but don't have any suggestions at all about what to do to make the electricity needed, and strangely seem to have little to say about fossil fuel (esp. coal) power, which has horrible environmental effects. Not all environmentalists are like this.

    IMO, we as a nation should be moving to eliminate most if not all fossil fuel electricity generation, and only use nuclear and renewables (solar, wind, etc.). Solar power is getting cheaper all the time, and is highly versatile: you can put panels over parking lots, on commercial rooftops, etc., which is also very close to the point-of-use which greatly reduces transmission losses (unlike nuclear where the plant is generally far from where the power is consumed). However, solar of course doesn't work too well at night so it requires a storage method, such as hydroelectric (pump water uphill during the daytime when you have surplus capacity, run it downhill through the dam at night to generate power). But realistically, we probably can't generate all we need with renewables just yet, so nuclear is a good solution for generating large baseline loads. This will be even more important as we move towards more EVs on the road, which will mostly be recharging at night.

  24. Re:...hours? by ChumpusRex2003 · · Score: 2

    Emergency core cooling, formally known as the passive residual heat removal system (PRHR) is provided by a gravity pumped heat exchanger which transmits heat from the reactor coolant into a 1 million litre refuelling water tank in the containment building. To initiate passive cooling, there are 2 parallel valves which hold the circuit closed, each capable of providing 100% of necessary flow. The valves are dual-activated (DC electrical and pneumatic). They fail open under spring tension in the event of failure of the control signal.

    In the event that both PRHR valves fail to open, then the reactor circuit will be vented into the containment building (simulating a pipe break). This will cause the reactor circuit to lose coolant and trigger the emergency cold coolant injection systems. A series of gas-charged hydraulic accumulator tanks discharge in sequence into the reactor to ensure it remains full of water, while steam is allowed to vent through pressure relief valves. Each stage of coolant injection has two fully independent dual redundant trains, with the key valves being dual redundant, dual-activated and fail-open within each train. This culminates with valves connecting the reactor coolant system and the refuelling tank together opening, providing 1 million litres of additional coolant capacity.

    After about 24 hours (or sooner in the event of a large pipe break) coolant injection is complete, the reactor is fully de-pressurised and the circuit is fully open to the containment building. The refuelling tank will have been drained, either through a pipe break (or manually) and the water will completely submerge the reactor and its associated piping. The decay heat from the core can then escape via the reactor vessel walls and pipes into the water flooding the containment.

    The core injection systems are sufficiently powerful that clean rupture of a 25 mm diameter pipe will not result water level dropping below the top of the core at any time. In the event of a large pipe break (e.g. a clean rupture of a 350 mm PRHR pipe), then temporary uncovering of the reactor core is possible, and this may result in overheating and damage to the fuel, however, because of the very high capacity of the coolant pressurizer and coolant injection tanks/accumulators, and temperature rise is brief and below the level at which the fuel rod cladding is expected to fail or produce hydrogen. As is conventional for nuclear pipework, the pipes are built in such a way that they are intended to leak long before rupture, so a clean rupture would be a rare event.