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Microsoft Follows Mozilla In Considering Early Ban On SHA-1 Certificates (csoonline.com)
itwbennett writes: Following the first successful collision attack on the SHA-1 hashing algorithm last month, Mozilla said that it was considering a cut-off of July 1, 2016 to start rejecting all SHA-1 SSL certificates, ahead of an earlier scheduled date of Jan. 1, 2017. And now Microsoft is considering blocking the hashing algorithm on Windows by June next year.
At least let me fucking override shit for my devices (UPSes, copiers, etc.) that have absolutely no ability to use anything other than the self-signed shit they come with.
I'm fine with warning or blocking by default, but when those idiots remove my ability to do what I need to do (whitelist) I end up having to keep an older version of the browser with more holes in it just to connect to this UPS, that switch, this copier, etc.
My experience of these changes is that you'll be forced to click through a warning in your browser even if you installed the certificate (or the root CA signing the certificate). The Microsoft page about no longer trusting SHA1 certs is confusing in this respect because it includes information about signing Windows binaries but it does say
Windows [...] will no longer trust any code that is signed with a SHA-1 code signing certificate and that contains a timestamp value greater than January 1, 2016
That document also says it only applies to certs that are in the Microsoft Root Certificate Program so ones you've manually installed might not be affected.
This is slightly different to the Mozilla's SHA-1 deprecation information:
After January 1, 2017, we plan to show the “Untrusted Connection” error whenever a SHA-1 certificate is encountered in Firefox.
Perhaps this isn't the override you were thinking of but it doesn't sound like a total block.
It's fine rejecting insecure certificates but sometimes, I'd rather have browsers get their priorities in order.
If you go on a SSL website that uses a self-signed certificate or use a slightly outdated one, you are presented with a scary warning page with multiple clicks needed to get to it. However, plain HTTP goes right through even though it is less secure than SSL with any bogus certificate.
Instead of a ban, I'm all for a rating system, like :
- Strong : everything OK, strong crypto
- Medium : slightly outdated, weaker crypto (SHA-1 could be on this level)
- Weak : self-signed, completely outdated
- None : HTTP
- Dangerous : revoked, mismatched certificate, suspect behavior (such as a decrease in security from last visit)
Only the "dangerous" category should trigger a warning, for the other categories, a different "lock" icon should be sufficient. Like the crossed-out "https" in Google Chrome.