Slashdot Mirror


Swedish Researchers Break 'Unbreakable' Quantum Cryptography (eurekalert.org)

New submitter etnoy writes: Quantum key distribution is supposed to be a perfectly secure method for encrypting information. Even with access to an infinitely fast computer, an attacker cannot eavesdrop on the encrypted channel since it is protected by the laws of quantum mechanics. In recent years, several research groups have developed a new method for quantum key distribution, called "device independence." This is a simple yet effective way to detect intrusion. Now, a group of Swedish researchers question the security of some of these device-independent protocols. They show that it is possible to break the security by faking a violation of the famous Bell inequality. By sending strong pulses of light, they blind the photodetectors at the receiving stations which in turn allows them to extract the secret information sent between Alice and Bob.

101 comments

  1. It just shows that... by ls671 · · Score: 0

    It just shows that nothing is unbreakable or at least, it tends to prove it.

    --
    Everything I write is lies, read between the lines.
    1. Re:It just shows that... by gtall · · Score: 4, Insightful

      No, it shows that this method of key distribution might be borked, nothing more.

      Short logic lesson, your reasoning is indistinguishable in form from: 3 is prime, therefore all numbers are prime.

      Or more bluntly: (Ex) P(x) --> (Ax) P(x)

      is falsifiable in first-order logic. In English, this is "if there exists some x such that P(x), then for all x it is the case that P(x)."

    2. Re:It just shows that... by gweihir · · Score: 1

      There is theoretically unbreakable crypto and crypto that is provably hard enough to break as to be unbreakable practically for a long, long time. The quantum-snake-oil "encryption" is neither. First, it has the requirement that some physical models are absolute truth. That would be a first in physics, so far there were always inaccuracies, and circumstances where the theoretical models failed. And second, it relies on a physical, analog implementation being perfect. That is uisually not possible to achieve.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    3. Re:It just shows that... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But that is unprovable, because it has already been proven that unbreakable cryptography exists:
      One-time pad encryption is almost 2 centuries is old and the math is really easy so it's also really easy to prove that it's unbreakable.
      The reason it's not used everywhere now is that there are practical problems.

    4. Re:It just shows that... by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Aside from the one-time pad, there is no crypto that is provably hard to break.

      All practical decryption is in NP, in that we can verify the correctness of the decryption in polynomial time. Therefore, the most we can say about crypto algorithms is that they may be (but, AIUI, are not provably) NP-complete. This means that they may be efficiently solvable. It seems unlikely, but we can't prove it otherwise. Alternately, we might find other ways to crack a given cipher. Again, it seems unlikely, but is there any proof that certain classes of ciphers require a certain minimum effort?

      We're not going to brute-force a 256-bit key with any sort of computer we've managed to think of, if that's what you're thinking, but that's only one way to defeat crypto.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    5. Re:It just shows that... by gweihir · · Score: 1

      You are very, very wrong on this. With a good key-schedule and a maximum message size used per key, even the Enigma is provable "hard to break", or rather impossible to break. It requires random keys and something like a maximum of 4k characters encrypted per key (if I remember the numbers right).

      Your NP argument completely misses the point in several regards: First, for practical attacks, P is not "efficient". Second, what makes you think you can verify the correctness of decryption in the first place? That is not generally true, unless you only think simplistic toy examples happen in practice. And third, you can get information-theoretical security with quite a few practical set-ups for ciphertext-only attacks.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    6. Re:It just shows that... by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      True, there is a minimum text length to break ciphers, based on what is known of the cipher and the amount of redundancy in the language. (I don't think you'd have any real difficulty reading that last sentence with vowels omitted, for example, which means the vowels primarily provide redundancy.) A break requires a certain minimum of text.

      As far as recognizing plaintext, this is automatic in cases with known plaintext or forced plaintext, and cipher experts want them to resist these attacks as well. As far as ciphertext attacks go, Otherwise, let's assume a 256-bit key used on 64-bit chunks. There are 2^256 possible keys, impossible to enumerate with a maximally efficient quantum computer using only the Solar System's resources. There are 2^64 possible inputs, and they map to 2^64 possible outputs. This means that the key determines the one-to-one mapping of 2^64 possible values to 2^64 possible values. The number of mappings is therefore (2^64)!. You can get an estimate of a factorial that's going to be not too horribly off in orders of magnitude with e^(2^64 * ln(2^64)), definitely in excess of 2^(2^64) mappings, of which we can use 2^256 because that's the number of keys.

      If we have no idea what the plaintext will look like, we're stuck here. If we can expect some pattern, like text in a language, or numbers of a certain size, or something like that, we can recognize plaintext with several chunks. Suppose we know it's English text. English has an information content of roughly one bit per character, so let's call it two, so our 64-bit chunk contains 128 bits of information, so the odds that one 2^64 chunk will decipher into recognizable text given a random key is one in 2^57. If we have a few of these chunks, we can establish whether the given key can decipher a certain ciphertext into recognizable plaintext.

      P can be efficient. For example, a O(log n) algorithm is in P. P means that, as the NSA piles up computer after computer, or your rival conducting corporate espionage allocates money for a really big AWS bill, the size of the crackable key goes up and up.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  2. quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    The point of quantum crypto is to be able to detect whether someone is eavesdropping on you. Blinding detectors is kind of a tell-tale sign that something is wrong and parties should stop transmitting.

    1. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 5, Informative

      The point of quantum crypto is to be able to detect whether someone is eavesdropping on you. Blinding detectors is kind of a tell-tale sign that something is wrong and parties should stop transmitting.

      Paper author here. You can try detecting my specific attack, but it won't help. Sooner or later I'll find a way around your countermeasure and break it again. What we actually show in the paper is that the security proof is flawed. Fix the security proof and I won't ever be able to break it.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    2. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by JoshuaZ · · Score: 1

      They don't mean blind in the sense of giving the detector so many photons that it is blinded but rather by cleverly adding a small number of extra photons they can make the detectors think everything is ok.

    3. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You fail at reading.

      "With this security hole, it's possible to eavesdrop on traffic without being detected. We discovered this in our theoretical calculations, and our colleagues in Stockholm were subsequently able to demonstrate it experimentally"

    4. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by NormalVisual · · Score: 3, Informative

      Blinding detectors is kind of a tell-tale sign that something is wrong and parties should stop transmitting.

      FTA: "An intuitive countermeasure to our attack is to add a power monitor to the analysis station that detects if the incoming light is too bright. If such an anomaly is detected, Alice and/or Bob are alerted and discard the relevant measurement outcomes. This modified Franson interferometer would not be vulnerable to the specific attack as described so far; however, it does not solve the postselection loophole, which is the actual issue at hand. "

      --
      Please stand clear of the doors, por favor mantenganse alejado de las puertas
    5. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      5 years ago I read exactly the same thing; as a man-in-the-middle use non-quantum light pulses so that you have the same error rate as if you where not there. It was a specific attack against the implementation of quantum encryption, not quantum encryption itself.

      I thought some manufacturers now check if multiple sensors receive light at the same sample time to detect if there is a man-in-the-middle person there. Something that should have been build into the device in the first place, otherwise you don't know if it was a quantum signal.

    6. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 3, Informative

      You probably read the paper from Makarov: http://www.nature.com/nphoton/...

      Our attack is performed on a different system, but our level of control is much higher (and also works with near 100% efficiency) than in Makarov's paper.

      Measuring the optical power is not a solution to this attack. Sure, it'll detect it, but the attacker would just adapt. Instead, fix the actual flaw at hand, the incorrect security proof.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    7. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You misunderstand what is supposed to happen here. As soon as any form of attack is detected, communication stops. You can not adapt to that.

    8. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Please have a look at this paper: http://journals.aps.org/pra/ab... where the authors successfully perform a blinding attack with only 120 photons per pulse. If Eve uses this attack Bob cannot catch it with a simple optical power monitoring system. So he needs something different to catch the attack (assuming he can discover this new attack in the first place). Then Eve will improve her attack and crack the system again. Patching individual attacks is NOT a permanent solution. Like the OP is saying, you need to fundamentally fix the flaw, and this is what has to be done.

    9. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      You misunderstand what is supposed to happen here. As soon as any form of attack is detected, communication stops. You can not adapt to that.

      Sure I can. I just have to figure out how your detection mechanism works and then circumvent it so that no detection occurs.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    10. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You don't make sense now. How does adapting to a non-existing thing work?
      If they stop communicating, you lost, your attack was discovered.
      All you can do is disrupt their communication again, when they chose a different channel.
      You simply say you can find a countermeasure to their new detection mechanism. But can you? Where is your proof for that?

    11. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      Oh, now I understand what you mean. If I am discovered, you will of course stop communicating. The next time you try to communicate, I might have discovered a way around your nifty attack-detector-thing. Or I might not. The point is that you can not guarantee that I won't attack your system unless you correct the flaws in the security proof. All of this is in the paper, but Makarov has an excellent write-up to your very question: http://scitation.aip.org/conte...

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    12. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Real world systems are vulnerable, that is a fact of life. That's not my problem here.

      Of course fixing individual problems won't make it absolutely secure eventually. Just look at IT security. A never-ending mess of patches.

      This is not what I am getting at. The alleged author claims to have broken QC, while in fact he broke a certain implementation. That is a crucial difference. The fundamental flaw isn't within QC itself, as he seems to claim, but in the (current) machines implementing it. This is like clickbait.

    13. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 2

      Read the paper. QKD is secure. In fact, it's so secure that we can prove it will never be cracked. However, we found a flaw in the proof for a class of QKD devices, and the paper shows how to exploit that. Big difference to IT security where we can't prove security, just aim for the best.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    14. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That is exactly what I said. The IT example was referring to the patching of individual vulnerabilities. You need to practise some reading comprehension. Seriously.

    15. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Alice and Bob count their photons. They see your extra photons. Right?

    16. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by postbigbang · · Score: 2

      You can keep shifting phase angles, halting the blinding attack, but there may be a pre-emptive method as you mention of pre-arranging sufficient tautology of concurrent streams where a valid stream is channelized, not unlike how frequency-shift-keying works. n>2 is a possibility, and perhaps even desired.

      Go ahead, blind the detectors, make them think they're valid, except that ones that stop you aren't the ones you desired until your blind so many channels that the time domain rats out your actual physical location in the chain, and we send Guido.

      --
      ---- Teach Peace. It's Cheaper Than War.
    17. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by mlts · · Score: 2

      I've read about ways to handle this myself.

      One way is to use the quantum connection channel to negotiate a session key via Diffie-Hellman, but each side also has a pre-shared key or a chunk from a one-time-pad that gets XOR-ed or combined with the session key. Then the Internet or conventional channels is used for the bulk transmissions. The attacker would have to find the pre-shared info, as well as decode the quantum crypto, each alone would score nothing.

      Another way is to use the quantum channel for sending info... but wrap the info in an existing crypto protocol, be it IPSec or a VPN tunnel, SSH, SSL/TLS, or something else. This way the data is still protected, end to end. Since the quantum channel is relatively slow, adding another encryption layer wouldn't create much of a performance decrease.

      What it boils down to is not trusting one form or layer as absolute, especially if the data going over the pipe is sensitive and valuable enough to warrant high security in the first place. The physical equivalent would be something valuable being placed in a sealed security container, then taken via armored car to the destination. If the armored car is compromised, the security container and the GPS on the container would still protect the contents. Similar if the security container is the weakest link.

    18. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's quantum entanglement. Thee will never be a proof for any of it.

    19. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by gumbi+west · · Score: 1

      somebody anonymous woke up on the wrong side of the bed.

    20. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What actually is needed it for the receiving sensor to count individual photons. Then the implementation should stop communications when it receives more than a single photon in a sample period. The quantum key exchange protocol only works securely if the sender is able to send single photons, and the receiver is able to detect if it receives only single photons.

      But all is not lost, cell phone cameras are very sensitive, a few years ago they where able to count in increments of about 6 photons on each site, I am sure by now they are even more sensitive.

    21. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      There is no such thing as "QC" in general, only a number of protocols. Each one of these protocols has their own security proof, and we've utterly broken the security of one of those protocols. You try to make a distinction between "QC" in general (which does not exist) and a certain implementation. But even if you build a machine out of ideal components, the protocol we attacked will not be secure since it's security proof is flawed.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    22. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      We're talking security here, so it is beneficial to look at it from Alice's and Bob's point of view. They can only relax when they use a QKD system with a complete security proof which guarantees security. If they use a system with a flawed security proof (what we show in the paper) they can never be secure. No matter how many blinding-detectors they apply and Guidos they hire, they can not be really sure that the system is attacked. In essence, we are back to the good old classical security picture which is a giant cat-and-mouse game.

      Then, why would they use QKD in the first place? Either switch back to classical security measures, or choose a QKD system with a complete security proof. Our paper does list a system that has all the good properties of the Franson interferometer, but with a valid security proof. Read more here: http://www.nature.com/ncomms/2...

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    23. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      From our paper: "An intuitive countermeasure to our attack is to add a power monitor to the analysis station that detects if the incoming light is too bright. [or, counts photons] If such an anomaly is detected, Alice and/or Bob are alerted and discard the relevant measurement outcomes. This modified Franson interferometer would not be vulnerable to the specific attack as described so far; however, it does not solve the postselection loophole, which is the actual issue at hand. " (emphasis added)

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    24. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      In the QKD picture, the security proofs place no restriction on the computational power of the attacker, so Diffie-Hellman, IPSec, VPN Tunnels, SSH, SSL/TLS all become broken. The one crypto method that remains safe is the one-time pad. (We call this information-theoretic security). What QKD does is allow Alice and Bob to randomly and secretly generate a key. Therefore, the system is completely safe. In fact, we can prove this mathematically, so the QKD layer is absolute...well, except for the system we just showed to have a flawed security proof ;)

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    25. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      See my other replies to this question.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    26. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      You'd be surprised, entanglement was in fact proven correct just the other day: http://physics.aps.org/article... Full paper here: http://journals.aps.org/prl/ab...

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    27. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      We actually do blind the detector by flooding it with photons.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    28. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      Someone read TFA? Pinch me ;)

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    29. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually (as I understand the quantum crypto) if someone eavesdrop then the intended receiver can't read the message... now that is a fantastic solution, the intended receiver is not getting the message only the eavesdropper is, fabulous way to disrupt secure transmissions.

    30. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No, they're all broken, it was all smoke and mirrors. Really if you're sending polarized light and using interference fringes, its not quantum anything, that is just to stop anyone with crypto backround sifting through the actual key exchange. Which is just a straight private key passed and trivial to man in the middle.

      The protocol is irrelevent both is attack and all man in the middle attacks can be used here.

    31. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You think you're smart? I have autism. I studied physics. Quantum. Theory. What did you study? Computer software? You think you're smarter that me?! Than the Internation Physics Consenus? Than SCIENCE itself! I invented the Piano Sifting Quantum Key Algorithm. What have you invented?! Nothing! You've GOT NOTHING!!

    32. Re:quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by gweihir · · Score: 1

      What we actually show in the paper is that the security proof is flawed. Fix the security proof and I won't ever be able to break it.

      Unless physical reality turns out to not quite follow the theoretical models precisely. So far that has always been the case.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    33. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They shut down the communication when they find a MiTM. But that doesn't stop him from trying again and again. He basically says fix the hole, not work around it with detectors.

    34. Re: quantum crypto is not "unbreakable" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If they can detect the extra light and shut down the comms, what have you really done? Best case is the intrusion detection doesn't work.

      Every time you goto spy, they get alerted and shut down shop. You've accomplished nothing.

  3. Quantum key distribution is a boondoggle by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Electronic quantum computing, quantum key distribution all boondoggles and distraction.

    Optical quantum computing has far more capacity for scaling, but that gets next to no (public) funding. Funny how that works.

  4. Submitter has no clue what QC is. by AchilleTalon · · Score: 2, Insightful

    "Quantum key distribution is supposed to be a perfectly secure method for encrypting information. Even with access to an infinitely fast computer, an attacker cannot eavesdrop on the encrypted channel since it is protected by the laws of quantum mechanics. In recent years, several research groups have developed a new method for quantum key distribution, called "device independence." This is a simple yet effective way to detect intrusion. Now, a group of Swedish researchers question the security of some of these device-independent protocols. They show that it is possible to break the security by faking a violation of the famous Bell inequality. By sending strong pulses of light, they blind the photodetectors at the receiving stations which in turn allows them to extract the secret information sent between Alice and Bob."

    First of all, quantum key distribution is not a method for encrypting information. As its name judiciously indicates, it is a method to securely exchange encryption keys. This is not the same thing at all.

    Second, the speed of the attacker's computer has no role in this attack and quantum key distribution has never claimed a code is unbreakable since there is no code to break here.

    Third, quantum key exchange is a protocol, not a cipher. It relies on quantum mechanics features to tell Alice or Bob the just receive key is compromised or not since it is not possible for a man in the middle to observe the key without being noticed. That is the idea behind this mechanism. Once keys are securely exchanged between both parties, a classically encrypted communication can take place between both parties.

    Of course, if you are blinding the receiver, it may be possible to tamper with the key, however, the blinded party should notice it has been blinded. The whole thing rests on very low luminosity photons exchange. If the light beam is too strong, it clearly no longer depicted the quantum characteristics needed to secure the key exchange. I don't really see where the problem is here since it is easy to determine the exchange can no longer be trusted due to high luminosity.

    And finally, it seems to me this is old news.

    --
    Achille Talon
    Hop!
    1. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The submitter is the guy who wrote the paper. Are you saying he is clueless?

    2. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      From the article...

      > With this security hole, it's possible to eavesdrop on traffic without being detected. We discovered this in our theoretical calculations, and our colleagues in Stockholm were subsequently able to demonstrate it experimentally

    3. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by etnoy · · Score: 5, Informative
      Paper author here.

      Submitter has no clue what QC is.

      Oh, sorry. I confess I know nothing about quantum cryptography, I just happened to break it.

      First of all, quantum key distribution is not a method for encrypting information. As its name judiciously indicates, it is a method to securely exchange encryption keys. This is not the same thing at all.

      Semantics. QKD is a way of obtaining a secure key which we then use to perform one-time pad encryption. In other words, we use it for encrypting information.

      Second, the speed of the attacker's computer has no role in this attack and quantum key distribution has never claimed a code is unbreakable since there is no code to break here.

      It's a layman's definition of the concept of information-theoretic security (ITS). Normal crypto is secure under certain hardness assumptions (i.e. hard to factor integers, hard to do discrete logarithms). If you give the attacker an infinitely fast computer, all those crypto methods will be broken. QKD on the other hand remains secure.

      Of course, if you are blinding the receiver, it may be possible to tamper with the key, however, the blinded party should notice it has been blinded.

      This is a very good question and there is a very good answer (one I even answer in the paper itself!) You can surely detect my attack by using an optical power meter, but eventually I'll figure out a way around this as well. What our paper really shows is that there is a missing link in the security proof. Fix the proof and you'll be safe forever.

      The whole thing rests on very low luminosity photons exchange. If the light beam is too strong, it clearly no longer depicted the quantum characteristics needed to secure the key exchange.

      Which makes our attack even juicier. We don't even need to use quantum phenomena to break the security of the QKD device, we just good ol' classical pulses of light.

      And finally, it seems to me this is old news.

      Please tell me more!

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    4. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by NormalVisual · · Score: 2

      If the light beam is too strong, it clearly no longer depicted the quantum characteristics needed to secure the key exchange. I don't really see where the problem is here since it is easy to determine the exchange can no longer be trusted due to high luminosity.

      The paper addresses this.

      --
      Please stand clear of the doors, por favor mantenganse alejado de las puertas
    5. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I just happened to break it. ...
      You can surely detect my attack by using an optical power meter, but eventually I'll figure out a way around this as well.

      First you say you broke it (past tense), then you say you will break it (future tense), yet your stated accomplishment is

      You can surely detect my attack by using an optical power meter ...
        If the light beam is too strong, it clearly no longer depicted the quantum characteristics needed to secure the key exchange.

      QE never promised to guarantee key exchange, so you are not causing it to break any promises.

      QE promises Alice and Bob will know if/when the key is intercepted. But you never extracted the key, you simply interrupted communications.

      Seems like a strawman to me. You make up a non-existent claim of QE simply so you can tear that down, ignoring the actual claims QE makes.

      Until you obtain the key in such a way that Alice and Bob do not know the key was intercepted, quite the opposite of preventing communications such as you have done, then you can claim you have broken QE.

    6. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by etnoy · · Score: 3, Informative

      I just happened to break it. ... You can surely detect my attack by using an optical power meter, but eventually I'll figure out a way around this as well.

      First you say you broke it (past tense), then you say you will break it (future tense), yet your stated accomplishment is

      Let me put it this way: I broke it (past tense), I break it (current) and will break it (future). Unless you re-establish full, provable security (which the Franson interferometer lacks) this is what will happen.

      QE never promised to guarantee key exchange, so you are not causing it to break any promises.

      QKD promises a secret key shared between Alice and Bob, what is your point?

      QE promises Alice and Bob will know if/when the key is intercepted.

      That is the function of the security test. In the Franson interferometer, the security test is a Bell inequality violation. We then show how to fake a Bell inequality violation, which makes the security test believe everyting is alright.

      But you never extracted the key

      Not only does our attack extract the key, it allows Eve to dictate the key to Alice and Bob.

      you simply interrupted communications. Seems like a strawman to me.

      We never claim to interrupt communication, we claim that we find and/or dictate the key. You are the one throwing strawmen.

      You make up a non-existent claim of QE simply so you can tear that down, ignoring the actual claims QE makes.

      Ditto.

      Until you obtain the key in such a way that Alice and Bob do not know the key was intercepted, quite the opposite of preventing communications such as you have done, then you can claim you have broken QE.

      As per above, we do obtain the key in such a way that Alice and Bob do not know the key was intercepted. Therefore I claim to have broken QKD:

      You should read our paper before trying to discredit it.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    7. Re: Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No need to be smug about anything.

      You claim to have broken QC while in fact, you have broken an implementation under certain circumstances. This is what your parent meant when he said it was old news. There have been multiple hardware vulnerabilities in the past.

      You really need to work on your discussion style. Proof by intimidation never works.

    8. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You can surely detect my attack by using an optical power meter, but eventually I'll figure out a way around this as well. What our paper really shows is that there is a missing link in the security proof. Fix the proof and you'll be safe forever.

      Could you explain your attack in laymans terms? From what you said here, you've not really "broken" quantum encryption and worked around the wave function collapse, rather you've discovered that quantum encryption as currently defined is flawed and immune to the observer effect?

    9. Re: Submitter has no clue what QC is. by etnoy · · Score: 1

      No need to be smug about anything.

      That was never my intention, however am replying to needless accusations and need to be clear with my answers.

      You claim to have broken QC while in fact, you have broken an implementation under certain circumstances.

      Which is exactly what our paper says.

      This is what your parent meant when he said it was old news.

      This is the first attack of this kind on the Franson interferometer.

      There have been multiple hardware vulnerabilities in the past.

      Correct! The vulnerabilities found by Makarov et al. are excellent examples and have been an inspiration for us.

      You really need to work on your discussion style. Proof by intimidation never works.

      Again, not my intention.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    10. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by etnoy · · Score: 3, Insightful

      You can surely detect my attack by using an optical power meter, but eventually I'll figure out a way around this as well. What our paper really shows is that there is a missing link in the security proof. Fix the proof and you'll be safe forever.

      Could you explain your attack in laymans terms? From what you said here, you've not really "broken" quantum encryption and worked around the wave function collapse, rather you've discovered that quantum encryption as currently defined is flawed and immune to the observer effect?

      Any QKD protocol relies on a security proof, and the observer effect is only a small part of the puzzle. In this case, we attack the Franson interferometer which uses a security test in the form of a Bell inequality violation to make sure no attack is occurring. We have discovered a way to fake this Bell inequality violation.

      Bell's theorem is a very interesting part of physics on it's own, I really recommend looking into the recent Vienna and NIST experiments (good writeup here). The short version is that it allows us to distinguish between "quantum" things and "classical" things with a surprisingly powerful tool, Bell's inequality.

      In essence, when measuring Bell's inequality you need data on the form of Probability(A,B), where A is the setting Alice uses for her box and B the setting Bob uses for his box. However, the Franson interferometer is very deceptive here and gives you data on the form Probability(A,B | coincidence), which means you condition on coincidence, i.e. you remove half of the events from the statistical ensemble.

      The net result is that you don't really measure Bell's inequality, but a similar but (unfortunately) useless cousin. This paper shows why this happens. Therefore, we can start attacking the system and at the same time, fool the security test. Again, the Franson interferometer removes half of the events, which means the apparent detector efficiency is 50% even in the ideal case.

      For even more info, see our previous paper: http://iopscience.iop.org/1751...

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    11. Re: Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Let me quote the headline for you:

      "Swedish Researchers Break 'Unbreakable' Quantum Cryptography"

      See? Instead, it should have read

      "Swedish Researchers Discover Method to Extract Quantum Cryptographic Keys from Franson Interferometer"

      And all would be well. Instead, you were fishing for attention without substance.

    12. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by AchilleTalon · · Score: 1

      Obviously.

      --
      Achille Talon
      Hop!
    13. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by AchilleTalon · · Score: 1

      You didn't break any encryption here. Sorry to said so, but you still persist with this nonsense. The quantum key distribution is not encrypting anything, it transmits in clear the keys and the quantum effect is what tell you if the keys were compromised or not by someone looking at them. That's it and that's all. Whatever the keys are, one-time pad or anything else, the encryption will proceed thru another communication channel with classical encryption.

      Worst, it seems you do not understand at all why one-time pads are not commonly used these days. Because they have to be at least the size of the message they intend to encrypt and they are wasting bandwidth. This constraint of not wasting bandwidth still exists even in a context of quantum key distribution.

      --
      Achille Talon
      Hop!
    14. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Many worlds! Collapse of state vectors! Symmetry operatos in entangle space!! Decoherant consistent past histories!!! I AM RIGHT BECAUSE I AM SMART!!

    15. Re: Submitter has no clue what QC is. by etnoy · · Score: 1

      The Franson interferometer is a QKD system that many (including senior researchers in the field!) believe is perfectly secure. Our paper shows it isn't and never will be. Also, there is no "general" QKD system, only a number of protocols, each with a corresponding security proof. The headline is correct.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    16. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by etnoy · · Score: 1

      It's hard to argue about QKD without understanding how it works. Your starting point about QKD transmitting keys in the clear is wrong, as the information does not even exist in the quantum channel. Alice's and Bob's measurement operations are what create the secret key. That key is then used in a one-time pad. Also, OTP is exactly what we use after finishing a QKD session. The key requirements you talk about is exactly what makes OTP 100% secure.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    17. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Paper author here.

      Oh, sorry. I confess I know nothing about quantum cryptography, I just happened to break it.

      No, you did not break quantum cryptography. And you certainly did not break device-independent QKD as the submission insinuates. You broke an implementation that is not and cannot ever be device-independent. The scheme intrinsically uses postselection, which you must not do if you want to achieve device-independence. You need to account for every instance of your entangled state, otherwise you do not have a loop-hole free violation of a Bell inequality.

      It is important to point out the flaws in specific implementations. But linking that to device-independent QKD itself is just plain misinformation.

      This is a very good question and there is a very good answer (one I even answer in the paper itself!) You can surely detect my attack by using an optical power meter, but eventually I'll figure out a way around this as well. What our paper really shows is that there is a missing link in the security proof. Fix the proof and you'll be safe forever.

      The proof is fine, you just need a system that fulfills the assumptions of the proof. Your system does not, so obviously the proof does not apply to it.

      And finally, it seems to me this is old news.

      Please tell me more!

      Cracking QKD that is not device-independent by blinding the detectors is indeed old news. You have just shown that this attack also works on another system, that is also not device-independent.

    18. Re: Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You say there are ways to detect it, then you say you can evade detection the next time, how? Why are you getting caught the first time, but will later find ways around getting caught?

      They can either detect it or they can't, which is it?

      If I caught you on my network or anything I'd lock it down completely until I know what's causing the breach. So you wouldn't have a second chance at it like you do in your lab. This is the real world, not school.

    19. Re: Submitter has no clue what QC is. by Kkloe · · Score: 1

      no, real world would be:
      alice: I want to talk to bob
      admin: its not secure
      alice: fix it
      admin: will take x days
      alice: fix it in 1 hour or look for another job

      and sometimes A and B will need to talk even if they do know itis not secure, otherwise as a attacker you will have achived the secondary mission, making the parties not be able to talk to each other at all and loose, this is a damned if we do damned if we dont situation

    20. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Semantics. QKD is a way of obtaining a secure key which we then use to perform one-time pad encryption. In other words, we use it for encrypting information.

      I don't understand this. Sending a one-time pad key is equivalent to sending the plaintext, as far as information transfer goes. (Otherwise, it isn't a real one-time pad.) The only advantage of the 1TP is that we can send the pad when we can get a secure communications channel, and then send messages at arbitrary times over insecure channels. If you have a reliable and persistent secure channel, why bother with the 1TP key?

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    21. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Excuse me, are you claiming that Slashdot editors wrote a misleading headline? I'm shocked, shocked I tell you.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    22. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by etnoy · · Score: 1

      Semantics. QKD is a way of obtaining a secure key which we then use to perform one-time pad encryption. In other words, we use it for encrypting information.

      I don't understand this. Sending a one-time pad key is equivalent to sending the plaintext, as far as information transfer goes. (Otherwise, it isn't a real one-time pad.) The only advantage of the 1TP is that we can send the pad when we can get a secure communications channel, and then send messages at arbitrary times over insecure channels. If you have a reliable and persistent secure channel, why bother with the 1TP key?

      Excellent question! QKD is just what it means, key distribution. There is actually no transmission between sender and receiver, instead it randomly establishes a secret, shared key at Alice's and Bob's place. Therefore, to do transmission, you use OTP to perform encryption.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    23. Re:Submitter has no clue what QC is. by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Thank you. That was a good explanation.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  5. Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob? by AndyKron · · Score: 5, Funny

    Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob? All they want to do is live in peace, but they're thrown into black holes, sucked into whirlpools, and subjected to all sorts of unimaginable things.

    1. Re:Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob? by fustakrakich · · Score: 1

      Ted and Carol are looking for them...

      --
      “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
    2. Re:Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob? by radarskiy · · Score: 1

      Alice should go back to that restaurant.

    3. Re:Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I blame Mallory.

    4. Re:Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob? by dohzer · · Score: 2

      One time they even had a threesome with a man-in-the-middle.

    5. Re:Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Blame Eve.

    6. Re:Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob? by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      What Bob doesn't know is that Bruce Schneier is having torrid affairs with Alice and Eve.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  6. Poor Alice and Bob by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

    When will they figure we are all plying games with them, and they believe they are talking in secret about secrets, secretly.

    --
    Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
  7. Too bad Comey doesn't read slashdot by WOOFYGOOFY · · Score: 2

    Too bad FBI director James Comey doesn't read /. He'd see how insecure even the most thuoght to be secure secure things - like backdoors - are and perhaps lose the impulse to make things even less secure and start moving in the other direction.

    You know, it's possible that somewhere in the FBI there's one highly capable James Corney who is right now mopping floors in the basement because every time he and James Comey were evaluated by their superiors, personnel mixed up their reviews, owing to an unfortunate choice of fonts on the review forms.

    1. Re:Too bad Comey doesn't read slashdot by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Too bad FBI director James Comey doesn't read /. He'd see how insecure even the most thuoght to be secure secure things - like backdoors - are and perhaps lose the impulse to make things even less secure and start moving in the other direction.

      You know, it's possible that somewhere in the FBI there's one highly capable James Corney who is right now mopping floors in the basement because every time he and James Comey were evaluated by their superiors, personnel mixed up their reviews, owing to an unfortunate choice of fonts on the review forms.

      www.TheNobleIslam.com

  8. The real question is... by fahrbot-bot · · Score: 1

    ... allows them to extract the secret information sent between Alice and Bob.

    ... who the hell are Alice and Bob and why are they always sending secret information in these types of stories. Someone should report them.

    See something, say something people ! - geesh.

    --
    It must have been something you assimilated. . . .
  9. Re: Why are people always picking on Alice and Bob by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Because fuck Alice and Bob, that's why. How dare they keep me out of the loop!

  10. Interesting for some nations by AHuxley · · Score: 1

    A few nations do not have a lot of hardened mil only networks. They have to use public telco networks passing into a lot of other nations domestic infrastructure thanks to competition policy and trade deals.
    The way around having to use very public, foreign owned networks and satellites sourced from many different providers for gov and mil communications was often thought to be emerging quantum cryptography.
    Australia is spending huge amounts of time, funding and effort to try and keep the idea of national public/private networks open to its very secure mil and gov communications needs.
    An Unbreakable Code (24/08/2006)
    http://www.abc.net.au/catalyst...
    Real gov and mil networks or risk a new Engima 2.0 on public networks due to cost cutting and really having faith that quantum cryptography was good enough :)

    --
    Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  11. Quantum Key 101 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Third, quantum key exchange is a protocol, not a cipher. It relies on quantum mechanics features to tell Alice or Bob the just receive key is compromised or not since it is not possible for a man in the middle to observe the key without being noticed."

    Strip off all the wibbly wobbly QM stuff and its very simple:

    Alice and Bob send each other photons that are polarized and measure each others photons based on the polarization of the photon they sent.
    Since you tell the direction of polarized light by shoving it through a filter, or some similar destructive method, it would affect the key exchange.

    1. Re:Quantum Key 101 by etnoy · · Score: 1

      Correct, and this is the same short explanation as I usually give, too. As always, the answer is much more complex (including the fact that we're not dealing with polarization in the Franson interferometer), but it gets the point across.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
  12. Easy to "man in the middle" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It's a key exchange done by sending polarized light.

    You can man in the middle it, by breaking the fiber, and Alice exchanges the key with Fake Bob, and Bob exchanges the key with Fake Alice. Different keys exchanged with the attacker, and he man in the middles.

    Quantum Key Exchange does not use 'entanglement', which is claimed by Yin to be > 10,000 times faster than light, and the photon is not in some fuzzy undefined state till the sender measure it. That's just obfuscation here.

    Does anyone actually use this?

    It's tempting to believe nobody would break a fibre optic and insert a tap, but the fiber IS broken at repeaters anyway, so it definitely is trivial to "man in the middle" this, you just change the repeater to be the attackers repeater!!

    1. Re:Easy to "man in the middle" by etnoy · · Score: 1

      QKD doees not work if you use a repeater station, unfortunately you need direct line-of sight.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    2. Re:Easy to "man in the middle" by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually you can do quantum key exchange using entangled photon pairs, and this is the type of setup that was hacked in the paper published today.

  13. Move along, nothing new here by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Back in 2010, it had already been provable that you can intercept, without either end know you had done so.
    http://www.technologyreview.com/view/418968/commercial-quantum-cryptography-system-hacked/

    1. Re:Move along, nothing new here by etnoy · · Score: 1

      Makarov's group attacked the E91 protocol, our paper attacks the Franson system. A significant difference is that we show the Franson system to be insecure even if the device is implemented with perfect devices. Makarovs papers are very well-written and interesting to read. I recommend starting to watch one of his YouTube lectures: https://www.youtube.com/watch?... , it is entertaining, highly interesting and is on a reasonable level for the average ./ reader.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
  14. Déjà vu by manu0601 · · Score: 1

    This has a strong smell of déjà vu. Something is secure within a domain of application. Attacker push the system outside of domain of application.

    I am almost certain I did read something similar several years ago with quantum crypto and blinded receptor

    1. Re:Déjà vu by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes, this was done years ago. I'm too lazy to look it up as well and dont care. The "Paper author" seems to be doing a lot of posting in this story, maybe they can just link to the original paper for us? And thats not a jab at you if you can explain how your method is any different.

    2. Re:Déjà vu by etnoy · · Score: 1

      The link to our paper is right there in TFS: http://advances.sciencemag.org...

      --
      Quantum hacker.
  15. I knew it... by Irate+Engineer · · Score: 1

    I just knew Alice was up to something with Bob.

    That fucking skank whore...

    --

    Left MS Windows for Linux Mint and never looked back!

    Vote for Bernie in 2016!

  16. Give us a decent descritption please. by aberglas · · Score: 1

    With the available information it is impossible for technical people like those that read SlashDot to make sense of anything. There is either the paper itself, which would require slogging through dozens of other papers to even make sense of it, or there is journalistic fluff that is completely meaningless. When you write for an academic audience in your discipline area you should be terse and obscure. But not for a general but technical audience.

    My understanding of Quantum encryption is that two qubits are produced at the same time and one is sent to the encrypter and the other to the decrypter. Detecting them destroys them, defeating Eve the eavesdropper.

    More importantly the process of creating these produces random qubits and they cannot be created to a specific pattern. Thus they cannot be regenerated in the same pattern that they were created, making like hard for Mallory the man in the middle.

    There still needs to be some sort of digital signature to detect Mallory. But the argument goes that that would need to be broken in real time, and Quantum encryption is all about reading the back traffic.

    So which part of that story have you attacked? And leave out the bits about the Frigembroten Sniggens defrobulation principals.

    1. Re:Give us a decent descritption please. by etnoy · · Score: 1

      So which part of that story have you attacked? And leave out the bits about the Frigembroten Sniggens defrobulation principals.

      In QKD, you don't need any "extras" to be secure, it is information-theoretically secure all on its own. No need for signatures. We have found class of QKD devices that have a flaw in the security proof which allows an attacker to evade detection. We exploit this flaw by sending pulses of light to Alice and Bob which 1) allows the attacker to dictate the key and 2) evades detection. We never intercept the qubits, we replaced the source device with a trojan device of their own. Ordinarily, the security test should detect that the source device is misbehaving, but due to the flaw we found, it doesn't.

      --
      Quantum hacker.
    2. Re:Give us a decent descritption please. by aberglas · · Score: 1

      I'm sorry, I have no idea what you are talking about.

      If you do not have some kind of pre shared data it becomes trivial to insert a man in the middle, whatever mystical properties qbits have.

      If there is substance to your claims, then a semi-technical paper would make your results much more widely known, if that is helpful. As it is all that I have got out of the discussion is that "somebody has done something with quantum crypto". Not very interesting.

      (I have never read anything that makes a lot of sense about QKD.)

  17. Small potatoes. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "It's mostly rumours, I haven't seen any system in use. But I know that some universities have test networks for secure data transfer," says Prof Larsson.

    OK so this is an issue?

    Consider this. Big Bang Theory.

    0) Incomprehenisible time happens
    1) Stars in Universe
    2) Incromprehensible time happens
    3) Sun exists
    4) Jupiter comes into orbit of our Sun
    5) Incromprehensible time happens
    6) Planet by planet come into orbit of our Sun as if pinball happens
    7) Incromprehensible time happens
    8) Craters exist on Earth, caused by ?
    9) Incromprehensible time happens
    10) No oxygen in space, but exists on Earth now. From where?
    11) Incromprehensible time happens
    12) People now.

    Thank you God.

  18. Re:https://web.archive.org/web/20140330133427/http by Zontar+The+Mindless · · Score: 1

    And apparently nobody donated. Your point relevant to this story being...?

    --
    Il n'y a pas de Planet B.
  19. From an NSA course on cryptography by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If someone tells you they have an unbreakable cryptographic method, they are either lying to you or they're too stupid to know any better.
    Advice in a course I had from NSA over 30 years ago.

    Laws of quantum mechanics my foot. There's still a method, there is still secret info and if Alice can convey that key to Bob, some other party can get it too.

  20. No method of quantum encryption is truly secure by lucien86 · · Score: 1

    "Even with access to an infinitely fast computer, an attacker cannot eavesdrop on the encrypted channel since it is protected by the laws of quantum mechanics."

    No method of quantum encryption is truly secure. The problem with these methods of quantum encryption is that they take too narrow a view of quantum physics and do not deal with the potential for attackers also using quantum techniques. If your quantum system has more energy and the right configuration it should be possible to break virtually any quantum encryption. - Many or most mathematical encryption methods are also vulnerable to the same methods for the same reasons.. Capture an encrypted source and it inevitably contains an information interference pattern leading to the key, it is merely a matter of devising the right geometry to break the barrier between source and destination.. This is because quantum fields in some models can go faster than light and the FTL geometry represents a point where the quantum system becomes fully deterministic.
    The technology to use this is probably still ten to twenty years away though so it is not an immediate concern.. - Might just be possible that some secret military lab in the US can already do it, but very unlikely..

    --
    Below the speed of light Special Relativity is one of the most accurate theories in physics - above the speed of light..
  21. Me & Alice by Bob+Munck · · Score: 1

    I can't speak for Alice, but I'm getting sick and tired of having to do half of the encryption in the world. Most of the time it's just Lorem Ipsum anyway. I do this by moving rocks around in a desert, you know. It's not fun.