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Google Joins Mozilla, Microsoft In Pushing For Early SHA-1 Crypto Cutoff (blogspot.com)

itwbennett writes: Due to recent research showing that SHA-1 is weaker than previously believed, Mozilla, Microsoft and now Google are all considering bringing the deadline forward by six months to July 1, 2016. Websites like Facebook and those protected by CloudFlare have implemented a SHA-1 fallback mechanism. Both companies have argued that there are millions of people in developing countries that still use browsers and operating systems that do not support SHA-2, the replacement function for SHA-1, and will therefore be cut off from encrypted websites that move to SHA-2 certificates.

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  1. Remember. by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Some of the talk about SHA-1 cutoff has been in terms of "Should we break the intertubes for the poor people who can't upgrade?"

    Remember; we really don't have that choice. SHA-1 is doing the mathematical equivalent of creaking, groaning, and starting to splinter under load. Our choice is not whether to break SHA-1 or not; it is whether or not to pretend that SHA-1 isn't dangerously precarious.

    It's like telling a structural engineer "We can't close that bridge! People need it to cross the river!". That's exactly why we must close the bridge; because if we don't there will be people on it when it falls into the river.

    (That said, in environments where security is provided by other means, say a suitably isolated management-only network, there will continue to be a need for browsers that can interact with pitifully outdated SSL implementations for some time to come, probably a disgustingly long time; just as various ancient JVMs are currently kept around to interact with assorted horrible management interfaces, network KVMs, and the like. In practice, since virtualization is so cheap and such legacy systems should be kept the hell away from the internet, we'll probably just end up using an old browser version on a VM that is firewalled from everything except the legacy devices it is used to manage; but there will be places where compatibility will require accepting a known-pitiful authentication mechanism; but such environments should treat that mechanism purely as an archaic quirk, not as any sort of substitute for security.)