Deprecation of MD5 and SHA1 -- Just in Time? (threatpost.com)

mitcheli writes: If you're hanging on to the theory that collision attacks against SHA-1 and MD5 aren't yet practical, two researchers from INRIA, the French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation, have provided reason for urgency. They demonstrated a new series of transcript collision attacks centered on the SHA-1 and MD5 implementations in TLS 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, along with IKEv1 and v2, and SSH 2. They say, "Our main conclusion is that the continued use of MD5 and SHA1 in mainstream cryptographic protocols significantly reduces their security and, in some cases, leads to practical attacks on key protocol mechanisms (PDF)." Of course, Mozilla officially began rejecting new SHA-1 certificates as of the first of the year. And as promised, there have been some usability issues. Mozilla said on Wednesday that various security scanners and antivirus products are keeping some users from reaching HTTPS websites.