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Antivirus Software Could Make Your Company More Vulnerable (csoonline.com)
itwbennett writes: Since June, researchers have found and reported several dozen serious flaws in antivirus products from vendors such as Kaspersky Lab, ESET, Avast, AVG Technologies, Intel Security (formerly McAfee) and Malwarebytes. Many of those vulnerabilities would have allowed attackers to remotely execute malicious code on computers, to abuse the functionality of the antivirus products themselves, to gain higher privileges on compromised systems and even to defeat the anti-exploitation defenses of third-party applications. And evidence suggests that attacks against antivirus products are both possible and likely. Some researchers believe that such attacks have already occurred, even though antivirus vendors might not be aware of them because of the very small number of victims. Among the emails leaked last year from Italian surveillance firm Hacking Team there is a document with exploits offered for sale by an outfit called Vulnerabilities Brokerage International. The document lists various privilege escalation, information disclosure and detection bypassing exploits for multiple antivirus products, and also a remote code execution exploit for ESET NOD32 Antivirus with the status 'sold.'
I don't know if it is possible to have a MS Windows running on the internet without a anti virus software. So the question is not which AV software has vulnerabilities, as all software has this issue, but which provides significantly more protection than risk. Or if there is better way to protect MS Windows machines than AV software.
"She's a scientist and a lesbian. She's not going to let it slide." Orphan Black
The main vector for malware is people doing what computers tell them to do. Users have become so accustomed to oversight and "someone else" taking care of their computers that they feel they do need to "update their media player program", "install a codec" and "download this antivirus to remove the trojan horse" when their computer tells them to. That's what the pros do, right? Update and install something and then everything works. And Windows has a "security center" which lambasts the users with red exclamation marks until they download an antivirus, and now that website has found something and offers a free antivirus software. Phew, close one.
Microsoft, Google, Apple, etc. need to stop their programs from telling people how to keep their computers safe. If you know how, then just do it. If you don't know, then what's the point in warning the users: They certainly won't know what to do. Either way, shut up about it. When the computer tells them it has a virus, then users must know that the message is not from someone who looks over them, but probably from someone who wants them to do something that they shouldn't do. "Install this" should instinctively sound exactly as dangerous as installing software off the internet is.
Every piece of software is a potential security hole. AVs, firewalls, encryption layers like SSL or what not constitute no exceptions.
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Exactly, which is why things should be kept simple - the less code you have running the less you have to keep track of.
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I'll half agree with you... I think I know what you're getting at, but I think it's worth clarifying a bit. After all, it's not like any arbitrary code on a machine is vulnerable to random attacks from the internet.
Rather than talking about simplicity - because let's face it, that will never happen - we need to focus on minimizing and hardening the attack surface. For instance, if my personal machine sits behind a router, arbitrary incoming traffic from the internet is blocked. Anything that isn't blocked then has to make it past my personal machine's built-in firewall, which would tend to reject most anything else. Thus, it's likely that 99.999 percent of the code on my machine (any modern OS is *horribly* complex by nature) is completely immune to random internet-based attacks, at least ignoring user actions like launching an infected program or script.
A good example of minimizing attack surface is Amazon's recent release of a very tiny TLS library called s2n. With only 6000 lines of code, it's *much* easier to vet and declare secure than the feature rich but dangerously bloated OpenSSL library, which may put servers at risk with features they never used. Even the name (signal to noise) indicates the intent, which is to keep the library tiny and focused. We're discovering that there's a danger to letting code grow infinitely large and complex, and not depreciating it, because even if those old features work, they still may contain security issues. I'd be extremely surprised if s2n had any serious security flaws in its implementation simply due to its small size - there's just not as much that can go wrong there.
Irony: Agile development has too much intertia to be abandoned now.