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Questions Linger As Juniper Removes Suspicious Dual_EC Algorithm (threatpost.com)

Posted by samzenpus on from the raise-shields dept.

msm1267 writes: Juniper Networks has removed the backdoored Dual_EC DRBG algorithm from its ScreenOS operating system, but new developments show Juniper deployed Dual_EC long after it was known to be backdoored. Stephen Checkoway, assistant professor of computer science at the University of Illinois at Chicago, said that he and a number of crypto experts looked at dozens of versions of Juniper's NetScreen firewalls and learned that ANSI X9.31 was used exclusively until ScreenOS 6.2 when Juniper added Dual_EC. It also changed the size of the nonce used with ANSI X9.31 from 20 bytes to 32 bytes for Dual_EC, giving an attacker the necessary output to predict the PRNG output. 'And at the same time, Juniper introduced what was just a bizarre bug that caused the ANSI generator to never be used and instead just use the output of Dual_EC. They made all of these changes in the same version update.'

3 of 78 comments (clear)

  1. Why Dual EC? by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I'm an implementor of non backdoored RNGs that are very widely deployed. However to be able to do that well you need to understand the many ways how to backdoor RNGs, so you can take preventative measures to prevent other people backdooring your design.

    So I know many ways to backdoor an RNG. If I was trying to do that, why would I choose an RNG that was already widely known to be backdoored?

    So either they are back at backdooring, or not good at not backdooring.

    --
    I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
  2. A few of the many articles: by Futurepower(R) · · Score: 5, Informative

    NSA Helped British Spies Find Security Holes In Juniper Firewalls Quote: "... British spy agency GCHQ, with the knowledge and apparent cooperation of the NSA, acquired the capability to covertly exploit security vulnerabilities in 13 different models of firewalls made by Juniper Networks..."

    Secret Code Found in Juniper's Firewalls Shows Risk of Government Backdoors Quote: "This is a very good showcase for why backdoors are really something governments should not have in these types of devices because at some point it will backfire."

    New Discovery Around Juniper Backdoor Raises More Questions About the Company Quote: "Juniper added the insecure algorithm to its software long after the more secure one was already in it, raising questions about why the company would have knowingly undermined an already secure system."

    Juniper 'fesses up to TWO attacks from 'unauthorised code'

    'Unauthorized code' that decrypts VPNs found in Juniper's ScreenOS Quote: "And it may have been there since 2008, making this a late contender for FAIL of the year."

    How to log into any backdoored Juniper firewall -- hard-coded password published

    Juniper promises to fix ScreenOS cryptography ... eventually

    Listen up, FBI: Juniper code shows the problem with backdoors Quote: "FBI director James Comey should be taking notes: The Juniper debacle shows why security experts are up in arms over government-ordered backdoors."

    Another quote from that article:

    "Cryptographic backdoors are one of the best ways for attackers to break into systems. '[The backdoors] take care of the hard work, the laying of plumbing and electrical wiring, so attackers can simply walk in and change the drapes,' Green said.

  3. Weird: No articles about NSA management by Futurepower(R) · · Score: 5, Interesting

    NSA = No Sales for America

    I find it shocking that articles about the NSA seem to start from the assumption that, except for the theft of a huge amount of data by an employee of a sub-contractor, Edward Snowden, the NSA is well managed. To me, it is utterly obvious that the NSA is not well managed.

    If NSA employees can listen to all telephone calls, do you think that none of them notice an increase of traffic at a company and listen to the recordings to find stock tips?

    My perception is that governments don't manage technology companies well. (NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy, for example.) Part of the reason is that the best technology people want to work for organizations that are known for their good work. A government, especially a secret government agency, cannot hire the kind of people who are creative with technology. What technology genius wants to go to prison if he talks about his work?

    I posted links to 8 more articles about Juniper Networks below. A quote from one of them:

    "Cryptographic backdoors are one of the best ways for attackers to break into systems. '[The backdoors] take care of the hard work, the laying of plumbing and electrical wiring, so attackers can simply walk in and change the drapes,' Green said."

    It is definitely not reasonable to think that the NSA can hire people who are smarter than all those who want to break into computer systems. Cryptographic backdoors are a bad idea, and not only because they kill the sales of any nation that sponsors them.

    When a government agency can break into any company's affairs, do you think the managers never take advantage of that information to make money?

    Who chooses the sub-contractors, and decides how much they are paid? Suppose a relative of an NSA manager owns a contracting company?

    Secrecy causes huge problems. It is difficult or impossible to review the quality of management. Bad managers can hide their mistakes. That effectively assures that the management will be poor.

    Also, democracy works only if citizens can know what the government is doing.

    The NSA is based on an idea that just does not function correctly, and cannot be made to function correctly.