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Apple Court Testimony Reveals Why It Refuses To Unlock iPhones For Police (dailydot.com)
blottsie writes: Newly unsealed court transcripts from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York show that Apple now refuses to unlock iPhones for law enforcement, saying "In most cases now and in the future, the government’s requested order would be substantially burdensome, as it would be impossible to perform." “Right now Apple is aware that customer data is under siege from a variety of different directions. Never has the privacy and security of customer data been as important as it is now,” Apple lawyer Marc Zwillinger said at the hearing. “A hypothetical consumer could think if Apple is not in the business of accessing my data and if Apple has built a system to prevent itself from accessing my data, why is it continuing to comply with orders that don’t have a clear lawful basis in doing so?”
I think the statement reads oddly out of context because the case is about an iOS7 phone, where it's not 'impossible' (only burdensome) yet warning them that it will be impossible in the future. They're afraid that un-encrypting it now, just because it's not 'impossible' will mean that in the future they might be forced (by law) to make it possible, so they're arguing that they shouldn't have to do it, even now that it's only 'burdensome'.
The simpler solution that you are describing was the kind of system that was implemented prior to iOS 8. iOS devices have had encryption as long as I can remember but the implementation was changed into one that Apple could no longer access. Thus Apple did have access in another system now they don't. Ergo they spent development time and money to implement a solution that they could not access. Whatever your beef with Apple at least acknowledge that this is a positive step forward.
"There are lies, there are damn lies, and there are statistics"
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
At least in the United States, the intent of the Founders was specifically to discourage that interpretation. You don't need to be granted the right to unbreakable encryption, it is reserved for you by default.
You mistake an iPhone's unlock code with the iPhone's encryption key. the iPhones do typically use a 4-6 digit pin as an unlock code. The user also has the ability to create a full alphanumeric password for the unlock code as well. However, that is simply the code that's used to unlock the actual full encryption key that is stored within dedicated crypto hardware. Apple uses a dedicated chip to store and process the encryption. They call this the Secure Enclave.
Within the secure enclave itself, you have the device's Unique ID (UID) . The only place this information is stored is within the secure enclave. It can't be queried or accessed from any other part of the device or OS. Within the phone's processor you also have the device's Group ID (GID). Both of these numbers combine to create 1/2 of the encryption key. These are numbers that are burned into the silicon, aren't accessible outside of the chips themselves, and aren't recorded anywhere once they are burned into the silicon. Apple doesn't keep records of these numbers.
The second half of the encryption key is generated using a random number generator chip. It creates entropy using the various sensors on the iPhone itself during boot (microphone, accelerometer, camera, etc.) This part of the key is stored within the Secure Enclave as well, where it resides and doesn't leave. This storage is tamper resistant and can't be accessed outside of the encryption system. Even if the UID and GID components of the encryption key are compromised on Apple's end, it still wouldn't be possible to decrypt an iPhone since that's only 1/2 of the key.
The secure enclave is part of an overall hardware based encryption system that completely encrypts all of the user storage. It will only decrypt content if provided with the unlock code. The unlock code itself is entangled with the device's UDID so that all attempts to decrypt the storage must be done on the device itself. You must have all 3 pieces present: The specific secure enclave, the specific processor of the iphone, and the flash memory that you are trying to decrypt. Basically, you can't pull the device apart to attack an individual piece of the encryption or get around parts of the encryption storage process. You can't run the decryption or brute forcing of the unlock code in an emulator. It requires that the actual hardware components are present and can only be done on the specific device itself.
The secure enclave also has hardware enforced time-delays and key-destruction. You can set the phone to wipe the encryption key (and all the data contained on the phone) after 10 failed attempts. If you have the data-wipe turned on, then the secure enclave will nuke the key that it stores after 10 failed attempts. Whether the device-wipe feature is turned on or not, the secure enclave still has a hardware-enforced delay between attempts at entering the code: Attempts 1-4 have no delay, Attempt 5 has a delay of 1 minute. Attempt 6 has a delay of 5 minutes. Attempts 7 and 8 have a delay of 15 minutes. And attempts 9 or more have a delay of 1 hour. This delay is enforced by the secure enclave and can not be bypassed, even if you completely replace the operating system of the phone itself. If you have a 6-digit pin code, it will take, on average, nearly 6 years to brute-force the code. 4-digit pin will take almost a year. if you have an alpha-numeric password the amount of time required could extend beyond the heat-death of the universe. Key destruction is turned on by default.
Even if you pull the flash storage out of the device, image it, and attempt to get around key destruction that way it won't be successful. The key isn't stored on the flash itself, it's only stored within the secure enclave itself which you can't remove the storage from.
Each boot, the secure enclave creates it's own temporary encryption key, based on it's own UID and random number generator with proper entropy, that it uses to store the full device encryption key in ram. Since the encryptio
Does it matter to me WHY they chose to tell the feds to jump in a lake? Not really. Because they chose to offer a device that has some level of assurance that the government isn't snooping on me illegally they have gained some trust from me, and that means I am more likely to buy their stuff in the future.
The primary purpose of any entity is to ensure its continued existence. If people lose trust in Apple then people stop buying their stuff. Of course this will make them money. I'm just not sure why you think this is a bad thing.
I am armed because I am free. I am free because I am armed.