Slashdot Mirror
How Far Have We Come With HTTPS? Google Turns On the Spotlight (networkworld.com)
alphadogg writes from an article on NetworkWorld: HTTPS is widely considered one of the keys to a safer Internet, but only if it's broadly implemented. Aiming to shed some light on how much progress has been made so far, Google on Tuesday launched a new section of its transparency report dedicated to encryption. Included in the new section is data highlighting the progress of encryption efforts both at Google and on popular third-party sites. "Our aim with this project is to hold ourselves accountable and encourage others to encrypt so we can make the Web even safer for everyone," wrote HTTPS evangelists Rutledge Chin Feman and Tim Willis on the Google Security Blog.
Better link to "other sites" report: https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/https/grid/?hl=en
Notice that Apple, Bing and Microsoft are all knocked for NOT running a "Modern TLS Config" and NOT using HTTPS by default. (I actually had to check that for myself - it was hard to believe that major companies are still NOT doing HTTPS by default - I enforce this even on my little podunk sites - but it was true!)
Google, er, Alphabet didnt really get a rock in their shoe about encryption until Edward Snowden so lets take a moment to thank their engineering consultant in Russia. Once it was revealed that the US government had placed secret taps on links between google datacenters to render their endpoint to service encryption meaningless, the company began working to make the internet a living hell for the surveillance state.
Google owns a browser, so that browser adopted SSL, then TLS as a mandatory connection parameter for google services. a pretty good share of Mozilla, at least in braintrust, is owned by Google and so getting firefox to endorse and enforce encrypted channels to google and other web services was childsplay. after a year, the titty got tougher and HSTS was the norm on some of the largest web content providers on the internet. SSL had been completely phased out for TLS 1.2 and strong AES256 crypto in light of a more concerned review of open source encryption after the governments audacious claim they could break in excess of 80% of encrypted traffic. Libressl hit the scene after some disclosures, DEFCON changed their status with US law enforcement to "its complicated" and now in this foul year of our lord 2016, uncle sams up proverbial shits creek with Apple in what will either be a resounding defeat, or a knock-down drag out multi decade battle at the hands of a corporation with more income and assets than most foreign nations. But slashdot, its only getting good.
googles set their target to the next generation of encryption, elliptic curve, and its looking to be a trend-setter. the primes used by most current elliptic are cooked up by NIST, and NIST has in the past been implicated in weakening encryption as part of US security policy. NIST primes are still used in chrome, but chrome supports Dan Bernsteins Curve25519 alternative that isnt intentionally gimped for uncle sam. Look for Google --and the internet-- to begin using this and other "safe curves" as standards to replace secp384r1 and prime256v1. devices and services in the year of the hoverboard are now shipping with encryption as a requirement, not an option, and features to disable it in browsers have been quietly retired. And perhaps the most resounding confirmation of the internets collective "fuck you" against the carte-blanc collection of data on citizens has come from outside the US. a majority of VPN and encrypted storage providers do not reside within the immediate jurisdiction of Washington.
Good people go to bed earlier.
SSLLabs gives A rating
Protocols
TLS 1.2 Yes
TLS 1.1 Yes
TLS 1.0 Yes
SSL 3 No
SSL 2 No
Protocol Details
DROWN (experimental) No, server keys and hostname not seen elsewhere with SSLv2
(1) For a better understanding of this test, please read this longer explanation
(2) Key usage data kindly provided by the Censys network search engine; original DROWN test here
(3) Censys data is only indicative of possible key and certificate reuse; possibly out-of-date and not complete
Secure Renegotiation Supported
Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation Yes
Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation No
BEAST attack Not mitigated server-side (more info) TLS 1.0: 0xc014
POODLE (SSLv3) No, SSL 3 not supported (more info)
POODLE (TLS) Inconclusive (Timeout) (more info)
Downgrade attack prevention Yes, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV supported (more info)
SSL/TLS compression No
RC4 No
Heartbeat (extension) No
Heartbleed (vulnerability) No (more info)
OpenSSL CCS vuln. (CVE-2014-0224) No (more info)
Forward Secrecy With modern browsers (more info)
ALPN No
NPN No
Session resumption (caching) No (IDs assigned but not accepted)
Session resumption (tickets) No
OCSP stapling No
Strict Transport Security (HSTS) No
HSTS Preloading Not in: Chrome Edge Firefox IE Tor
Public Key Pinning (HPKP) No
Public Key Pinning Report-Only No
Long handshake intolerance No
TLS extension intolerance No
TLS version intolerance No
Incorrect SNI alerts No
Uses common DH primes No, DHE suites not supported
DH public server param (Ys) reuse No, DHE suites not supported
SSL 2 handshake compatibility Yes
Miscellaneous
Test date Wed, 16 Mar 2016 19:51:39 UTC
Test duration 125.443 seconds
HTTP status code 200
HTTP server signature Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
Server hostname star.slashdot.org
Google, er, Alphabet didnt really get a rock in their shoe about encryption until Edward Snowden
While I think we should all be very grateful for Snowden's revelations, that's not true. Google was really serious about encrypting everything long before Snowden's revelations.
For example, Gmail was the first major webmail service to provide users the option of only using SSL, back in 2008 or so. Google turned on SSL for web searches in 2011. The design of SPDY, later adopted by the IETF as HTTP2, started around 2010 and from the beginning had no unencrypted mode (though the IETF insisted on adding one).
Once it was revealed that the US government had placed secret taps on links between google datacenters
Google actually started work on encrypting all of those data center links long before Snowden's information came out, though Snowden definitely did light a fire under the project, causing it to get fully deployed very quickly. Snowden probably also had a lot to do with Google's decision to completely disable non-TLS traffic for many of their services (IIRC it was 2014 when gmail and search went TLS-only).
Google owns a browser, so that browser adopted SSL, then TLS as a mandatory connection parameter for google services.
Chrome supported SSL and TLS before Snowden, and ownership of Chrome had nothing to do with making encryption mandatory for Google services, which was done in a browser-agnostic way. Chrome did provide a platform for Google to experiment with other improvements, though, such as certificate pinning, SPDY and QUIC. SPDY and QUIC are mostly about performance, but as I mentioned above Google build encryption into them from the ground up and never even bothered with unencrypted versions.
after a year, the titty got tougher and HSTS was the norm on some of the largest web content providers on the internet.
HSTS also predated Snowden, and Google even started using it for some services before Snowden. But, yes, again Snowden spurred much wider adoption. Which is awesome.
But slashdot, its only getting good.
Indeed. All new Internet protocols and standards now specifically address anti-surveillance in their designs, and lots of academic research is focused on new technologies to make surveillance hard. This is actually an even bigger change than the TLS push, etc., indicates. Prior to Snowden, preventing surveillance was not a design goal. If it happened, it happened by accident. No more. It's now a design goal for much of the tech industry.
It doesn't matter that SSL is computationally expensive, because you don't use it to encrypt the entire session. Instead, you use it to exchange symmetric encryption keys in a secure manner and *those* keys (and algorithms) are what is used to encrypt the session. Even an old Xeon 5160 could encrypt 100-150 MB/s with AES-128 which is enough to keep up with a 1Gbps NIC.
Modern CPUs are even faster. Those are per-core numbers, so multiple by 4/8/12/16 (however many cores you have).