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CCTV DVR Vulnerabilities Traced To Chinese OEM Which Spurned Researchers' Advice (softpedia.com)

An anonymous reader writes: RSA security researcher Rotem Kerner has identified a common vulnerability in the firmware of 70 different CCTV DVR vendors, which allows crooks to execute code and gain root privileges on the affected devices. The problem was actually in the firmware of just one DVR sold by Chinese firm TVT. The practice of "white-labeling" products helped propagate this issue to other "manufacturers" who did nothing more than to buy a non-branded DVR, tweaked its firmware, slapped their logo on top, and sold it a their own, vulnerability included.

1 of 51 comments (clear)

  1. I got the T shirt. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

    On my common cheapo 'H960 DVR' I used Nessus for discovery.
    Nessus navigated my directory structure via the web interface.
    Nessus showed me the contents of the /etc/password file.

    It only took me a minute to google "rainbow table" and find JTR.
    It took JTR less than 1/4 hour to crack the SIX CHARACTER password WITHOUT any rainbow tables.

    It took me many many many emails to convince the distributor's cust. serv. that I was talking about an actual vulnerability.

    I never expected it to be secure at the price I paid.
    I'm glad I can root my box.
    Now I can, if I choose, fix the shitty user interface.
    I doubt the typical user would think it is a 'feature' as I do.

    The fact that it BY DESIGN interfaces with an external server not under my control convinced me never to use the web features.
    I knew that before the purchase, I wanted an offline recorder.
    Oddly, the typical user DOES consider the remote server a feature. Most people hand a stranger the keys on day #1.

    I have an inexpensive 'H.264 tribred' DVR that is slightly more secure. Provided I don't hand the keys to an unknown 3rd party.