Petya Ransomware Uses DOS-Level Lock Screen, Prevents OS Boot Up (softpedia.com)
An anonymous reader writes: A new type of ransomware was discovered that crashes your PC into a BSOD, restarts your computer, and then prevents your OS from starting by altering the hard drive's master boot record (MBR). This keeps the user locked in a DOS screen that doubles as the ransomware's ransom note. The ransomware's name is Petya, and was currently seen only targeting HR departments in Germany.
Sounds like a Windows problem.
Another satisfied Microsoft customer?
I thought Windows[7,8,10,9999] was supposed to fix this? Was the user "warned" about opening a file for the 10th time that day?
What happens when I open it with WINE?
http://www.maxineudall.com/2010/02/should-economists-be-sued-for-malpractice.html
According to the update in TFA, so just repairing the MBR will not solve the problem.
I eat only the real part of complex carbohydrates.
I love malware. It makes stupidity more painful. Never seen this shit happen to someone who has a clue. Probably never will.
Stupidity must always be made painful or else it grows out of control and the clueful can no longer shoulder its burden. The bad guys did good this time. If only there were more meatspace equivalents.
Sorry, a DOS screen?
What's to lose?
I can always download more porn.
I can re-install Lubuntu in half an hour (including customizations).
What happens when I open it with WINE?
The virus needs to modify the boot sequence so the next reboot starts its "fake" CHKDSK (to encrypt the disk and display a lock screen).
Under most Unix, root-level privilege are necessary to write to a raw block device (as required to change the MBR) and as Wine is usually ran under an end-users account, it simply lacks the necessary rights to perform this action.
"Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
"HR employees are sent an email with a link to a file stored on Dropbox, where an applicant's CV can be downloaded. This file is an EXE file named portfolio-packed.exe, which if executed, immediately crashes the system into a standard Windows blue screen of death."
How does this scenario even occur? Why didn't HR just tell them to attach an appropriate file instead of going out of their way to download the "CV" and unpacking it? This is insanity.
Unless you are going to tamper with the firmware or its settings, "good luck" changing my boot sequence.
Oh, by the way, a comment at this Trend Micro write-up suggests that the initial program that infects the system won't work unless the user has administrative privileges.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
This won't impact a Mac, nor will it impact Linux (it's an .exe file). The TFA referred to Windows, so should the summary.
Just like as usual - most rampant exploits and malware are Windows-only.
Make sure everyone's vote counts: Verified Voting
I don't *always* boot from non-writable media.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
If we all volunteer to kick in a little to the ransom gang, is it possible we could spread it to all HR people worldwide? A world full of hamstrung HR people would allow us to all get direct-hire jobs.
There is no reason anybody should be able to run unknown exes on a work computer without notifying IT first.
It's the only way to combat this kind of lack of basic IT knowledge that afflicts most office workers.
I work with people who have used PCs for over a decade who still lack basic IT knowledge and would still fall for this trick in a heartbeat. You cannot drill it into your staff to not open stuff like this, you have to actively prevent it happening.
Your PC is now Stoned!
What if the editors misheard and it's really a case of being locked into a Task Ring?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MkwiJ_rZh4
Not new.
So just boot from a CD or USB drive and then fix the MBR.
Just cruising through this digital world at 33 1/3 rpm...
- msg in subject
I looked at the timestamps of the files of a cryptolocker attack victim once - it's worth remembering that computers are very fast these days and it did quite a few GB per minute.
Initial text console level lock screen is what that should read.
Anyone who supplies an exe as a resume/CV, even if it doesn't contain any malicious software, should be summarily dumped into the trash and dismissed out of hand.
I thought QDOS, and thus the BSOD, went away with Windows Vista. At least, that's what the ads told me.
Are you implying that Microsoft might have lied to me? :cry emoji:
Hey, slashdot, the technical site how about telling us the name of the Operating System and the Hardware Platform this ransomware runs on? hint Windows and Intel ..
Or boot using UEFI, which probably breaks this. Toss in Secure Boot, and even if they wrote a UEFI bootloader they wouldn't be able to intercept the boot process.
Cue idiots who make inaccurate comments about UEFI and betray their technical ignorance.
I honestly entered this story hoping to read lots of merciless ridicule of these phrases.
Where is it? Or have all the geeks finally left Slashdot?
STOP . AMERICA . NOW
I was hoping for exactly the same, there's a brief mention of it followed by someone(user 4,496,745, yikes) seriously asking
That, a day or so after some prick from the gadget show made it to the front page pontificating on things we all know he has absolutely no grasp of, this just isn't my slashdot any more and it's sad.
You know, just so that it runs on not the older computers.
In Russian, Petya - is variation of name Peter. A childish way to say that name. That makes me wonder...
This is actually true for Windows as well - need local admin to write to the mbr.
The difference is that wine will simply refuse and fail.
Whereas, on windows, this will open an UAC prompt which user have taken the habit (...have been pavlovian-trained...) to click okay to get anything done due to countless badly designed pieces of software.
Also if the machine is using uefi/"Secure Boot" wouldn't be affected either.
That's a bit more complicated.
If the disk is partitioned in Legacy mode, this will fry the partition table.
The UEFI firmware won't be able to locate the special FAT32 boot partition ("EFI system partition") with the bootloader .EFI executable used by the OS.
The system is left in an unbootable state, and the few next available boot options will be taken in turns, eventually reaching legacy boot, which will load the booter code of the malware.
If the disk is partitioned in GPT mode, things will get a little bit more complex.
Some UEFI firmware implementation DO require an appropriate "Guarding DOS partition" to boot in UEFI mode (some are even picky about whether the ms-dos "BOOT" flag should be set on that guarding partition). Of course, none of which is standardised.
Because of this, and because the partition table is hosed, some UEFI firmware won't detect the availability of the EFI system partition and won't boot in UEFI mode, again degrading to next available modes, eventually reaching the point they attemps a legacy MBR boot.
Some other UEFI implementation completely ignore the MBR and go straight for the GPT.
Then it depends on the malware. I can't find reliable sources whether the malware does encrypt files on the disk or not.
If it doesn't, then MBR-ignoring UEFI firmware will boot as usual. No problem noticed beyond the initial bluescreen crash.
If the malware does encrypt files, the boot process will fail at some point (depending on the encrypted fils).
The only difference that "Secure booting" brings, is that it refuses to run .efi executables (like bootloader) which weren't signed by Microsoft's key or any key that an admin has loaded into the system (for Linux users that do use it, but don't use the shim and load their own keys instead).
The system will refuse to boot all the same as above (except for the single exception), and simply won't fall back to displaying the skull. But the system is hosed all the same.
I can't find relliable information about what exactly is encrypted, so it's impossible to know if simply rebuilding the partition table using a USB boot stick (like System Rescue CD) is enough, or whether a decryption tool will be eventually needed to rescue important files from the drive.
"Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
There, took care of that for you.