New Attack Discovered On Node.js Package Manager npm (softpedia.com)
An anonymous reader writes: A Google researcher has discovered a way in which he could exploit some npm registry design flaws to propagate a malicious package to other packages, and in the projects that load them. The exploit leverages things such as npm's persistent authentication, developers who never lock down dependencies (and often use version number ranges), npm lifecycle scripts that run with the user's privileges (sometimes as root), and npm's centralized registry, which doesn't review or scan code. Attackers can compromise other projects with malicious code, can compromise Node apps used in corporate environments, or they can launch worm-like viruses that poison npm packages at random.
How do we know that such techniques haven't already been used?
Even if they fix these flaws, I think every single line of code in every single version of every single npm package will need to be reviewed by a team of security experts.
Aside from that, why are libraries pulled in dynamically from the intertoobs on a production server? Why aren't the libraries packaged like Perl CPAN stuff, or PHP PEAR stuff, to be downloaded (and signature verified?) to the server or dev machine and accessed only locally? Heck a tar.gz file with a posted list of hash sums would be more secure. This is all old hat stuff that has been solved in multiple ways, no reason at all for it to be an issue now.
Don't blame me, I voted for Kodos
Wait... there are people who run Javascript code, on a server, as root? Untrusted Javascript code they don't control to boot? Uhhh, wow.
I argue this with other devs a lot. Dependency managers, *especially* if you use version wildcards, are asking for trouble. Keep more of a handle on what your dependencies are, and only move versions if there's a compelling reason (security update, huge performance boost, etc).