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Over 1,400 Vulnerabilities Found In Automated Medical Supply System
An anonymous reader writes: Security researchers have discovered 1,418 vulnerabilities in CareFusion's Pyxis SupplyStation system -- automated cabinets used to dispense medical supplies -- that are still being used in the healthcare and public health sectors in the US and around the world. The vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely by attackers with low skills, and exploits that target these vulnerabilities are publicly available. Things already seem to be getting out hand.
Medical and healthcare companies consistently seem to have *no idea* whatsoever about security, and *no idea* that they actually need to hire someone who knows security.
Anything with a computer in it needs to take into account security. If you're putting code into your product and don't know security and aren't hiring someone who does, you're doing it wrong. Medical devices, cars, even Bluetooth toilets. If it communicates with the outside world or is exposed to users who aren't authorized full control over the device, it needs security. If you don't do it, your product is a ticking time bomb waiting for a researcher, if you're lucky, or a malicious attacker, if you aren't, to notice the lack of security. This will keep happening until everyone gets the message.
No Shit sherlock.
Windows XP and Windows 2003 systems are prone to all sorts of horrible security flaws. Reading the Fucking Article I see that the newer, non EOL, equipment isn't prone to any of these problems.
I wonder how many vulnerabilities are in older Cisco routers that haven't been patched since 2007?
Wheel of Time: Book by Book and Sumview (summary review) Bigdady92 style: http://bigdady92.blogspot.com/
. . . . year or two back, my oldest daughter entered a program to learn the "EPIC" medical records system. Now, admittedly, we're a geekhaus, my daughters were doing computers at age 5, and my youngest managed to hack the oldest by examining her browser cache at age 8.
But she came back from the first day or two of training, shaking HER head. Not only was there no folder security, but, at least as configured there, every user was an admin.. Each of which could mess with another's files and account settings.
Worse still, they were being trained at the site where the system was being hosted for production. No physical security. No backup power: in fact, zero redundancy whatsoever. And data backup ? "What's that ?"
She wrote up a 2-page summary of problems SHE saw (and her training was in Medical Administration, although she DID learn Security from me. . .). She sends it to the POC at the Hospital the system was in the process of being installed for. . . .and the EPIC people dropped her from the course.
There's a cherry on the top of this Sundae of Fail: she was eventually hired by the Hospital as, surprisingly enough, a Ward Medical Admin. And the IT Department comes to HER for help and suggestions. . . .