Slashdot Mirror
New Surveillance System May Let Cops Use All Of The Cameras (engadget.com)
An anonymous reader quotes a report from Wired: [Computer scientists have created a way of letting law enforcement tap any camera that isn't password protected so they can determine where to send help or how to respond to a crime.] The system, which is just a proof of concept, alarms privacy advocates who worry that prudent surveillance could easily lead to government overreach, or worse, unauthorized use. It relies upon two tools developed independently at Purdue. The Visual Analytics Law Enforcement Toolkit superimposes the rate and location of crimes and the location of police surveillance cameras. CAM2 reveals the location and orientation of public network cameras, like the one outside your apartment. You could do the same thing with a search engine like Shodan, but CAM2 makes the job far easier, which is the scary part. Aggregating all these individual feeds makes it potentially much more invasive. [Purdue limits access to registered users, and the terms of service for CAM2 state "you agree not to use the platform to determine the identity of any specific individuals contained in any video or video stream." A reasonable step to ensure privacy, but difficult to enforce (though the team promises the system will have strict security if it ever goes online). Beyond the specter of universal government surveillance lies the risk of someone hacking the system.] EFF discovered that anyone could access more than 100 "secure" automated license plate readers last year.
If I grok the summary correctly, they're going to use any cameras without a password to augment their existing capability. That means persons-unknown-to-them can control the output of those cameras, and thus alter the reality (as they see it) of whatever the camera is pointing at.
As an example, let's say there's a passwordless camera pointed at a pawn shop. I decide I want to rob said pawn shop, so I convince the camera owner to delay the feed by 15 minutes (which they do, perhaps by inserting an extra frame every so often for a couple of weeks so no one notices). I then rob the pawn shop, and get 15 minutes head start on the lazy cops sat in the office eating snack and talking about sports and their cheating spouses. The police-owned cameras (and in fact all the others) just see my van drive down the road and turning onto some dirt track where there are no cameras at all. GENIUS!
To MalQuote: "advice from and old tracker: if you want to find someone, use your eyes".
I mean honestly, if there is one thing we know, it is that the police would never violate our right to privacy.
http://www.theguardian.com/com...
I cannot imagine them logging onto random "hot girl" cams to monitor their "safety".
Knock knock... Are you OK miss?
Yes, but how did you know I slipped in the shower?
Except the surveillance possible today is way worse than that in the book 1984.
.
The type of surveillance mentioned in TFA extends that isolation, further removing the police from the people and communities they have sworn to protect and serve.
The communities are not a zoo and the police are not the zoo keeper. Yet that is the model that seems to be emphasized by the current trends in law enforcement.
Security camera systems should:
o be wired (ethernet or HD video), not wifi or OTA video
o if data, be connected locally only, via LAN
o if data, not be hooked to "the cloud" ("cloud" is a synonym for "I have no privacy or security... or clue, but I digress")
o if data, never be accessible from outside the LAN
o if data, be behind a dedicated firewall (ideally, multiple firewalls) or on a completely isolated network
o be recording locally (DVR or equivalent) on a physically secure DVR/etc.
o utilize armored, hidden cabling and armored, difficult to access camera mounts
Skip any of this, and you're just inviting unauthorized use of your video feeds.
I've fallen off your lawn, and I can't get up.