Xen Vulnerability Allows Hackers To Escape Qubes OS VM And Own the Host (itnews.com.au)
Slashdot reader Noryungi writes: Qubes OS certainly has an intriguing approach to security, but a newly discovered Xen vulnerability allows a hacker to escape a VM and own the host. If you are running Qubes, make sure you update the dom0 operating system to the latest version.
"A malicious, paravirtualized guest administrator can raise their system privileges to that of the host on unpatched installations," according to an article in IT News, which quotes Xen as saying "The bits considered safe were too broad, and not actually safe." IT News is also reporting that Qubes will move to full hardware memory virtualization in its next 4.0 release. Xen's hypervisor "is used by cloud giants Amazon Web Services, IBM and Rackspace," according to the article, which quotes a Qubes security researcher who asks the age-old question. "Has Xen been written by competent developers? How many more bugs of this caliber are we going to witness in the future?"
"A malicious, paravirtualized guest administrator can raise their system privileges to that of the host on unpatched installations," according to an article in IT News, which quotes Xen as saying "The bits considered safe were too broad, and not actually safe." IT News is also reporting that Qubes will move to full hardware memory virtualization in its next 4.0 release. Xen's hypervisor "is used by cloud giants Amazon Web Services, IBM and Rackspace," according to the article, which quotes a Qubes security researcher who asks the age-old question. "Has Xen been written by competent developers? How many more bugs of this caliber are we going to witness in the future?"
which quotes a Qubes security researcher who asks the age-old question. "Has Xen been written by competent developers? How many more bugs of this caliber are we going to witness in the future?"
Well, "Qubes security researcher", which platform did you choose for your project, and did you audit it fully before making your releases? No?
Which raises the age-old question: Has Qubes been written by competent developers?
Has Xen been written by competent developers?
Strictly speaking the answer is no, but they are definitely as good as the VMWare guys, who've had plenty of vulns.
"First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
And I can't help but wonder if much of it is because security was an afterthought for so long and if we would have been better off and designed for it from the get-go, even though it would have meant rewriting or scrapping decades of code.
The counterargument i was hearing back in the late 80s was that too much would have to be redone - and that was before the explosive growth that's seen a billion people walking around with more computing power in their pockets than most companies had available back then.
Pain is merely failure leaving the body
So patch your OS. If it's not a zero-day it's not a problem. Why is this news?
Show me this type of vulnerability in VMware, any version
Here's one example.
Here's a story showing that VMWare tries to hide their vulnerabilities.
"First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
Well, at least he didn't say "pwn the b0xen".
#DeleteChrome
Show me this type of vulnerability in VMware, any version. I think you are a bit off base here. The Xen Guys are good, it sucks when this type of vulnerability were to surface, but there has never been one like this on vSphere.
Any computer software more complex than this has bugs:
10 PRINT "HELLO, WROLD!"
20 GOTO 10
.
.
.
(so does this one)
Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
https://www.qubes-os.org/ claims (tongue in cheek) to be "Reasonably secure." Really it loos like they are all about the security, so this is kind of a big deal for them.
https://www.qubes-os.org/tour/...
What is Qubes OS?
Qubes is a security-oriented operating system (OS). The OS is the software which runs all the other programs on a computer. Some examples of popular OSes are Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X, Android, and iOS. Qubes is free and open-source software (FOSS). This means that everyone is free to use, copy, and change the software in any way. It also means that the source code is openly available so others can contribute to and audit it.
... How much did the qubes researcher, or anyone, pay for this software?
I think it's the same as with the OpenSSL library: sure, it may be buggy and unsafe. But would you rather do without? And those complaining don't *have* to use Xen, or OpenSSL: they can always use commercial software. And I have to say that the trackrecord of the Xen solution vs. the commercial solutions is pretty good.
Dissing developers who put in time and effort to help others is insulting to the entire OS community. Point out mistakes, sure. Report bugs, sure. But dissing them this way just to make yourself look better? Yuck.
Therefore, by the (faulty) logic you're using, you're just a cow with a keyboard - osu-neko (2604)
That wired story reads like fiction, and doesn't really explain anything.
The first link is interesting - it's not a "bug" in VMware code (which thus far has only had a couple of exploitable bugs in its history), but an extremely clever remote exploit that's only loosely related to virtualization. Certainly a design flaw in VMware Workstation, though, since they allowed it to happen.
By printing to the host's printer from the guest, which by default is Microsoft's bizarre fake printer, you can exploit Microsoft's almost insane level of stupidity with Word and printing.
Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
C++ fixes these issues already, if you actually learn and use the language standard libraries (yes, what you're calling the 'crap' is the fix you're too arrogant to see).
Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
The first link is a description of XSA-148, which was published last October, not XSA-182.
TCP: Why the Internet is full of SYN.
Take your pick: https://www.cvedetails.com/vul...
Show me this type of vulnerability in VMware, any version. I think you are a bit off base here. The Xen Guys are good, it sucks when this type of vulnerability were to surface, but there has never been one like this on vSphere.
Any computer software more complex than this has bugs:
10 PRINT "HELLO, WROLD!"
20 GOTO 10
.
.
.
(so does this one)
That's demonstrable false. Software can be formally proven. Not all software for the general case. But if you limit inputs or execution time, you absolutely can prove software to be correct, bug-free, etc..
Big egos and small skills usually go hand-in-hand....
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
That wired story reads like fiction, and doesn't really explain anything.
I posted it because it shows how the company, VMWare, responds to vulnerabilities. Wired has a crappy tone and I hate it (which is what you were complaining about when you said it "reads like fiction"), but on the other hand, they do a relatively good job with fact checking. Which isn't the same as doing a good job fact-checking, I guess.
The first link is interesting - it's not a "bug" in VMware code
Was the fix in VMWare code or in Microsoft code?
"First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
The fix is usually in the code of the company that gives a shit about its customers, regardless of where the actual problem is. This is fundamentally a horrible MS security bug, that VMware didn't wall off. I'd bet that VMware fixed it, because they actually care about security.
Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
This is fundamentally a horrible MS security bug,
That's true too.
"First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
Oh so... is this why the tor people always say it's better to have the whonix workstation in a qubes VM but still have to go through the whonix gateway VM on a completely separate machine? Which just leads me to another question: Is there a smaller attack vector in physical separation or is it just a different one? Or is the idea that you have to get through a physical machine to get to the workstation machine but then still get through the VM to dox fully? It would seem like just getting to the gateway pc would be enough because it's still a machine on the same network right?
First off, I'm not quite sure what to make of you calling Joanna a "shitlord". Has that epithet recently undergone a dramatic shift in meaning?
Now, do you actually expect the leader of a relatively small distro to personally audit everything upstream before every single release? Or were you just being rhetorical and you think that harsh criticism is always unwarranted? I do not have the time or expertise to vet anything personally, but Joanna's white papers and her philosophy for Qubes have almost always struck me as spot-on. Xen was initially chosen because it is a thin type-1 hypervisor with less than 150,000 lines of code[1]]. It has major corporate backers and it's been around for over a decade. If any massive holes turn up, I'm all for Joanna or anyone else yelling for a bit. I'm not sure that Torvalds-style management is always called for, but horrendous mistakes should not slip by with a shrug, especially in a major project that is small enough (in terms of lines of code) to make comprehensive security reviews feasible.
As it happens, Joanna already decided several years back that Qubes should not be wedded to Xen for all of time. Qubes 3.0 saw the introduction of the "Hypervisor Abstraction Layer", which was specifically intended to eventually allow Qubes to be ported to platforms. So, this isn't empty complaining we're talking about here... if the Qubes devs are dissatisfied with the direction Xen is headed, they can start looking for alternatives sooner rather than later.
Joanna is the head of a extremely interesting project that produces 100% open source code. (Their Windows guest tools, previously proprietary but free of charge for personal use, were released under the GPL v2 earlier this year.) I would rather she spend her limited time and money making Qubes more awesome. And I'd rather the Xen devs and their corporate backers spend their time and money making Xen more efficient and secure. Does that sound unreasonable to you?
Well, do you know what sounds unreasonable to me? Saying that Joanna should audit Xen before every Qubes release.
1. "but that's misleading! Dom0 should be considered part of the hypervisor attack surface as well!" That was what I'd always assumed as well, but she convinced me otherwise... first with her whitepaper and then with her product, which has already isolated several vulnerable components in de-privileged domains. In particular, the network card drivers and the firewall are in separate domains and Dom0 has no network connections whatsoever.