Samsung Pay Hack Lets Attackers Make Fraudulent Payments (theverge.com)
jmcbain writes: The Verge reports that a security researcher at DefCon outlined a number of attacks targeting Samsung Pay, Samsung's digital payment system that runs on their smartphones. According to the article, the attack "[focuses] on intercepting or fabricating payment tokens -- codes generated by the user's smartphone that stand in for their credit card information. These tokens are sent from the mobile device to the payment terminal during wireless purchases. [They expire 24 hours after being generated and are single-use only.]" In a response, Samsung said that "in certain scenarios an attacker could skim a user's payment token and make a fraudulent purchase with their card," but that "the attacker must be physically close to the target while they are making a legitimate purchase."
"the attacker must be physically close to the target while they are making a legitimate purchase."
s/the attacker/a skimming device planted by the attacker/
Since when has this ever been a hurdle for fraudsters?
Forgive me if I'm being stupid, but I don't understand the summary. A single use token indicates that it can only be used once. Presumably the token is equivalent to the functionality performed by the chips on new cards. I assume the token has to be presented in order for the transaction to ever be approved. That should prevent it for ever being used for another transaction. If so, how is intercepting this token actually a vulnerability of it's already used at the time it's transmitted and would be intercepted? Shouldn't that be it's only use? Also, if that's not the case, shouldn't chip cards be vulnerable to the same attack? I thought the point of a single use token or password is that it doesn't matter if it's intercepted, because it's useless to an attacker when they intercept it.
I think you mistyped YUUGE!
Oh, man must have accidentally bumped up against the post anonymously checkbox on the mobile site again.