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Windows 10 Will Soon Run Edge In a Virtual Machine To Keep You Safe (arstechnica.com)
An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Microsoft has announced that the next major update to Windows 10 will run its Edge browser in a lightweight virtual machine. Running the update in a virtual machine will make exploiting the browser and attacking the operating system or compromising user data more challenging. Called Windows Defender Application Guard for Microsoft Edge, the new capability builds on the virtual machine-based security that was first introduced last summer in Windows 10. Windows 10's Virtualization Based Security (VBS) uses small virtual machines and the Hyper-V hypervisor to isolate certain critical data and processes from the rest of the system. The most important of these is Credential Guard, which stores network credentials and password hashes in an isolated virtual machine. This isolation prevents the popular MimiKatz tool from harvesting those password hashes. In turn, it also prevents a hacker from breaking into one machine and then using stolen credentials to spread to other machines on the same network. Credential Guard's virtual machine is very small and lightweight, running only a relatively simple process to manage credentials. Application Guard will go much further by running large parts of the Edge browser within a virtual machine. This virtual machine won't, however, need a full operating system running inside it -- just a minimal set of Windows features required to run the browser. Because Application Guard is running in a virtual machine it will have a much higher barrier between it and the host platform. It can't see other processes, it can't access local storage, it can't access any other installed applications, and, critically, it can't attack the kernel of the host system. In its first iteration, Application Guard will only be available for Edge. Microsoft won't provide an API or let other applications use it. As with other VBS features, Application Guard will also only be available to users of Windows 10 Enterprise, with administrative control through group policies. Administrators will be able to mark some sites as trusted, and those sites won't use the virtual machine. Admins also be able to control whether untrusted sites can use the clipboard or print.
Hooray! A security feature exclusive to Windows 10 Enterprise customers. That will substantially cut down on the actual difference this makes.
All applications should be sandboxed. The kernel should be sandboxed.
“He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
remember the days Microsoft said they cannot separate the browser. now they are forced to from a security standpoint
You could do this on linux if you wanted. Using a tool like firejail, you can run all your software in lightweight sandboxes (linux namespaces). It comes with custom profiles for 100+ desktop/server applications and it's easy to write more. I wouldn't recommend converting all of /usr/bin to run under firejail as this would certainly cause issues but, I run all my desktop applications with it and it's worked well.
I know this is Slashdot and it's essentially illegal to say "good" and "Microsoft" in the same sentence but, "good". I don't plan on using Edge any time soon but I still applaud any security based efforts made by mainstream OS vendors, that can help improve things. I know this won't stop idiots downloading "movie.torrent.exe" and running it but at least it will significantly cut down on drive by downloads of malware through hacked ad servers and out of date Flash. That's got to be a good thing.
I've got a more secure solution.
I'll only let Edge run on other people's computers.
I'm a dreamer, the world is my playpen. But hey, I'm a serious person, I can't dream all the time.
There used to a disclaimer every time an older VM program ran, I think it was "bochs", which told the user that a VM is not security.
It only gives you the illusion of it.
In reality the VM software has to get it's hooks so deep into the hosts networking and other sensitive bits that you can never be sure that software running on the client can't get up to nasty tricks on the host.
If you want security design for security instead of taking the lazy way out of using something completely different done by someone else and pretend that partial separation for totally different reasons is equivalent to security.
It's just like expecting to enter a Ford Bronco is a horse race. The name makes it sound like it belongs but it's not the same thing and was never intended to be.
A good start. But I run the Windows virtual machine inside a virtual machine, because Windows 10 can not be trusted. I don't store any personal information on it, and use it just for games.
Windows runs BETTER virtualized, because it has simpler hardware, that Microsoft programmers can understand.
No running for driver CD's, or having Windows brick my machine.
I can roll back updates just by copying a file.
The way Windows should be run.
Virtualization != sandboxing. You can sandbox on Windows with SandboxIE, where all writes from the sandboxed app are redirected elsewhere. Doing this doesn't require a separate OS or filesystem, so it doesn't add that context shifting as overhead.
You can also run your Web browser in a VM. You get better separation, but at a price, although with hypervisors becoming the norm and not the exception, running VMs may not have as onerous a penalty as they used to.
I like a combination of the two. I like browser windows and tabs separated from each other, like what Chrome/Chromium does, but the browser should run in its own VM so if something does get out of the browser, it is in a completely separate user and machine context. Without the VM isolation, even if malware just has context of a user, that can allow files to be uploaded and ransomware to do its dirty work.
Jails are another solution, but it can be argued that it might be best to completely isolate filesystems, especially if some software decides to do stuff like mkdir foo; cd foo loops, or just create tons of files in order to use up all inodes. Done on a VM, worst case, it means one dumps the VM and rolls back. Done on a desktop, it can mean work stoppage.